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Articles

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-- Kailing Xie

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The Favourable Partner: An Analysis of Lianhe Zaobao’s Representation of China in Southeast Asia
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Free Trade, Yes; Ideology, Not So Much: The UK’s Shifting China Policy 2010-16
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Book review
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Editors’ Introduction

We are pleased to start 2018 with a new issue of JBACS. From now on we will be publishing twice per year, making this the first issue of the eighth volume, and marking a slight shift in the way we number the journal to reflect its now regular, biannual character.

JBACS aims to publish the best research in Chinese Studies—a term that may not necessarily reflect the institutional or disciplinary affiliations of our authors. Research in Chinese Studies can address a wide variety of topics and timeframes; it can also employ a wealth of different methodologies. What qualifies something as Chinese Studies research is the centrality of Chinese-language sources, be they written documents, interviews, or images. The new issue presents excellent examples of the diversity of Chinese Studies in the UK.

The issue opens with an article by Kailing Xie, the winner of the 2017 BACS Early Career Researcher Prize. Her article on premarital abortion among China’s “privileged daughters” is based on in-depth interviews and explores attitudes towards premarital sex and abortion in the context of an increasingly sexualized popular culture. Like Pamela Hunt’s winning paper the previous year, her article earned the rare accolade of being “publishable as is”, requiring only the minutest of corrections. Congratulations on a wonderful achievement. William Matthews’s article was the runner-up in the 2017 ECR competition, and constitutes a hugely impressive piece of sinological research on the Yijing. Focusing on hexagram images as two distinct, but interrelated, forms of analogy, and by adopting perspectives from cognitive linguistics and anthropology, Matthews’s article constitutes a significant contribution to the debate about the “correlative cosmology” of the Yijing. It is extremely pleasing to work with such talented early career researchers, and to support them in bringing their publications out so quickly in this way.
These articles are joined by two more pieces that focus on the world of international relations, and China’s place in it. Daniel Hammond’s piece focuses on how China and Southeast Asia are represented in Singapore’s media, focusing on *Lianhe zaobao*. His research shows that while the Singaporean media reports on China in a positive light regarding bilateral relations, there is a clear willingness to raise awareness of the broader regional challenges of China’s rise. Scott Brown’s article puts the spotlight on the direction of the UK’s China policy since 2010, asking how apt the UK’s previous label of “ideological free trader” remains under the Conservative government.

We also want to alert our readers that the **2018 BACS Early Career Researcher Prize** is now open. The prize invites early career researchers to submit an original research paper for consideration. This may be on any arts, humanities or social science topic to do with traditional or modern China, broadly conceived. All submissions must involve original research on China or Chinese-language sources, and engage with relevant academic literature in Chinese Studies. The winner will receive: publication of the winning paper in *Journal of the British Association for Chinese Studies* (JBACS), subject to satisfactory revision according to judging panel recommendations; a cash prize of £250; reimbursement of travel costs to the 2018 annual BACS conference to be held at Kings College London (12-14 September 2018); as well as mention on the BACS website and in the BACS Bulletin. Detailed information has already been circulated via the BACS mailing list and BACS social media accounts; it can also be found here: [http://bacsuk.org.uk/ecr-prize](http://bacsuk.org.uk/ecr-prize).

JBACS is a double-blind peer-reviewed, fully open access journal, which relies entirely on voluntary work by the editors and peer reviewers. Following the formalisation by the BACS Council of the terms and conditions for JBACS editorship, one **editor position** is coming up for replacement at the end of this academic year. We will soon send out invitations for an expression of interest to take up the (unpaid) position of editor of JBACS and work alongside the existing editorial team. We are looking for an established academic with substantive experience in reviewing research for journals, academic presses and research funders, and a proven ability to engage with Chinese-language-based research that may come from a wide range of disciplines. Ideally, this person should be based at a UK institution in order to be able to attend editorial
meetings, most of which coincide with BACS Council meetings. If you would like to know more before committing a formal expression of interest, you are welcome to contact either of the editors directly.

In order to alleviate the load of the editors, the BACS Council has generously agreed to fund an **editorial assistant** to support the editors one day a month (eight hours). We are looking for an enthusiastic PhD student or post-doc with excellent command of English, who would like to learn about editorial processes by aiding the editors in their correspondence with peer reviewers and authors. Please look out for an advertisement, which will land in your inbox shortly!

And, finally, we welcome your feedback on the journal. If you do have any comments or suggestions for future special issues, please do get in touch.

*Gerda Wielander and Sarah Dauncey*
Premarital Abortion—What is the Harm? The Responsibilisation of Women’s Pregnancy Among China’s “Privileged” Daughters

Kailing Xie
The University of York

Abstract

In the West, women’s safe access to abortion services is central to the debate around reproductive freedom. In China, easy access to abortion arrived hand-in-hand with the one-child policy in 1979 as part of the Party-state’s birth control programme. Based on interviews with 31 women and 11 men from the well-educated 1980s generation, and using vignettes to explore attitudes towards premarital sex and abortion in the context of an increasingly sexualized popular culture, and the acceptability of premarital sex but lack of safe sex knowledge, I illustrate a strictly moralised discourse around female sexuality, where the normalisation of abortion practice does not translate into public acceptance of premarital abortion for women. I argue that the responsibilisation of women’s pregnancy reflects persistent patriarchal values and the state’s regulatory power over women’s reproductive bodies. While the heterosexual family remains the only legitimate site for reproduction, Chinese women’s reproductive freedom is subjugated to the priority of maintaining social stability. Hence, permissiveness over premarital abortion should not be simply understood as moral approval of abortion practice, but reflects pragmatic attitudes under a restrictive regime. I further argue that the Chinese case shows that a more nuanced, contextualised approach to understanding reproductive rights is necessary.

Keywords: China, one-child policy, premarital abortion, responsible motherhood, sexual morality, state.

China’s “opening-up” policy has been accompanied by change in the country’s sexual climate since 1979. In addition to economic reform, the implementation of the one-child policy also helped separate sex from reproduction, as it promoted the use of contraception among married couples, indicating that sex for love and pleasure are important in marital relationships (Pan, 2006; Jeffreys & Yu, 2015). The liberalisation of social and sexual mores has manifested itself
in many ways, such as increased acceptance of premarital sex, the proliferation of pornography and prostitution, a rising divorce rate and private permissiveness towards extramarital sex (Jeffreys, 2004, 2006; Jeffreys & Yu, 2015; Pan, 1994; Xiao et al., 2011; Zarafonetis, 2014; Zha & Geng, 1992; Zheng, 2006).

Despite a gradual loosening of restrictions on personal sexual pleasure and desire (Evans, 1997; Jeffreys & Yu, 2015; Pei et al., 2007; Ruan & Matsumura, 1991; Wang & Ho, 2011), the Chinese government is still constantly trying to curb these less predictable social consequences through various measures in order to maintain control—for example, through visible nationwide campaigns against pornography and prostitution, which have led to numerous arrests (Ruan & Matsumura, 1991), and debate on the legal regulation of sex-related bribery and corruption among government officials (Jeffreys, 2006). Besides, public discourse around sexuality and sexual conduct remains heavily moralised, such as through the Party-state’s promotion of “socialist morality”, and monitored, so as to maintain social stability (Zarafonetis, 2014). This state-sponsored moralisation of individual behaviours is shown through public condemnation and punishment of Party officials who were caught having extramarital affairs, and an emphasis on the importance of “moral character” when appointing government officials (Emia, 2015; Xinhua wang, 2012),¹ as well as banning youth literature because of its sexually charged content (Weber, 2002). The “abstinence” attitude has generally been dominant in Chinese sex education since 1949 (Aresu, 2009; McMillan, 2006), as conservative educators worried that public exposition of sex-related knowledge would encourage young people to engage in promiscuous behaviour (Burton, 1988; Honig & Hershatter, 1988; Honig, 2003; Wang & Wang, 2012). As a result, the conservative tone around sex and sexuality from the Party-state was reaffirmed, which remains some distance from people’s lived reality in the reform era.

Major public debate on sex education did not erupt until March 2017, when a news item about a newly-published sex education textbook triggered

¹ News reports within and outside China have shown sexual bribery and scandals to be rampant among high-ranking officials: officially adultery is deemed intolerable and punishable according to the CCP’s disciplinary regulations, and can lead to expulsion (Emia, 2015).
widespread online debate (Koetse, 2017). The official media called on the public to desensitize children’s sex education—citing rising numbers of premarital abortions and an increase in the number of cases of sexual violation of underage children in recent years as evidence of the need to change (Lü, 2017). This most recent debate around sex education reveals the massive gap, and tension, between realism and moralism on this matter. One of the consequences of loosening sexual morality coupled with the lack of sex education is an increase in the number of unplanned premarital pregnancies, most of which are terminated (Cao, 2015).

Abortion is framed as a remedial measure in the national population control programme (Nie, 2005). Cao (2015) cites statistics from the National Family Planning Research Institute, from 2014, to show that China performs the most terminations in the world, while large numbers of non-surgical abortions are left undocumented. Though one could attribute the figure partly to the strict implementation of the birth control policy, the prevalence of unplanned pregnancies among unmarried young women that lead to abortions is not news to the public (QQNews, 2015; Wang, 2015; Liu, 2015). According to national statistics, there has been a notable increase in induced abortions in recent years: 6,000,000 in total from 2000 to 2003, and 8,000,000 in 2003-2007, which rose to 9,170,000 in 2008 (Wu & Qiu, 2010). Women aged below 25, without a history of pregnancy, accounted for nearly half of these numbers. A large unmet need for temporary methods of contraception in urban areas of China has been identified as the reason behind the large number of unplanned pregnancies and induced abortions for unmarried women (Xu et al., 2004).

In this paper, I draw on research with young educated professionals to highlight the gap between the distant official Party line and people’s lived reality. I illustrate a strictly moralised discourse around female sexuality under the Party-state’s promotion of “socialist morality”, where the normalisation of abortion as a practice does not translate into public acceptance of premarital abortion for women. Through analysing narratives about the stigma attached to premarital abortion and women’s interpretation of “responsible motherhood”, I reveal how they navigate such moralised tensions in contemporary China. In so doing, I highlight how the responsibilisation of women’s pregnancy bears
specific Chinese characteristics. I begin by describing the study from which the data is drawn.

**Methodology**

Previous research on abortion in China has mainly been conducted from the reproductive health perspective using demographic statistics or medical documents, and has lacked a perspective on gender. The data included in this paper derives from a study investigating the gendered lives of China’s privileged daughters: well-educated, female only-children from urban China born in the 1980s. Adopting a feminist approach, it places an emphasis on women’s life experience to understand women’s issues from their own perspective (Letherby, 2003). I use qualitative methods, specifically in-depth interviews, to make the individual’s case visible and make the rich description of women’s own experiences and interpretations possible (Rubin & Rubin, 2012).

Snowball and convenience sampling methods through existing social networks were used, which has been proven effective in China’s relation-based society (Liu, 2007). In total, I carried out interviews with 31 women and 11 men. My female participants were at various life stages, including those who were single, in a relationship, married without children, married with children, two pregnant mothers and one divorced mother. None of my male participants had children, but two were engaged and three were married. Despite some differences in their income levels, they were all employed fulltime, in various white-collar professions, and included teachers, bank managers, government employees, and office staff in private firms. All were university educated, and ranged from bachelor’s to master’s degree holders, plus one PhD researcher. My interview questions were designed to probe people’s attitudes towards sex, abortion, reproduction, homosexuality and virginity, which are still relatively sensitive topics and are not often discussed even among friends. Therefore, several vignettes were shown to participants on these topics. Jackson et al. (2016: 37) describe vignettes as “mini-narratives or scenarios, usually centred on a problem or dilemma facing an imaginary protagonist, designed to elicit responses on what a person would or should do in the situation depicted”. Contextual information provided in vignettes, instead of seeking participants’
views in the abstract, allows for the recognition that “meanings are social and morality may be situationally specific” (Finch 1987: 106, cited in Jackson et al., 2016). This is a more subtle approach than simply asking people outright about views that might be personally sensitive, and has proved successful for my project.

The Under-Discussed Reality: Premarital Sex

The increased acceptance of premarital sex among the public is shown through a survey conducted in 1989 and 1990, which included 23,000 people from 15 provinces; the majority (86%) approved of this practice (Burton, 1990). In an interview with the BBC, Li Yinhe, China’s first female sexologist, compares figures in her surveys on the number of people who engage in premarital sex, showing a sharp increase between 1989 and 2014, with the percentage rising from 15.5% to 71% (Buckley, 2016). Despite lacking much comprehensive sex education, many scholars have noted the increasingly liberal attitudes and practices of sex and sexuality among Chinese youth, including casual sex, non-conjugal sex, commercial sex and homosexuality (Farrer, 2002; Huang et al., 2009; Zhang, 2011). China’s youth-led “sexual revolution” has been through three stages since reforms commenced: from the re-emergence of romantic love in the early reform era, moving to the 1990s’ awakening of female desires, to the new millennium’s pleasure-centred sexual practices that have become valued as a means of enhancing individual happiness (Zhang, 2011).

Against this backdrop, premarital cohabitation has also become more common among many well-educated young people (Yu, 2009). Meanwhile, the rising number of induced abortions among unmarried women, and the increasing risk of sexually transmitted diseases, have highlighted the urgent need to improve sexual health and promote sex education among Chinese youth (Ma et al., 2006; Ma et al., 2009). The recent change of tone on sex education at school, which represents a more open attitude, could be read as a response to these challenges.

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2 Though the concept of “youth” varies in different contexts, in China today, the post-1990s and post-1980s generations are often referred to as the “younger generation” (Jeffreys & Yu, 2015).
All of my participants described premarital sex as “very common” or “too normal” among couples, which confirms other scholars’ findings, even though a few people said that they personally did not agree with it. Nonetheless, they also stressed the importance of responsibility in sexual relationships. For them, premarital sex, including cohabitation, could be justified as part of marriage preparation. As long as marriage is on the table, sex is excusable. This indicates that the moral justification for sex has extended from strictly within marriage to marriage in prospect. Nevertheless, it is not without need of moral justification, at least in public. Research from the 1990s suggested that sex before marriage was harmful in many ways, particularly to young women, as husbands were unforgiving and “easily disgusted by promiscuous women” (Chen 1998: 48, cited in McMillan, 2006: 64). Although it has become more common, there is little sign of change in the official attitude from research conducted in the 1990s. Authority figures, including parents and schoolteachers, have attempted to control pre-marital sex in ways that include warning of its dangers to implementing disciplinary measures (Farrer, 2002).

My participants’ general tolerance towards premarital sex does not necessarily mean that everyone sees it as a positive thing worth promoting. Similar views are voiced by both genders. Maomaocong and Muyu made it clear that premarital sex is not for them. Though viewed as a “common phenomenon” (Theodone, male) by all, its semi-secrecy is also evident.

Tj: How to put it … things like sex before marriage, everybody does it. But when it needs to be discussed at the table, people still feel it is not a good thing. Though people are already doing it, if you really ask them to discuss it openly, there are many people who would find it shameful to admit it.
Me: Really?
Tj: I feel it is such a private thing. Maybe in China, traditionally speaking, you should not have sex before marriage.

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3 All participants’ names have been replaced by pseudonyms. Unless specified as male, they are female.
Tj’s narrative reflects the tension of living between realism and moralism regarding individual sexual conduct; maintaining secrecy seems to be the best adaptation. By doing so, the public moral standard remains intact, and face is saved for both the individual and the families involved. More importantly, they can avoid the social sanctions that come from overtly challenging the establishment.

**Women as Tension Bearers**

Facing the increasingly common practice of premarital sex and the moralised public sexual discourse, how do young Chinese women navigate their path? For women like Maomaocong and Muyu, insistence on avoiding sex before being legally married arguably comes from a sense of self-protection. Officially, virginity is required from both sexes, but responsibility has been left mainly with women to protect their sexual purity due to the generally accepted, naturalized understanding of the male sexual drive as uncontrollable (Evans, 1997; Pei et al., 2007). A decent woman, who is expected to be passive in sex, cannot be led by her own desires. Hence, she is supposed to regulate her own behaviour according to society’s moral boundaries. Liu’s study on white-collar women in Chinese organizations shows that women’s sexual reputations are heavily moralised and are tied closely to their social status, which constrains their agency (Liu, 2017). Hence, it is understandable that women would try to defend their sexual reputation through various means. When knowledge of safe sex practices is not sufficiently provided, the most secure option is to not be involved in sex, or at least to not make one’s sexual life public. Xiaozhu commented: “I think it is best not to live together, because, it ultimately hurts the woman.” Her suggestion can be understood as having a double meaning: first, it reduces the physical risk of involvement in premarital sex that might lead to unwanted pregnancy. Second, at least it reduces her reputational risk by avoiding being seen by others. However, even for women who want to avoid premarital sex, it can be difficult.

Joyce: Cohabitation is so common! I feel in many cases, it is not women who initiate it. Because biologically speaking, female ... more often it is men who ask to sleep together. But if the woman wants to keep the man,
she might have to cooperate. I see it is quite common around me. Basically, those who eventually got married, they lived together or had sex before that.

Lulu: It is too common and difficult to avoid! Because now men would use all sorts of excuses and strategies to ask you to sleep with them, saying that if you love me, you should have sex with me. But in fact, 80% of girls paid a high price because of it. Surely there are also 20%, who obtained marital happiness because of it. It is rare, I feel personally. It is up to your luck.

In both Lulu and Joyce’s accounts, it is male sexual desire that appears active and dominant, whereas women’s sexual desire appears invisible. Her sexuality is portrayed as a means to “keep” the man, with marriage as her happy ending. The universality of marriage for Chinese youth, with women facing a harsher reality in the marriage market, is widely observed in the “shengnü” (leftover women) phenomenon (To, 2013; Fincher, 2016). Under pressure to marry, women face a “double risk” in either choice regarding premarital sex. No matter how strategic an individual woman is in navigating her way through this scenario, it would be unrealistic to assume that every woman has the means to defend herself throughout.

As a result of strictly implementing family planning policies, China has become the world’s leader in contraception usage (United Nations, 2015; Sivelle, 2005). In sharp contrast to the high Contraception Prevalence Rate among married women (89%), contraception usage among sexually active unmarried women in China has remained extremely low, with more than 25% relying on less effective contraceptive methods such as rhythm and withdrawal, which has led to an annual induced abortion rate of approximately 20% among those women (Li et al., 2013). A combination of social and economic factors have been identified to explain this (Sivelle, 2005; Xiao et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2004; Zheng et al., 2001). The breakdown of different contraception measures (United Nations, 2015) shows a very low level of pill usage, and a comparatively more common male condom usage in China, which gives women little autonomy in contraception and helps account for the prevalence of abortion. Ironically, women are commonly blamed for contraception failure, as the following responses to a vignette reveal.
Vignette A: Xiaozhen recently found herself pregnant, but she and her boyfriend are not suitable for marriage. What would you suggest?

Joyce’s comments reflect my participants’ typical reaction to this case:

Joyce: I feel it is such a stupid situation. Very stupid! ... I would ask both of them whether they would be willing to get married and raise the child together. I won’t suggest that they end a life if it is not absolutely necessary.

Me: Why you think the situation is stupid?

Joyce: Because I feel if you are not ready to get married, why would you … have sex with no protection! Fine, a lot times it might be the man … he didn’t protect the woman. It shows that he is very selfish, right? If you sincerely want to be with a woman, you should treat her as your wife-to-be, your fiancée. Then you should have protected her from this. Second, as a woman why didn’t you protect yourself? Maybe women are vulnerable in sexual relationships; she is at the receiving end of it. Maybe she didn’t know how. Then she suffers from her own ignorance. If she knows but still had sex without protection, I can only say that she is too submissive in the relationship!

Joyce’s answer is telling in several ways: first, it reveals the taken-for-granted belief among my participants that having children born within marriage is “a happy ending for the couple” (Quennie). Hence, Yimi’s comment, “Let them get married!” (followed by laughter) is often considered an ideal solution. Second, premarital sex is acceptable if the man treats her as his “fiancée”, which indicates the importance of the marriage prospect in justifying similar dilemmas like cohabitation and pregnancy. Finally, once contraception fails, it is the woman’s own fault, as she is either “too stupid” and “ignorant”, or “too submissive”.

Xiaozhu also believes: “Girls should be responsible for the consequences of abortion. She failed to take ‘her own’ responsibility to treat herself with respect and take herself seriously”. For her, women who fail to live up to society’s sexual moral standards deserve the consequences. Whereas “men are just men. This is his nature. You cannot control men; you can only control yourself”. Due to the
embedded understanding of the naturalized male sexual drive and a moralised female sexuality, women are expected to take both responsibility and the blame. The overwhelming consensus among my participants is that there are only two feasible options for women in this scenario: marriage or abortion.

**Abortion in Contemporary China**

Official attitudes to abortion have also been through radical changes since the establishment of the PRC in 1949. The regulation of abortion has changed according to the demands of the Party-state’s population policy. When population growth was viewed as good for national defence and economic development, between 1950 and 1956, strict administrative procedures restricted abortion (Nie, 2005). The gradual removal of legal limits on abortion since the late 1970s resulted from the Party-state’s ambition to control its population by implementing the national birth planning and control policy (Nie, 2005, 2010). To achieve this, women have reportedly undergone coercive measures from sterilisation to forced abortion regardless of their gestation stages (Greenhalgh, 2005; Nie, 2005), though officially and euphemistically, abortion is described as a remedial measure.

The controversial one-child policy came to an end at the beginning of 2016 as China found itself facing a looming population structure crisis (Xinhua wang, 2015). Despite all the policy changes mentioned, the ethos remains the same: the Party-state’s attempts to control reproduction to suit its agenda, under which the abstract collective is deployed as the official moral discourse to justify the absolute submission of individual interests to state power. Relevant Western values and ethics, and traditional customs and norms that are not in accord with the present policy, are officially dismissed or condemned (Nie, 2005). Scholars have criticised the lack of consideration for women’s right to choose, and the right of the foetus to life, in the policy (Aird, 1994; Mosher, 1983, 1993). Yet paradoxically, Chinese women do not have to fight for their choice of abortion or face social stigma like their peers in many other jurisdictions, where such choices provoke strong moral controversy (Sumner, 2014).
Caño (2015) argues that the notion of “glorious motherhood” is constructed to justify the state’s use of women’s fertility as a platform to achieve its population goals. Unlike the official praise for abortion within marriage, the abortion law construes premarital sex as a legal taboo for women, which in turns reflects the “social taboos” of premarital sex and premarital fertility in China (Li & Liu, 2004). Though abortion is widely practiced in China, this does not translate into public acceptance of premarital abortion for women. To avoid the disgrace of premarital fertility attached to women and their families observed by Guo (2012), women are more likely to hide away from family and friends instead of seeking their help (Pu, 2013). The legal restriction of the state-funded abortion services to married women means large numbers of economically disadvantaged unmarried women have to turn to unlawful abortions, which are highly likely to be unreliable and dangerous for their health. The double social and legal taboo can leave them vulnerable.

**Damaging the Reproductive Body**

The idea that “abortion damages a girl’s body” repeatedly occurs in my participants’ accounts. The blurred linguistic boundary between a woman’s own body and the “bone and flesh” she carries can literally mean in Chinese terms that abortion is easily read as an “unnatural” intrusion. Hence, even without an established understanding of a foetus as having its own moral and legal status that is independent of the women before birth, women’s embodiment of pregnancy makes it hard to separate the “harm” to this “bone and flesh” from her own health. Nevertheless, the physical harm referred to by many of my participants also indicated the fear of damaging the reproductive body. Xiaozhu warns that “abortion does not negatively affect men, but it does affect women, especially her body. For some people, it might mean lifelong infertility. I would say a woman should avoid abortion if she can.” In addition, common stories of spontaneous miscarriage after bad abortion experiences circulating among friends serve as warnings for women.

Lulu is the only woman who shared her own abortion experience, as she was married when it happened, which legitimised it: “For two years after that, I miscarried three or four times. I was unable to keep them.” Qincai, an unmarried woman, used her friend’s similar experience to make the same point:
She is an older mum, and had her first child when she was over 30. She told me that she had abortions several times before that. Then it caused several miscarriages afterwards. When she was one month pregnant, she took time off to keep the baby. She lay in bed all day; it seemed that she would start to bleed once she stood up. The doctor told her it was the result of her previous abortions, which damaged her body. So I think one should avoid this situation when you are not ready.

Qincai stressed that “I have not had such an experience”. Her deliberate distancing of herself from premarital abortion again indicates the taboo nature of this topic. Safeguarding the reproductive body is the main concern in the bodily damage narratives. It illustrates the tight association of Chinese womanhood with maternity. As a result, despite the fact that abortion has little negative effect on women’s subsequent fertility and is even safer than childbirth (Rowlands, 2011), the fear that they might lose their reproductive ability remains strong.

**Women as “Devalued Property”**

Regardless of whether or not the experience of abortion leaves a mark on women’s physical bodies, it certainly negatively affects her marriage prospects. Using the following vignette, I was able to understand the evolved “virginity complex” in contemporary China’s dating scene.4

Vignette B: Chenlu and her boyfriend decided to get married after living together for a while. But her boyfriend found out that she had an abortion with her ex-boyfriend. He is bothered about her past. What do you think?

The answers show that this phenomenon is very common.

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4 According to Wang and Ho (2011), the female virginity complex (chunü qingjie 处女情结) is a popular term used to describe how the “fetish of female virginity” remains strong for young Chinese men and women.
Maomacong: It is certain that the man won’t be happy about it. Abortion before marriage in China indeed is a bad thing. It is normal that he holds a grudge against her.
Me: Is it common for men to mind in such a situation?
Tj: Sure! They even mind if you are not a virgin! [Laughter.]

Though female chastity does not hold the same repressive institutionalized power anymore, as premarital sex is commonly practiced, it still exerts considerable influence on the Chinese psyche. The symbolic importance of women’s chastity, reflected in the “female virginity complex”, in contemporary Chinese date and marriage selection, remains strong (Wang & Ho, 2011; Zhou, 1989). Lulu’s answer below indicates that the “boundary” of chastity is fluid and contested, facing social changes: losing virginity now is less bad than having an abortion for unmarried women. Despite that, the devaluation of women remains the same.

Lulu: It is perfectly normal for men to care about women’s abortion history! Now we have a saying: in the past, it is said that you must save your virginity for your husband; whereas now, you should guarantee that your first child is your husband’s.

Scholars have found plenty of evidence to show the persistence of double standards across cultures, despite the boundary of sexual virtue having been redrawn (Jackson et al., 2013; Jackson & Scott, 2010; Ho & Tsang, 2005, 2012). How women are judged in the Chinese context illuminates this sexual double standard (Jackson & Cram, 2003), which continues to objectify women under the persistent patriarchal value system. D explains how the gendered difference is played out in the marriage market:

Me: How do you see the consequences for both men and women after an abortion?
D: It is different. For men, there might be some moral criticism at most, but there won’t be any practical social rejection of him. He might become less popular in the marriage market. People might think he is cold-hearted. But if he is willing to repent and tell his new girlfriend: “I didn’t love her enough at that time, but I love you very much”, most
people would accept him again. Whereas, if a girl had an abortion, and it was known by others, it would be much harsher! Many men absolutely cannot accept a girl who had an abortion with another man. Furthermore, as a friend of this girl, I would not set her up with any of my friends. Because I would worry that if one day my male friend found out, it would end our friendship. He might blame me for giving him something bad. Even if I do introduce her to somebody, it won’t be my good friends and I won’t tell him the truth. I don’t want to take the responsibility for covering up the fact. Because men do mind!

D’s honest answer not only highlights the sharp contrast in consequences for men and women, it also demonstrates how women’s sexual experiences are understood as a moral marker for drawing binary images of the good/bad girl. Her abortion experience makes her “less complete and pure” and thus not presentable in the market. Chain’s explanation further demonstrates the objectification of the female body as a commodity that needs to be kept intact.

Chain: I think men would mind this. Because abortion is like ... I am not sure how to put it. I feel they might see girls who had an abortion ... they become somehow different. It seems they are broken. Men cannot be broken in this way.

Furthermore, a striking metaphor shared by both Lixia and Lisi illustrates vividly that the continuous objectification of the female body in Chinese marriage transactions is common knowledge: “People might not mind buying a second-hand property, but they do mind buying a house in which somebody had died.” This metaphor paints plainly the cruel reality: nearly one hundred years after the abolishment of arranged marriage on a monetary basis, Chinese women can still be subjected to objectification, such that men can pick and choose them, like property. The invisibility of men, contrasted with the concentrated judgment imposed on women, reflects the persistent patriarchal value system that continues to give men the voice and choice as a subject, but presents women as objects that are subject to men’s choice. It further mirrors the invisibility of the internalised male dominance in contemporary Chinese patriarchy, which treats a woman’s reproductive body as an object, and hence potentially degrades her full humanity.
The Implications of Sexual Double Standards

Facing a heavily moralised public discourse on female sexuality, Chinese women’s compliance with societal expectations concerning her sexual behaviour is closely tied to her social standing.

Xiaoliu: It happens within my family. My uncle’s daughter, she has not been good at school and has had lots of boyfriends. I heard she also had an abortion more than once. From my point of view, I do not agree with her behaviour. Because I feel as a girl, she is unable to behave in a respectable way. If one cannot respect oneself, how can she expect others to love her? Right? So I do not agree with abortion. You should prevent it from the beginning. Why wait until it has happened?!

Xiaoliu’s description of her cousin as “not good at school”, as having had “lots of boyfriends”, and as having “had an abortion more than once” reflects the expectations surrounding a decent girl’s behaviour in Chinese society: she needs to be good at school, have no boyfriends during her school years, and to preferably remain a virgin (Evans, 1997; Xiao, 1989). She is not only blamed for contraceptive failure, but is also portrayed as not respectable. Based on her behaviour, she does not deserve to be respected or loved. Hence, any subsequent social punishment is justifiable. My participants often gave examples of the public discourse describing such women as “morally loose and improper” (Maomaocong) and “like girls from outside” (Lili). Tracing back to China’s gender segregation, which existed until the late Qing dynasty, women who exposed themselves to the outside world were not considered respectable (Mann, 2011). Hence “girls from the outside” connotes “morally loose and improper”. Such damage to women’s reputations would directly result in them being disadvantaged in the marriage market, where all of them are expected to perform well. Xiaozhu’s comments below further pinpoint how Chinese women’s sexuality is strictly moralised and commodified.

Xiaozhu: Plus, people might think that if you are married once, you may try to find a man to marry again! Definitely, a man would consider your abortion history … you might not be able to bear children after that!
Furthermore, you failed to behave in a respectable way even before marriage. How would you be afterwards?!

Xiaozhu equates women who have had an abortion with divorcees, which highlights their devaluation in the marriage market. Moreover, she also points out the moral concern for such women as untrustworthy, and as failing to demonstrate desired female chastity, which would directly reduce her bargaining power in partner selection.

In sharp contrast to the woman’s moralised body, my participants all agree that men have it easy, though they struggle to comprehend the reason. Chain: “People do not gossip about men in this scenario. I also do not know why they never talk about men.” It is the consensus that men are often invisible even in gossip, whereas women become an easy target.

Lily: If I say it bluntly, he just played a bit. Nothing serious would happen to him. If he doesn't want to be responsible, he can totally be let off the hook. Society will not pick on him, whereas the girl will be the target of all arrows. They will judge her morally, and say things like she doesn’t protect herself or gossip, saying she is one of those girls from outside.

The sexual double standard is made explicit here. She is blamed for all the failures, while the man’s marriage prospect can remain largely intact. Lulu: “But in reality, I discover that many girls … never married and never had children, and still accept men like my ex-husband. I really do not understand.” The active sexual life of a man is often read as “normal”, and is easily laughed off.

Xiaoliu: People think it is normal for men to have many women in their lives. People might only comment that he is fickle in love.
Maomaocong: It doesn't matter to men. Seriously, they might laugh at men, but discriminate against women instead.

A few mentioned the moral guilt a man might feel, but also said that it strongly depended on the individual. For women, there could be multiple layers of guilt coming from both public condemnation and from within themselves.
Tina: She would have to wait and see whether this man can gradually accept it [his girlfriend’s abortion history]. I think the woman herself might also feel guilt towards her current boyfriend. She might think of herself as constantly owing him something, these kinds of mentality, etc.

Women often internalise the sexual double standard and feel guilty of not being able to present themselves as “pure and complete” to their husband-to-be, worrying that they might not be able to bear a child for him. Living under such a moralised discourse of female sexuality, the emotional stress women need to go through in this scenario is widely acknowledged by my participants as a form of “double damage”.

Lilin: For girls, it is double damage. First, damage to her body is unavoidable. Then it hits her psychologically as well as emotionally. It doesn’t follow the normal sequence and is not ideal for how things should be after all.

Lilin indicates the power of a normalised “ideal” life trajectory that one should follow: marriage first, then childbirth. Chain further illuminates the disadvantageous position women face.

Chain: She might think now she has even had an abortion for this man. Therefore, she would naturally have more expectations of him [expectation of marriage]. If any change of circumstance occurs between them [i.e. they split up], then she might feel even more hurt.

As the power of women starts to decline following their loss of virginity (Xiao, 1989), women face a more precarious situation when it comes to maintaining power in heterosexual relationships, when premarital sex becomes prevalent. Though she could use her sexuality to keep a man, ironically it simultaneously increases the risk of her ending up in an even weaker position: pregnant without securing a marriage. In this scenario, her agency is constrained in front of a powerful conventional discourse of female chastity. The sexual double standard silences her. Secrecy becomes her last resort to shed the stigma, as recommended by many, in order to fulfil the universal marriage expectation facing Chinese youth. The amount of emotional stress women face is obvious.
Nie (2005) reveals that the public silence on abortion practiced under the one-child policy, which is commonly interpreted in the West as China’s moral ambiguity on abortion (Aird, 1990), often hides a diversity of views regarding foetal life and the morality of abortion. Similarly, among my participants, behind the consensus on abortion as the last remedy, concerns about the foetus’s right to life with reference to religious beliefs, were also mentioned by a few.

Yimi: Let them get married! [Laughter.] First, she should not have an abortion. I am a Buddhist. I think having abortion will make you end up in hell.
Lijun: Because that is also a life. I feel it is a gift from God. It is a life! You won’t easily kill a kitten or a puppy, how can you kill a human life?

Though officially declared an atheist country, scholars have reported a gradual religious revival since the economic reforms were initiated (Lai, 2005; Potter, 2003; Yang, 2011). Among my sample, the hesitation to take a life was expressed by only four women, which remains the minority. No matter how vague the influence of religion was on the decision to have an abortion or not, their concern about taking the foetus’s life signals another dilemma that could make women experience internal emotional torment. Nevertheless, in the future, the main concern of women facing this scenario is damaging the prospect of future motherhood, expected in a patriarchal society, and not jeopardising her future husband’s masculinity or depriving him of fatherhood. It has little to do with mourning the loss of a child. On the contrary, abortion in this case is understood as part of being a responsible mother. The paradox a Chinese woman faces in this scenario is that if she chooses abortion, she is irresponsible regarding her own future fertility. However, only if she chooses abortion, is she considered responsible to the unborn child, her natal family and her own happiness in the future.

Abortion: A Responsible Choice

Despite the stigma attached to premarital abortion, all of my participants suggested having an abortion if marriage was not attainable. They acknowledged that abortion was not ideal, but necessary. Both Java and Lilin
Cao (2015) argues that due to the social stigma attached to unmarried motherhood, and administrative measures including financial punishment to prevent unauthorised parenthood, abortion becomes the only “rational and reasonable” choice for unmarried pregnant women. This justification is similar to the stigma and prejudice against unwed mothers in Japan (Hertog, 2009), as the mechanism of mixed guilt and shame explain women’s conforming behaviour. The pragmatic rationale behind the abortion decision becomes evident through their elaboration of what “responsible motherhood” is. Unlike their European and North American counterparts, among whom the moral status of the foetus could invoke strong debate, my participants’ quiet but firm decision to abort was attributed to their desire to be a responsible mother in the Chinese context. Viviankuku, a junior doctor, puts it like this:

I do not support abortion, but it doesn’t mean that you have to give birth to the child if you are pregnant. One needs to take the real case into account. Abortion is definitely bad for the girl’s body. This is for sure. But if you keep the child because you don’t want to damage your body, you are not being responsible to the unborn child.

For Viviankuku, abortion is being responsible to the unborn child, even if it sacrifices the woman’s own health. The existing public discourse that regulates childbirth within marriage illuminates the reason behind this. Children from single parent households are often portrayed as deviants and somehow lacking.

Muyu: If you keep the child, they will grow up in a single parent’s home, which will have lots of problems. If you want the kid not to suffer from the single parent influence, then you must really try hard to foster ... it would be so exhausting. So I think it is better not to have the child.

Chenchen: If the couple’s relationship is not stable enough to enter marriage, even if you keep the baby, it might not be the right environment for the child to grow up in.
Lisi: I would say have an abortion. It is not a matter of losing a life. If you cannot give the baby a good environment to grow up in, it is much better to not bring the kid into the world in the first place.

These answers reveal the general consensus that children should be born into a “normal” heterosexual family, which is the “right” and “good” environment. Otherwise, it is much better to not be born. My participants from single parent households always consciously introduced themselves as such. This indicates that the label has become embedded in their self-awareness as different from others. Though they were all born within marriage but later experienced their parents’ divorce, which is different from children born outside marriage, their deviance from the family norm still creates similar stigma. It is worth noting that children born without permission from the local family planning authorities may not be registered or treated equally until their parents pay the fines, which are imposed as punishment (Hemminki et al., 2005).

Growing up with his mother after his parents’ divorce, Roger (male) says he suffers from low self-esteem that he believes to be a common characteristic of children from single parent families: “You feel inferior … like myself. I have been trying to get over it most of my life. … The biggest thing from a single parent home is that you feel you lack security. … It has a huge impact.” D reports her experience of being told by her mother-in-law that her single parent background makes her less qualified as a marriage candidate for their son. Fully aware of the power of such stigmatization, it is understandable that women want to protect their future child from such an experience by avoiding it. Chain: “In a society like ours, I feel my child will become the target of gossip and be hurt by it. So I won’t do it.”

Single mothers are often viewed as “indiscreet and decadent” (Chenchen). People commonly equate single mothers with mistresses who plot to overthrow other people’s marriages. Practically, Chenchen noted that not registering with the government would create further problems for the child’s schooling and other activities that require legal identification. Against such a backdrop, Chenchen explains: “If a woman decides to raise a kid on her own, without having any other dodgy motivations, I personally admire her great courage.” A mother’s primary responsibility in childrearing is common knowledge in China,
particularly in providing physical care. Without the father bringing in his gendered resources (Zuo & Bian, 2001), often in financial form based on the conventional heterosexual family model, the mother faces multiple difficulties.

Lily: It seems to be the responsibility of women only. In this situation, she is left in a passive position. Really, she doesn't have much of an option, and she needs others’ help. Raising a kid is not only a matter of money, they need ... oh, this is such a complicated topic.

Western scholars have recognised the vulnerability of single mothers in many ways, including that they are more likely to suffer from low income and increased mental distress (Brown & Moran, 1997; McLanahan & Sandefur, 2009; Neises & Grüneberg, 2005; Franz et al., 2003). Premarital fertility is considered a disgrace for both Chinese women and their families (Guo, 2012). Facing low public tolerance, no wonder Lily adds that “it depends on whether her families are willing to confront the rest of society or not.” Though this sounds dramatic, it highlights the tension. A woman’s decision to become a single mother does not only matter for her own life, but also affects her family’s social standing, which presents another dilemma that she will feel responsible for. Even though she has adequate resources to raise healthy children, Lilin, from a wealthy family, illuminates another challenge for single mothers.

Lilin: It is always the girl who bears the cost of sexual relationships ... First, she might say: “I can raise the child on my own”. I believe a lot of us now have the financial capacity to do so. She can even provide enough love for the child to prove the conventional belief that kids born outside of marriage will lack love wrong. But first of all, I do not think it is fair for the kid to have such an upbringing. Second, I think it is also not fair for the woman herself. Under the current social circumstances, if she raises the kid on her own, what will happen when she meets somebody later who is appropriate to marry? Then the kid will become an obstacle between them. This would be so unfair both to her and her kid. Moreover, I feel she will have to bear lots of pressure from her parents and our society. She will have to put up with much discrimination as a single mum.
Lilin lists here the multilayered difficulties women need to tackle as single mothers. In a society that emphasizes patrilineal continuity (Barlow, 1994), a single mother and her child challenge the established family structure; therefore, both face social sanctions. Like Lilin, many share concerns over the woman’s future marital happiness and emphasise that she does not have to marry the man just because of the pregnancy. Besides her responsibility to her unborn child and her natal family, her responsibility to ensure her own marital happiness appears strong in my participants’ accounts.

Java: I think the relationship should be based on the couple themselves. If marriage is based on the kid, it is not sustainable. It would result in more future problems. If she didn’t want to marry him herself, but did it because of the kid ... more likely she would regret it later on, feeling bitter that the kid changed her life. Because of the kid, she missed lots of opportunities, which should have been hers. Then it is not fair both for her and her child.

Like Java, many prioritize the woman’s future happiness in this decision, carefully weighing up the man’s suitability as a good husband. Abortion is further justified, if it jeopardises the woman’s future happiness. Tj: “If you use marriage to solve your current problem, you will only create more troubles in the future.” My participants view the relationship between the couple as the primary consideration in the woman’s marriage decision. This signifies the importance of pursuing personal happiness for this generation, which reveals the neoliberal responsibility of self-realisation.

Zhangsan, who had watched the American film Juno (2007), mention giving up the child for adoption as another option. However, she soon realized that without a well-established adoption system like in America, practical implementation of this idea would be difficult.

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5 Juno (see Reitman, 2007) is an American comedy-drama about a teenage girl confronting an unplanned pregnancy. It has received criticism and praise from members of both the pro-life and pro-choice communities regarding its treatment of abortion.
Summarising all of the practical difficulties linked with the stigma generated from public rhetoric regarding single motherhood, and the lack of alternative public arrangements, the multi-layered responsibilities voiced above make abortion indeed appear to be the most responsible choice for the unborn child, the woman’s family and herself, if they are to avoid further troubles. Greenhalgh and Winckler (2005: 4) note the shift from Leninist to neoliberal biopolitics in terms of the governmentality of China’s population since its reform, arguing that the governmentalisation of PRC birth planning includes “the disciplining of conduct by nonstate social institutions and the cultivation by individuals themselves of the capacity to regulate their own behaviour” besides a direct intervention by government in its early Leninist style. The recent party-state’s emphasis on “traditional family values” such as filial piety is a good example of its effort to draw on existing cultural repertoires about male and female attributes and family morality in formulating its own policies and narratives. By transferring responsibilities to capable “neoliberal subjects”, individuals are able to govern themselves in ways deemed appropriate by the regime. Premarital abortion, understood as a responsible choice is a case in point. The responsibilisation of women’s pregnancies so as to fit into the heterosexual family model, through regulative power generated by certain discourses and practices, serves to maintain the Party-state’s desired social stability.

Conclusion

Following the Party-state’s use of “socialist morality” to regulate sex and sexuality within heterosexual marriage in order to maintain social stability, premarital sex became widely accepted and commonly practiced among the young generation. The lack of safe sex knowledge and contraception provision for unmarried women leaves them vulnerable to unplanned pregnancies. Women’s agency is constrained by a moralised discourse of female sexuality and by the sexual double standard in the marriage market. Facing universal marriage pressure, women become the bearers of this tension, while their reproductive freedom is subjected to the priority of maintaining social stability.
Exploring people’s attitudes towards premarital pregnancy, I reveal the gendered consequences: women face multi-layered damage as a result of objectification and stigmatization under China’s contemporary patriarchal marriage regime, whereas men’s privileges remain intact and unquestioned. Having an abortion in secret becomes the only responsible choice for the unborn child, the woman’s natal family and herself when marriage is not attainable. Through analysing the stigma attached to women after premarital abortions and their interpretation of “responsible motherhood”, I argue that the neoliberal biopolitics employed by the Party-state to govern China’s population, which sacrifice women’s reproductive freedom to further its political agenda (Greenhalgh & Winckler, 2005) have proven to be powerful and effective. Hence, their permissiveness regarding premarital abortion should not be simply understood as their moral approval of abortion practice, but as reflecting their pragmatic attitudes under a restrictive regime.

Despite the stigma and harm Chinese women face regarding pre-marital abortion, it is important to note that I am by no means saying that women are completely powerless victims even in these difficult scenarios. Hengehold (2000: 194) states that the dominant discourse portraying women as “victims” of male power deprives these women of “authority regarding the complexity of their own experience”. Gilfus (1999) reveals the need to recognise the strength that women often display and develop when facing trauma in order to survive in harsh circumstances. Confronting multi-layered constraints in given scenarios, Chinese women’s responses demonstrate their resilience and determination to forge a better life, through careful evaluation of multiple factors and an analysis of the pro and cons of different options.

Nie’s (2005) analysis of the Chinese silence on abortion highlights the basic survival strategy people employ under authoritarian regimes: guarding one’s tongue. At the same time, without sufficient public support in providing alternatives for resolving premarital pregnancy, and facing a strictly moralised public discourse of female sexuality, easy access to abortion does not mean there is a more liberal public attitude towards premarital abortion. Chinese women face a different stigma to that faced by their Western peers (Sheldon, 1997; Jackson, 2001); a more nuanced approach is therefore needed to understand reproductive rights in the Chinese context. Unlike the pro-choice
battle in the West, the choice of Chinese women to have an abortion bears the imprint of a patriarchal regime and its ambitions for governance. The responsibilisation of women’s pregnancy illustrates Chinese women’s embodiment of their struggle with persistent patriarchal values and the regulatory power of the state.

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Encompassing the Horse: Analogy, Category, and Scale in the Yijing

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Abstract

The canonised Yijing had a decisive influence over the development of so-called “correlative cosmology” in China’s early imperial period, presenting the cosmos as knowable through sixty-four hexagrams and classifiable according to eight trigrams. The exact nature of these correlative categories continues to inspire debate. On the one hand, they appear to be defined relationally, but on the other they purport to describe everything in the cosmos in terms of fixed principles. These apparently discordant properties can be reconciled by paying due attention to the role of scale. This is revealed through a focus on the hexagram images as two distinct but interrelated forms of analogy, as human constructs for symbolic manipulation and as empirical descriptors of cosmic circumstances. Adopting perspectives from cognitive linguistics and anthropology, this symbolic manipulation allows unknown situations to be understood metaphorically via the hexagrams, and then metonymically incorporated into a natural category of cosmic circumstances. This transition between metaphoric and metonymic relations is a function of scale, and is reflected in the Yijing’s correlative categories. These correspond to perceived absolute natural kinds, but maintain a relational character dependant on the salience of metaphorical and metonymic relations at different scales.

Keywords: Yijing, cosmology, analogy, correlative thinking, early China, divination, scale, metaphor, metonymy.

To say that the Yijing had an instrumental influence over the development of Chinese cosmology from the time of the early empires is hardly controversial. However, the question of whether the way of ordering the world according to

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relational categories such as the *Yijing*’s trigrams, *yin* and *yang*, and later the Five Phases—so-called “correlative cosmology”—constitutes something quite distinct from “Western” “causal” cosmological thinking remains subject to ongoing debate.¹ This has led some Western scholars of early China to argue for fundamental differences between the two (Graham, 1989; Hall & Ames, 1995; Ziporyn, 2012); others (notably, see chapter 5 of Lloyd, 1996), argue that maintaining such a distinction obscures the degree to which the two are interdependent.² The problem arises from the fact that texts such as the *Yijing* group apparently disparate phenomena together—such as dogs, hands, and the Northeast—based on a logic which is not immediately obvious. Hence, David Hall and Roger Ames (1995) maintain that such groupings do not constitute “natural categories”, and Brook Ziporyn (2012) contends that they are based on relational coherence rather than shared essence. Such arguments lead inevitably to a position that emphasises correlative categories as ways of ordering the world rather than descriptions of the way in which the world is (taken to be) ordered. As I show in this article, this position is problematic for the *Yijing*, given that the text unambiguously describes the world “as it is” and how it can be known.

However, it is possible to reconcile this with the relational character of the *Yijing*’s correlative categories by paying attending to the status of analogy and scale within the text. Drawing on anthropological and cognitive linguistic approaches to analogy, metaphor, and metonymy, this article demonstrates that the *Yijing*’s trigrams and hexagrams (three- and six-line diagrams that describe cosmic situations), can be understood both in terms of similarity (or resonance) and contiguity (or causal and part-whole relations). Which is salient is a function of scale, or of “zooming out” through the increasing levels of encompassment fundamental to this form of Chinese cosmology (Feuchtwang, 2014). I use “scale” here to refer to the scope of cosmological categories as indicated in the *Yijing*, from the scale of the cosmos as a whole, through to categories such as “animals”, to far more specific scales such as varieties of

¹ Nylan (2010) provides an incisive review of both the evidence for correlative thought in early China, and uses of the term in the sinological and anthropological literature.

² Similarly, I have argued elsewhere (Matthews, 2016) that “correlative thought” refers to at least three distinct ways of thinking.
horse. As I show, many beings cosmologically classified in the *Yijing* appear to belong to several categories, being classed under different trigrams. That is, they exist on several different taxonomic scales; which scale is relevant is a function of the comparative context in which a phenomenon is being considered. Hence, the *Yijing*’s correlative categories are best understood, *contra* Hall and Ames, as “natural”, but at the same time as encompassing phenomena across a wide range of cosmological scales. I begin with a brief overview of the *Yijing*’s structure, before discussing its central concept of images (*xiang* 象) as two forms of analogy. I then examine how analogy is presented as an epistemological device in terms of metaphor and metonymy. Finally, this discussion is brought to bear on the nature of cosmological categories presented in the *Yijing*, and how these are affected by scale, with specific reference to the *Shuogua* 説卦 (*Explaining the Trigrams*).

**The Structure of the *Yijing***

The *Yijing* is divisible into the *Zhouyi* 周易 and the *Ten Wings* (*Shiyi* 十翼). The former, its received form dating from the ninth century BCE (Rutt, 2002: 30–33; Shaughnessy, 1999), comprises the sixty-four hexagrams, their names, judgements on their meaning, and statements concerning their component lines (either broken or unbroken). Until the late Zhou the *Zhouyi* “was used exclusively for divination” (Smith, 2008: 7), not beginning to achieve its cosmological significance until the third century BCE and not yet incorporated into a correlative system (Shaughnessy, 1999: 341–342).

The *Ten Wings* comprise later commentaries appended to it to create the text canonised in 136 BCE as the *Yijing*. They date from the late first millennium BCE, and reinterpret the *Zhouyi* as a work of cosmology based on change and correlation, expanding its “divinatory potential” (Nylan, 2001: 233–252) in terms of the complementary principles of *yin* and *yang*. In considering “correlative cosmology”, this article thus focuses on the canonised text of the *Yijing*, focusing especially on the *Xiangzhuan* 象轉 (*Commentary on the Images*), *Tuanzhuan* 象轉 (*Commentary on the Judgements*), *Xici* 系辭 (*Appended Phrases*), and *Shuogua*. 
The Role of Images as Two Kinds of Analogy

The concept of the “image” (xiang 象) is central to the Yijing’s approach to the relationship between human perception and the cosmos, appearing in the Xiangzhuan, Tuanzhuan, and Xici shang. The term “image” typically refers to the diagrams of each trigram and hexagram together with the phenomena associated with them, illustrated below for the hexagram Bo 剝, “Peeling”.  

剝：不利有攸往。
《彖》：剝，剝也，柔變剛也。不利有攸往，小人長也。順而止之，觀象也。君子尚消息盈虛，天行也。
《象》：山附地上，剝；上以厚下，安宅。

Bo: It is not beneficial to set forth.
Tuanzhuan: Bo, this is peeling. The weak transforms the strong. It is not beneficial to set forth, as the petty man is growing. To be compliant and restrain, this is to observe the image. The noble man esteems ebb and flow and waxing and waning; this is the movement of Heaven.
Xiangzhuan: The Mountain below and Earth above, Bo. Those above are magnanimous towards those below, and secure their residences.

Here, the Tuanzhuan elaborates the meaning of the hexagram name, the reference to “weak” (rou 柔) and “strong” (gang 剛) pertaining respectively both to the yin (broken) and yang (unbroken) lines of the hexagram and its constituent lower and upper trigrams; read in conjunction with the Xici, change

3 The primary text consulted is the Zhouyi zhengyi 周易正義 from the Wusyingdian shisan jing zhushu 武英殿十三經注疏, accessed via the Chinese Text Project (available on-line: http://ctext.org/book-of-changes, accessed 28.04.17). Hexagram and trigram names are translated following Richard Lynn (1994); though his work is based on a reading of Wang Bi’s interpretation, this does not impact significantly on these names.
4 Although the Tuanzhuan and Xiangzhuan primarily refer to the lines as “weak” and “strong”, the term yang is also used to refer to the “strong” lines in the Xiangzhuan, and both terms are used in the Tuanzhuan, Wenyan, and Xici. As this article is concerned with a reading of the Yijing
is conceived as the complementary waxing and waning of *yang* and *yin*, strong and weak, *Qian* 乾 (extreme *yang*) and *Kun* 坤 (extreme *yin*). Hexagrams are read from bottom to top; here five *yin* lines precede a lone *yang* line, indicating *yin*’s increasing prevalence and *yang*’s complementary decline. Therefore, to “set forth” would be inauspicious, at odds with prevailing conditions, as *yang* is considered an initiating force (see Ziporyn, 2012: 238–243). An understanding of this image, in which the “weak” is effecting change, involves remaining “compliant” (*shun* 順). The image constitutes a conceptual means through which a person can understand a situation of the type *Bo*.

The *Xiangzhuan* describes the image of *Bo* based on the images of its component trigrams, comprising *Kun* 坤, the image of Earth (*di* 地), and below *Gen* 艮, the image of the Mountain (*shan* 山). This is presented alongside an analogical statement, “those above are magnanimous towards those below, and secure their residences”\(^5\), linking “those above” to Mountain, *Gen*, and “those below” to Earth, *Kun*. If “those above” are *yang* and active with respect to “those below”, *yin* and receptive, the two are complementary. Thus, in spite of the dangers of initiating action, to embrace the situation as complementary (being “magnanimous to those below”) is to be secure in one’s position.

This form of analogical interpretation can be understood further with reference to the anthropologist Stanley Tambiah’s (1985) distinction between “scientific predicative” and “conventional persuasive” analogies. The former serves as a model to generate hypotheses and comparisons verifiable through inductive reasoning. In his example (1985: 70), properties of light can be compared analogically with properties of sound, as shown below.

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\(^5\) *上以厚下, 安宅*
Here, horizontal pairs (between individual or aggregate properties of sound and light) are similar, and vertical pairs (between properties within each vertical category) are causally related “in that certain properties are necessary or sufficient conditions for the occurrence of other properties” (1985: 70). Tambiah provides a second example based on horizontal similarities of structure and function and vertical relations of parts to wholes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similarity Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Causal Relations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Properties of Sound</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echoes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loudness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. A “scientific predicative” analogy between sound and light. Adapted from Tambiah (1985: 70).

Such analogies allow predictions to be made regarding the constituents of one vertical category based on what is known of the constituents of the other, providing that “the vertical relations of the model are causal in some scientifically acceptable sense and if those of the explicandum also promise relations of the same kind, and if the essential properties and casual relations of the model have not been shown to be part of the negative analogy [i.e. the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similarity Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Co-occurrence</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bird</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lungs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feathers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. A “scientific predicative” analogy based on structural and functional similarities between birds and fish. Adapted from Tambiah (1985: 70).
properties not shared by the two vertical categories] between model and explicandum” (Tambiah, 1985: 70, emphasis original). In principle, such predictions should be verifiable by observation.

Tambiah’s “conventional persuasive” analogies are distinguished sharply from these. He gives the following example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father</th>
<th>Employer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>Workers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. A “conventional persuasive” analogy between fathers and children and employers and workers. Adapted from Tambiah (1985: 71).

In this case, the analogy’s purpose is to evoke rather than predict—for example, to persuade workers to hold certain attitudes to their employer. Here, “the vertical relations are not specifically causal” and there is no “relation of similarity between the terms, except by virtue of the fact that the two pairs are up to a point related by the same vertical relation” (Tambiah, 1985: 71, emphasis original). The analogy transfers the properties of the father–children relation to that of employer–workers. It is precisely this purpose of transfer rather than prediction that Tambiah argues characterises magical or symbolic action; for example, the use of the leaf-shedding Araka creeper as a leprosy treatment by the Azande people expresses the symbolic wish that the loss of extremities, analogous to the loss of leaves, be followed by growth rather than degeneration (1985: 73–74). Before applying this framework to the hexagram Bo, it is worth considering that whilst Tambiah’s aim is to distinguish these two forms of analogy in order to elucidate the different purposes of scientific (causal) and magical (symbolic) thought and action, they are not mutually exclusive. Whilst the distinction is particularly illuminating, the Yijing’s images can function as both, since they are dependent on scale.

The relevant form of analogy results from how far the hexagram is considered to yield an answer to the question of what should be done as opposed to the question of what will happen (Curry & Wallis, 2004: 57), the first of which may be considered symbolic action, and the second, cosmological in scale, causal.
The *Zhouyi* judgement for the hexagram *Bo* can be read as advice on proper course of action: “it is not beneficial to set forth”. Likewise, the *Tuanzhuan* commentary, “to be compliant and restrain, this is to observe the image”, reads similarly as suggested action. Thus, the image of *Bo* can be schematised as the following “conventional persuasive” analogy:

![Diagram of hexagram image Bo]

Figure 4. The hexagram image *Bo* as a “conventional persuasive’ persuasive” analogy.

Here, the five pairs of contrasts made in the *Tuanzhuan* and *Xiangzhuan* are presented alongside the hexagram’s constituent trigrams, *Gen* and *Kun*. The similarities posited between horizontal elements stem from their shared vertical relation. The predominance of *yin* leads a *yang* process of initiating action to be undesirable. This is described in the text in terms of the “strong” (*yang*) being caused to change by the “weak” (*yin*), their relationship being comparable to that between a “noble man” (*junzi*) when the “petty man is growing”.

The relationship between ego, who “observes the image” (*guan*), and their circumstances is similar. Within the *Tuanzhuan* passage, the enquirer (ego) is related to circumstances in a manner akin to the relation between the “strong” and the “weak”. The noble man complies with circumstances, here the “growing” of the “petty man”, as the “strong” is caused to change by the “weak”. Ego is thus advised to transfer the properties of the vertical relationships strong/weak and noble man/petty man to his own relationship with his circumstances. In the *Xiangzhuan* entry, the image of *Bo* is identified with the vertical relationship between Mountain (*Gen*) and Earth (*Kun*). The ability of “those above” to “secure their residences” is presented as a direct function of their ability to transfer the properties of the vertical

6 不利有攸往  
7 顺而止之，観象也  
8 小人長也
relationship between Mountain and Earth to their own vertical relationship with “those below”.

However, whilst this understanding of the image as a conventional persuasive analogy may be considered a proximate motivator to action on the part of ego, a consultor of the Yijing, the relationships between vertical pairs are open to further interpretations. Most obvious is that the vertical pairs strong/weak and noble man/petty man in the Tuanzhuan text for Bo describe a prevailing situation denoted by the hexagram, itself constituted by the vertical pair Mountain/Earth or Gen/Kun. The actions taken by ego in relation to circumstances, or “those above” in relation to “those below”, are appropriate precisely because of the situation described by the other vertical pairs. Therefore, the petty man growing can be considered a phenomenon co-occurrent with “the weak transform[ing] the strong”. In this sense, a causal relation exists between the vertical pairs strong/weak and noble man/petty man, changing the nature of the analogy between them. Moreover, the vertical pair those above/those below in the Xiangzhuan text may be considered similarly causally related. If “those above” are to “secure their residences”, then a particular course of action must be taken, which is causally related to the vertical pairs strong/weak and noble man/petty man. In fact, it can be predicted based on the vertical relationships of the latter two pairs. This similarly applies to ego’s relationship with circumstances if ego wishes to achieve an auspicious outcome. Considered this way, the pairs comprising the image of Bo can be schematised as a “scientific predicative” analogy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similarity Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Co-occurrence</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those below</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ego</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5. The hexagram image Bo as a “scientific predicative” analogy.
Considering both forms of analogy, whilst ego’s motivation to normative action (what should be done to achieve an optimum outcome) may be proximately derived (as advice) from a conventional persuasive analogy, in which the properties of the vertical relations between strong/weak, noble man/petty man, and Mountain/Earth are transferred to the relation between ego and circumstances, ultimately the specific properties of that normative action can be predicted based on the co-occurring or causal relations between the remaining pairs. When presented in this way, the component trigrams Gen and Kun, and their images Mountain and Earth, appear not as symbolic referents for normative action but as categories of phenomena, like the properties of sound and light in Tambiah’s example. Moreover, whilst the similarity between the vertical relations of the conventional persuasive analogy is retained, a second axis of similarity has been introduced. Whilst Kun and Gen (as trigrams) or “petty man” and “noble man” (as types of person) retain their relationship of similarity, a new, necessary similarity has been introduced between Kun and “petty man” and Gen and “noble man”. Considering the images in this way demonstrates that an understanding of them as scientific predicative analogies requires integrating the hexagrams into a conception of yin and yang as cosmic forces.

**Analogy in the Epistemology of the Xici**

The role of images in the cosmology of the Ten Wings is made explicit in the Xici, though it should be borne in mind that this text, like the rest of the Ten Wings, represents later interpretations of the original symbols and cannot be taken as a reliable account of their original meaning. In the Xici shang, section one, the images are described as the product of things coming together according to kind:

方以類聚, 物以群分, 吉凶生矣。在天成象, 在地成形, 變化見矣。

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9 Sections of the Xici are numbered following Lynn (1994).
The tendencies [of affairs] group according to kind, and things divide according to their groups; thus arise the auspicious and harmful. In Heaven this process creates images, and on Earth it creates forms; thus transformation and permutation arise.

Here, images are situated as Heavenly (Tian 天) counterparts to Earthly Forms (Xing 形). Elsewhere in the Xici shang, section twelve, these terms are described as follows: “what is visible is called an image, what has physical form is called an object” (Nielsen, 2003: 277). Transformation and permutation (bianhua 變化) are visible through image and Form, and overall, the Yijing holds that Forms may be classified according to trigram and hexagram images. In section eleven of the Xici shang, images are granted implicit priority as the observable aspect of change:

一闔一闢謂之變；往來不窮謂之通；見乃謂之象。

A closing [followed by] an opening is called “transformation”. Coming and going without exhaustion is called coherence and fluency. When it is seen, it is called the images.

Indeed, the association of Heaven with image and Earth with form is itself an example of this, Heaven and Earth being identified with the prototypical hexagrams Qian and Kun respectively; the Heavenly images and Earthly forms themselves exist in a process of change, perceptible as images. Without this conception of images as the percepts of groupings of natural kinds, hexagram images would cease to function as scientific predicative analogies and lose their predictive power.

The Xici describes the creation of the hexagram images and their role in terms of analogy, including through the use of the character ni 擬, meaning to be similar or analogous to or to imitate or simulate. This character appears in both parts of the Xici. Section eight of the Xici shang describes the creation of the

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10 見乃謂之象形乃謂之器
hexagram images by the “sages” (*shengren* 聖人) based on their observations of the phenomenal world:

The sages had the means to observe the mysteries of all under Heaven, and drawing analogies (*ni* 擬) from their appearances, made suitable images of things, which are therefore called the images. The sages had the means to observe the motions of all under Heaven, and watched their gathering and communion, in order to bring out the standards of behaviour appropriate to each. They appended phrases to determine the auspicious and harmful, which were therefore called the interpretations (*yao* 疟). Speaking of the greatest mysteries under Heaven, they cannot be odious. Speaking of the motions of all under Heaven, they cannot be disordered. To draw analogies [first] and speak afterward, to deliberate [first] and move afterward, it is in such drawing of analogy and [subsequent] deliberation that the transformation and permutation of things is successful.

In this account, images are derived in response to the problem of understanding the “mysteries of the world”.

11 This problem is solved by the sages’ ability to know the world via analogy (*ni* 擬); the mysteries are perceived, their appearances used as a basis for comparison with other things, and from these analogically suitable things, the images are derived. Observing the processes of the world, the sages “[brought] out the standards of behaviour appropriate to each”; 12 their ability to do so depended on an understanding of “the auspicious and harmful” (*jixiong* 吉凶). Describing how the sages used this

11 天下之賾
12 以行其典禮
to derive the “interpretations” (yao 羲) of the hexagrams, the text again acknowledges the value of analogy, embodied in the hexagram images, in understanding and operating effectively in the world; the interpretations’ exegesis of these images allows understanding of “the greatest mysteries under Heaven”.\(^\text{13}\) The first step in making sense of the cosmos is therefore to make comparisons using the images; only then can one “speak” (yan 言) of the phenomenon concerned, as it is through the images that knowledge of the world is acquired. Only after “deliberating” (yi 議) on this should one “move” (dong 動). Hence, there exists a sequence for ideal action by which “the transformation of things is successful”:\(^\text{14}\) observation (jian 見) → comparison by analogy 擬 → deliberation 議 → action 動. As Michael Puett (2004: 188–196) argues, it is thus only via the system of the Yiijing that the non-sage can know the world.

Puett further argues that the sages themselves are presented paradoxically not only as the creators of this epistemological system, but also as subservient to it (2004: 192–193). In the Xici xia section two, the sage-king Bao Xi, mythical creator of the trigrams, is presented “as purely an observer of patterns in the natural world” (2004: 192):

古者包犧氏之王天下也，仰則觀象於天，俯則觀法於地，觀鳥獸之文，與地之宜，近取諸身，遠取諸物，於是始作八卦，以通神明之德，以類萬物之情。

In ancient times, Bao Xi ruled over the realm. Looking up, he observed the images in Heaven, and looking down he observed the patterns of Earth; he observed the patterns of birds and beasts and the features of the Earth. Nearby he drew from his body, and afar he drew from phenomena, and from this beginning created the Eight Trigrams, in order to commune with the virtues

\(^{13}\) 天下之至賾

\(^{14}\) 以成其變化
of the spirits and in order to classify the dispositions of the Ten Thousand Things.

This passage presents an important distinction not made explicit in the section just discussed, between the appearance of things (“images in Heaven”,15 “patterns of birds and beasts”16) on the one hand, and “virtues of the spirits”17 and the “dispositions of the Ten Thousand Things” 18 on the other. The epistemological problem for Bao Xi is how to understand the latter when he can only perceive the former. The solution is a process of mediated analogical transfer; the known properties of appearances serve as a basis from which inherent qualities may be considered. However, a simple transfer of outward patterns to inward dispositions is inadequate. Rather, Bao Xi parses the appearances of things into a series of eight trigrams. It follows from this that the appearances of particular phenomena may be abstracted back from the trigrams, implying that they correspond to a more fundamental aspect of the cosmos. The eight trigrams therefore allow knowledge of that which is initially unknowable to human perception—the inherent virtues and dispositions of things.

The Yijing thus draws an epistemologically significant distinction between appearance and inner disposition. Knowledge of the former is available via human perception, but knowledge of the latter—full knowledge of the cosmos—requires the trigrams and hexagrams; Puett (2004: 188–196) makes a similar point. Moreover, both aspects of being are knowable via a single means, and for this to be valid the analogies drawn between the two aspects must be grounded in genuine similarity. Moreover, as Lisa Raphals (2013: 336–337) points out, the Yijing relies on “two parallel systems of signs”, the cosmos itself and the Zhouyi. The foregoing discussion reveals that the images possess dual referents: phenomenal (occurrent in the cosmos) and symbolic (the human representation of a hexagram or trigram reified in the Zhouyi as a diagram). A hexagram image considered as a conventional persuasive analogy constitutes a

15 象於天
16 鳥獸之文
17 神明之德
18 萬物之情
symbolic construct providing a framework for normative action. An image considered as a scientific predicative analogy, in contrast, refers to a natural kind based on cosmic principles; it is a means of cosmological explanation. Likewise, considering Bao Xi’s observations, the trigrams as facilitators of analogical transfer serve as symbolic constructs, but insofar as they are established as valid means of knowing the cosmos in all its aspects, they constitute referents to cosmic principles. Hereafter, I differentiate between these two usages with the terms trigrams/hexagrams-as-symbols or trigrams/hexagrams-as-phenomena. In the next section, I expand this discussion into the realms of metaphor and metonymy.

**Hexagrams, Metaphor, and Metonymy**

The linguist Roman Jakobson (1956) describes an experiment in which young children are told to provide the first words they think of based on a stimulus word, in his example “hut”, to which responses are of two kinds, “substitutive” (e.g. “cabin”, “hovel”) and “predicative” (e.g. “thatch”, “poverty”), respectively manipulating connections of similarity and contiguity (1956: 76–77). The former constitute metaphoric responses, and the latter, metonymic; as James Fernandez (1986a: xii) puts it, metaphor concerns relations between domains and metonymy those within domains. I follow these definitions here, referring to generalised cognitive operations based on similarity and difference, rather than purely rhetorical devices.

As Jakobson argued, all symbolic processes, “either intrapersonal or social”, involve both devices (1956: 80), but one or the other is likely to become prevalent. Anthropologists Deborah Durham and James Fernandez (1991) take this relationship further, arguing that metonymic association can follow as a result of metaphor. They define metaphors as operations of understanding a target domain by mapping onto it salient features of a source domain. Thus, for the hexagram Bo, ego’s situation, as yet unknown, is knowable via the mapping onto it of the hexagram image. The function here is one of substitution of the image for the situation. However, following Durham and Fernandez, this metaphoric substitution draws together ego’s situation and the hexagram Bo
into a “more encompassing whole” (1991: 198) in which they are associated metonymically.

Following this understanding of the relationship between metaphor and metonymy, we can return to the fluidity of conventional persuasive and scientific predicative analogies discussed above. Taking Bo as an example, the transfer of relational properties from the vertical pair Mountain/Earth to noble man/petty man expresses a similarity of relations between the two. It is but a small step to then suggest that a genuine similarity exists between Mountains and noble men on the one hand and Earth and petty men on the other, in addition to, or stemming from, the similarity of vertical relations between the two pairs. Thus, an individual can consider it reasonable to make predictions regarding a noble man based on their knowledge of Mountains, quite apart from the similarity between the vertical relationships Mountain/Earth and noble man/petty man, within a certain type of situation. Thus, a series of conventional persuasive analogies can become a scientific predicative analogy, as demonstrated above. In such a case, the metaphoric relationship between Mountain and noble man or Earth and petty man, based on substitution of terms along the horizontal plane, becomes a relationship of metonymy. Mountain, noble man, those above, the strong, and so on, become a metonymic series of co-occurrent phenomena. This series, in the context of a hexagram image, is ultimately encompassed by the dyad Gen/Kun, the two components of which exist in dynamic relation. This dynamic dyad is accorded the label Bo, itself thus constituting a metonymic category encompassing both vertical series shown in fig. 5. However, this does not mean that metaphor has no place in the scientific predicative analogy; whilst elements within a column are metonymic (contiguous), they maintain metaphoric relationships with their counterparts in other columns. From the perspective of taxonomic structure, to understand the category Gen the known category Kun can be substituted, allowing an understanding of Gen as also referring to a metonymic class with elements of certain types (natural phenomena, material qualities, social positions, etc.).

A crucial question remains concerning the status of the vertical pair ego/circumstances in fig. 4. Whilst the hexagram and component trigram images may be unproblematically considered metonymic categories, this is not so straightforward for this pair. The hexagram image functions by persuading
ego to adopt a relationship with circumstances analogous to that between the described dyads; this stems from an ability to predict the optimum relationship between ego and circumstances based on the remaining dyads. From the perspective of the Yijing as a complete account of the cosmos, at the beginning of the interpretive process all horizontal pairs in fig. 5 except ego/circumstances compose the metonymic categories Gen and Kun, together constituting the metonymic category Bo. These refer to a particular kind of situation, Bo-as-phenomenon, a dynamic composite of Gen-as-phenomenon and Kun-as-phenomenon taking the form of a scientific predicative analogy. Bo-, Gen-, and Kun-as-phenomenon are known domains. Consulting the Yijing, ego is interested in discovering appropriate action given her circumstances, a problem dependant on rendering these circumstances knowable in terms of an existing framework. The first operation she conducts is therefore one of metaphoric substitution; the known domain Bo-as-phenomenon (and its constituent trigrams-as-phenomena) is mapped onto the unknown domain of ego/circumstances. Now, the referent Bo-as-phenomenon is too complex for all its entailments to be meaningfully considered; ego’s understanding of it is better facilitated by drawing on salient features, producing the mental representation Bo-as-symbol (the pair Gen-as-symbol/Kun-as-symbol). This is substituted for the mental construct ego/circumstances-as-symbol; this process consists in following a conventional persuasive analogy, as shown in fig. 4. Once this metaphoric substitution has been completed (via conventional persuasive analogy), ego/circumstances-as-phenomenon has been rendered knowable. This metonymically incorporates ego/circumstances-as-phenomenon into the category Bo-as-phenomenon (here a scientific predicative analogy). Cognitively, this has altered ego’s understanding of both Bo-as-symbol and Bo-as-phenomenon, but in terms of cosmology, ego/circumstances-as-phenomenon is subsumed into an extant category of situations. I turn now to the implications of this analogical model for the trigram categories that are presented in the Shuogua.

**The Nature of Categories in the Shuogua**

Historically “extremely influential in the development of Han and later Chinese correlative metaphysics” (Redmond & Hon, 2014: 254), the Shuogua presents a
conception of the cosmos ordered according to the trigrams and their correlates. The trigrams are correlated with various aspects of the external world, including natural forms or phenomena, which constitute their primary associations (Heaven, Earth, Mountain, Lake, Thunder, Wind, Water, and Fire), cardinal directions, animals, body parts, horses, and kinship relations. Some of these associations are tabulated in fig. 6. Whilst these correlates constitute the main body of the text, it begins with a description of how the sages created the trigrams (sections one and two):

昔者聖人之作《易》也, 幽贊於神明而生蓍, 參天兩地而倚數, 觀變於陰陽而立卦, 發揮於剛柔而生爻, 和順於道德而理於義, 穷理盡性以至於命。
昔者聖人之作《易》也, 將以順性命之理, 是以立天之道曰陰與陽, 立地之道曰柔與剛, 立人之道曰仁與義。兼三才而兩之, 故《易》六畫而成卦。分陰分陽, 迭用柔剛, 故《易》六位而成章。

In ancient times, when the sages made the Changes, [they did so] to participate profoundly in [that which is of] the spirits, they created the yarrow [as a means of divination]. Taking Heaven as three and Earth as two they brought the numbers into accordance. Observing the transformation of yin and yang they established the trigrams. Setting forth the movement of the strong and weak [hexagram lines] they created the interpretations [ appended to the lines]. Complying with the Way and its virtue, they subjected things to a suitable principled order. Making full use of principle and the inner nature of things, they arrived at [an understanding of] fate.

In ancient times, when the sages made the Changes, they used it in order to comply with the principle inherent in inner nature and fate; it was to establish the Way of Heaven in terms of yin and yang, to establish the Way of Earth in terms of weak and strong, to establish the Way of Humanity in terms of benevolence and propriety. Bringing together the three capacities [Heaven, Earth, and Humanity] and doubling them, thus they took the six lines of
the Changes and produced the hexagrams. Separating yin and yang, alternating between weak and strong, thus the six positions of the Changes produced models [of the cosmos, i.e. the hexagrams].

Section one establishes the cosmological validity of the trigrams by rooting their initial creation as symbols in sagely observation of the patterns of nature, as similarly described in the Xici shang. Here, though, the emphasis is less upon the analogical mapping of appearance onto inner nature than upon the trigrams as models of cosmic processes. Indeed, the purpose of the Zhouyi is here described as a means “to comply with the principle inherent in inner nature and fate”. The trigrams thus not only allow an understanding of inner natures across space, but also an understanding of how these change over time; time and space are thus united via a common set of principles, the effects of which are elaborated in the hexagrams. This is seen in the very structure of the hexagrams, read as proceeding from bottom to top; as Lin (1995: 94–95) puts it, in the Yi jing “the meaning of a time is a function of [a hexagram line’s] position, the significance of a position also depends on time. A certain position will be a place at a certain time.”

It is likewise on the basis of this cosmological framework, “the Way and its virtue” (Daode 道德), that the observed world is to be classified according to a “principled order”, ji 理 being best understood as functioning as a verb (“to principle”). Yi 義, rendered here as “suitability”, should be taken as the grounds upon which “principling” makes the most sense in light of cosmological knowledge. Implicit here is the tripartite conception of the cosmos comprising the realms of Heaven, Earth, and Humanity, made explicit in section two. Ziporyn (2012: 244) describes this as a “two-termed ‘pendulum range’ … in three parallel realms”, each of which has its own Dao or “course”, the sustainability of which depends on a “dyadic alternation”. Accordance with the inherent nature of things is thus presented as the pursuit of benevolence (ren 仁) and suitability (yi 義) in harmony with the ebb and flow of their Heavenly and Earthly counterparts, yin and yang and “weak” and “strong”. Following

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19 以順性命之理
20 理於義
Ziporyn, what I termed the “principling” of things consists in the emergence of coherence across the three realms. Each trigram thus expresses a particular configuration of these realms, and the six lines (two per realm) of a given hexagram correlate with the duality of yin and yang across the three. Again, the trigrams and hexagrams refer both to manipulable symbols and cosmic phenomena. As demonstrated by the further text of the Shuogua, the trigrams-as-phenomena may be understood as cosmic principles; the hexagrams, containing within them information concerning the three realms and both aspects of their dyads, may be understood as particular configurations of cosmic principles under specific spatiotemporal circumstances. The three realms can be understood as a scientific predicative analogy, in which optimum action in the Human realm can be determined based on the configurations of yin/yang and weak/strong in the Heavenly and Earthly realms. Again, knowing the appropriate human action requires a metaphorical operation in which the relationships between yin and yang and weak and strong are substituted for that between benevolence and suitability, but what constitutes appropriate human action is a metonymic function of the configuration of Heaven and Earth.

The character of trigrams-as-phenomena as cosmic principles is well-illustrated by sections three to five of the Shuogua:

天地定位，山澤通氣，雷風相薄，水火不相射，八卦相錯。
數往者順，知來者逆，是故《易》逆數也。
雷以動之，風以散之，雨以潤之，日以烜之，艮以止之，兌以說之，乾以君之，坤以藏之。
帝出乎震，齊乎巽，相見乎離，致役乎坤，說乎兌，戰乎乾，勞乎坎，成言乎艮。
萬物出乎震，震東方也。齊乎巽，巽東南也，齊也者，言萬物之絜齊也。離也者，明也，萬物皆相見，南方之卦也。聖人南面而聽天下，嚮明而治，蓋取諸此也。
坤也者，地也，萬物皆致養焉，故曰：致役乎坤。兌、正秋也，萬物之所說也，故曰：說乎兌。戰乎乾，乾、西北之卦也，言陰陽相薄也。坎者，水也，正北方之卦也，勞卦也，萬物之所歸也，故曰：勞乎坎。艮，東北之卦也。萬物之所成終而所成始也。故曰：成言乎艮。
Heaven and Earth fix the positions, the Mountain and the Lake give passage to qi, Thunder and Wind press each other on, Water and Fire do not damage one another, the Eight Trigrams mutually alternate. That which reckons the past, proceeds, that which knows the future, recedes, thus the Changes enumerates in reverse.

Thunder is that which moves, Wind that which disperses, Rain [Water] that which moistens, the sun [Fire] that which dries, Gen [Mountain] that which restrains, Dui [Lake] that which pleases, Qian [Heaven] that which rules, Kun [Earth] that which harbours.

The thearch comes forth in Zhen, makes things uniform in Xun, [they] come into mutual contact in Li, [the thearch] delivers service in Kun, delights in Dui, contends in Qian, is rewarded in Kan, and reaches completion in Gen. The Ten thousand Things come forth in Zhen; Zhen is the East. They are made uniform in Xun; Xun is the Southeast. That which makes things uniform is called that which evenly delimits the Ten Thousand Things. Li is brightness, is the mutual manifestation of all the Ten Thousand Things, is the trigram of the South. The sage faces south and heeds [the affairs of] the realm, governing towards brightness, whence this [idea] is doubtless derived. Kun is Earth, is where the Ten Thousand Things all derive nourishment; thus it is said, [the thearch] delivers service in Kun. Dui is the height of Autumn, is that which delights the Ten Thousand Things; thus it is said, [the thearch] delights in Dui. [The thearch] contends in Qian; Qian is the trigram of the Northwest, and is called the mutual pressing on of yin and yang. Kan is Water, is the trigram of true North, is the trigram of comfort, is that to which the Ten Thousand Things return; thus it is said, [the thearch] is rewarded in Kan. Gen is the trigram of the Northeast. It is where the Ten Thousand Things come to final completion and where they begin. Thus it is said, [the thearch] reaches completion in Gen.
Here, the trigrams are set out in sequence, suggesting a fundamental natural process of endless generation and regeneration (Redmond & Hon, 2014: 150). Sections three and four refer to the trigrams metonymically via their associated natural phenomena. As Ziporyn (2012: 244–245) points out, section three presents the trigrams as four contrasting pairs with certain functions, and section four describes the specific function of each trigram-as-phenomenon. As he argues, the correlates of each trigram are not obviously derivable from the three-line symbols themselves, but many of them pertain to the natural phenomena outlined in sections three and four. Thus Water (i.e. the trigram Kan), referred to metonymically in section four as “rain” (yu 雨) which “moistens” (run 潤), in section seven is described as a “pitfall” or, in Ziporyn’s translation, “danger” (xian 陷); as he argues, neither meaning is easily discernible from the trigram symbol, but both are properties of water. The Shuogua thus classifies various groups of experiential phenomena metonymically according to trigram. Some of these correlates are tabulated in fig. 6; the Shuogua goes on to list many more, including far more specific groups such as kinds of horse and qualities of tree.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trigram</th>
<th>Qian ☰</th>
<th>Kun ☷</th>
<th>Gen ☲</th>
<th>Dui ☵</th>
<th>Zhen ☳</th>
<th>Xun ☴</th>
<th>Kan ☵</th>
<th>Li ☲</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural Form</td>
<td>Heaven 聚</td>
<td>Earth 地</td>
<td>Mountains 山</td>
<td>Lake 湖</td>
<td>Thunder 雷</td>
<td>Wind 風</td>
<td>Water 水</td>
<td>Fire 火</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Ruling 君</td>
<td>Storage 存</td>
<td>Restraint 制</td>
<td>Pleasing 便</td>
<td>Setting in motion 定</td>
<td>Dispersal 散</td>
<td>Moistening 潤</td>
<td>Drying 晾</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direction</td>
<td>North-west 北</td>
<td>(South-West) 南</td>
<td>Northeast 东</td>
<td>(West; the height of autumn) 西</td>
<td>East 东</td>
<td>South-east 南</td>
<td>North 北</td>
<td>South 南</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>Strength 健</td>
<td>Compliance 遵</td>
<td>Cessation 止</td>
<td>Delight 智</td>
<td>Energising 激</td>
<td>Entering 入</td>
<td>Pitfall 陷</td>
<td>Attachment 聚</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal</td>
<td>Horse 馬</td>
<td>Ox 牛</td>
<td>Dog 犬</td>
<td>Sheep 羊</td>
<td>Dragon 龍</td>
<td>Chicken 鴨</td>
<td>Pig 猪</td>
<td>Pheasant 鷹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body Part</td>
<td>Head 頭</td>
<td>Stomach 胃</td>
<td>Hand 手</td>
<td>Mouth 口</td>
<td>Foot 足</td>
<td>Thigh 膝</td>
<td>Ear 耳</td>
<td>Eye 眼</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Member</td>
<td>Father 母</td>
<td>Mother 父</td>
<td>Youngest 子</td>
<td>Youngest 子</td>
<td>Eldest 長</td>
<td>Eldest 長</td>
<td>Middle 中</td>
<td>Middle 中</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6. Selected correlates of the trigrams in sections four to nine of the Shuogua (translations following Lynn [1994: 121–123]).
So far, the discussion of metaphor and metonymy has focused on the interdependence of the two, and this is crucial for understanding the correlates laid out in the *Shuogua*. Relevant anthropological discussions, such as that by Edmund Leach (1976: 15), have argued that the designations “metaphor” and “metonymy” are approximately equivalent to symbol/sign, paradigmatic association/syntagmatic chain, and harmony/melody. Whilst this conception is valuable, it can obscure the degree to which relationships of metaphor and metonymy are functions of perspective and scale. Considering vertical categories in fig. 6, a Leach-inspired view of the table might conclude that the metaphorical relationship exists between a trigram-as-symbol and the members of its column, such that it may be substituted for them (*Qian*-as-symbol for Heaven, for example). Likewise, the *relationship* between any horizontal dyad may be substituted for its vertical counterparts (Heaven is to Earth as “ruling” is to “storage”); this may extend to the substitution of the relationships between the components of an entire row for those between the components of another (the relationships between all natural forms for the relationships between all actions, for example). This tells us about the relationship between members of experiential classes (i.e. classes of entities generally perceived as of a type, such as animals; rows in fig. 6), but not about the relationship between members of trigram classes (columns). To understand these, we must recognise that, from a taxonomic point of view, columns and vertical dyads may be similarly related metaphorically. Thus, *Qian* and all members of its class may substitute for *Kun* and all members of its class from the perspective of taxonomic structure, as in the scientific predicative analogy illustrated in fig.5. As such, relations of similarity may be found along both axes; vertically, similarities (and grounds for substitution) consist of an element’s belonging to a trigram category (any *Qian*-Kun dyad can substitute for another, e.g. Heaven : Earth :: ruling : storage), and horizontally, similarities consist of elements belonging to an experiential category (e.g. Heaven : ruling :: Earth : storage).

However, the fact that the components of a given trigram column can be predicted by those of another indicates that, although *Qian*-as-symbol can substitute for any of the *Qian* column’s elements, the relationship that exists within a column in fig. 6 is one of metonymy; that is, each column comprises a contiguous group composed of a natural form, an action, a direction, and so on.
As such, following Fernandez (1986b: 44), the relationships within categories are akin to those between cause and effect and part and whole. Thus, the metonymic category *Qian* corresponds to *Qian*-as-phenomenon, a real-world class of co-occurrent phenomena, that is, a spatial metonymy. However, as has been seen the *Shuogua* also positions the trigrams in a sequence of generation and regeneration. This complicates the structure illustrated in fig. 6 further, indicating a temporal metonymy along the horizontal plane, analogous to melody but accompanied by metonymic continuity in the vertical (spatial) plane. This, though, takes us to a different scale, as the metonymic category on the horizontal plane comprises all eight trigrams, which on this level cease to be the relevant taxonomic category as they themselves represent stages of transformation of a larger category, the cosmos itself.

This speaks to a broader question of the role similarity and difference play in correlative cosmology. Whilst the *Shuogua* predates the wholesale adoption of a systematised cosmology based on universal *qi* constantly transforming in a cycle of Five Phases, it nonetheless illustrates the problem very effectively. Here, it is worth considering Ziporyn’s (2012: 245–249) analysis of coherence in trigram categories. He argues that the horizontal categories tabulated in fig. 6 should be understood as “coherent wholes” each composed of eight points, which balance one another. These coherent wholes all follow analogous arrangements, and may contain within themselves other coherent wholes; the coherent whole of the animal kingdom, for example, contains the coherent whole “horses”, different kinds of which are grouped according to the trigrams *Qian*, *Zhen*, and *Kan* in sections eleven, thirteen, and fifteen. Horizontal coherences, moreover, comprise groups which may be experienced as natural kinds. This much is not especially problematic.

The problem arises, as Ziporyn acknowledges, when we turn to the “vertical coherences”. He argues that the trigram groups are based on “relations of parallelisms of position and function” (2012: 246, emphasis removed); among animals, for example, the ox is “compliant” and “earthlike” (easily domesticated and used to plough) and therefore *Kun*. Similar coherent relationships exist—or would have existed for the text’s authors—between each element of a trigram category and the qualities of the trigram-as-phenomenon to which it is metonymically related. Ziporyn argues that whilst it may be tempting to then
identify each member of a trigram category as instantiating a particular quality or essence, this is made problematic by nested coherences, such as that of horses within animals. Horses as animals are *Qian*, but a horse that is “good at neighing” (*shan ming* 善鳴) is *Zhen*. The question is whether the neighing horse is thus somehow both *Qian* and *Kun*, or whether, as Ziporyn argues, is a function of its horizontal coherence—*Qian* with respect to animals as a whole but *Zhen* with respect to horses as a whole. In this conception, “horses are not first *Qian*like and then included in the class *Qian*. Rather, by being put into parallelism with other *Qian* items, and assuming a position within the coherent whole of the animal kingdom, horse [sic] manifests *Qian*-ness” (2012: 248). Ziporyn’s argument opposes the notion of the trigrams somehow describing natural kinds, the members of which “instantiate a form of universal” (2012: 246); in his view, they are implicitly human-imposed terms describing relational properties which facilitate organising phenomena coherently. Regarding the trigrams, as he puts it, “sameness is a function of coherence, not the other way around” (2012: 247). Thus, the problem of correlative categories with which this article began. We are now in a position to address it in light of the foregoing discussion.

**A Relative Horse is an Absolute Horse**

The function of analogy and the interdependence of metaphor and metonymy across scales demonstrates that, *contra* Ziporyn, coherence is a function of scale, the categories of the *Shuogua* denoting natural kinds based on shared characteristics, which are nonetheless relationally defined with respect to scale. This is shown by the following three points. The first two concern the trigrams as human-imposed, but do not preclude their relational contingency, despite rendering it more complicated. The third concerns the knowability of the cosmos.

First, considered in terms of the account given in the *Xici shang*, the view of human-imposed relational categories is at odds with the description of the trigrams’ derivation from direct observation of natural patterns and consequent accordance with cosmic principles. Even considered in relation to the *Shuogua* alone, it is undermined by the account given in sections one and two; if the
movements of lines are derived from observations of the transformation of *yin* and *yang*, and the trigrams and hexagrams effectively accord with the inherent nature of things, then they must genuinely resemble natural kinds of phenomena.

Second, as the foregoing discussion of the hexagram *Bo* established, appropriate human action is *predictable*; it is hard to see how this could be tenable if a hexagram, and by extension its component trigrams, were not considered to accurately reflect the state of the cosmos at a given spatiotemporal juncture. Both of these objections assume that, for analogical reasoning to be practically effective (in the manner these accounts present it to be), on some level *genuine similarity* must exist between metonymically-related phenomena. That is, all situations denoted by a hexagram constitute a natural kind.

Nonetheless, Ziporyn’s point about trigram-ness being a function of context cannot be easily dismissed, especially when, as he points out, we consider the status of horses in the *Shuogua*. His point is similarly well-illustrated by his example of the trigram *Dui*, whose metonymic correlates include “delight”, “sheep”, and “mouth” (see fig. 6). He concludes that the connection between the three is not one of resemblance but of harmonisation; the three terms go together “because ‘lamb’ is ‘pleasing’ to the human ‘mouth’” (Ziporyn, 2012: 247). These arguments suggest coherences nested across scales on the horizontal plane—hence a horse can be *Qian* in one category and *Zhen* in another, in each case being identified as such not because it has a *Qian* or *Zhen* essence (or is of a kind), but because by being placed in a particular configuration of entities it manifests *Qian-*ness or *Zhen-*ness (2012: 248). Thus, the horse is “only locally coherent”, its “global coherence [being] restricted to seeing the totality [of all contexts] as a totality only, and in connection with the disambiguating decisions of the sages in making these particular connections” (2012: 248, emphasis original).

The third, and most significant, point is that whilst this is all well and good if we are concerned with human perception alone, the author(s) of the *Shuogua* were cosmologists whose concern was not simply describing relational properties but, as has been shown, knowing via the trigrams that which is
unknowable to ordinary human perception. An obvious corollary of something unknowable to human perception is that, like the trigram categories, it may not make obvious sense, regardless of its actual correspondence with cosmic reality. None of Ziporyn’s arguments—even that concerning the delights of lamb consumption—rules out the possibility that however bizarre the connections between trigram-category members may seem, the reason that trigram-category coherences work is that their members all share a set of common characteristics or embody a certain cosmic principle or configuration. Such a view implies a vertical nesting as well as a horizontal; that is, in addition to the nesting of, say, horses within animals, Qian can also be nested into Kun depending on the scale of the phenomenon being considered. Sections three to seven of the Shuogua describe a process of transformation, each phase of which is embodied in a trigram. If this is taken to work across scales, it follows that each phase of the cycle may be subdivided into analogous phases, such that phase Qian may proceed diachronically through stages of Zhen-ness, Xun-ness, Li-ness and so on. This view preserves both the relational properties of the trigrams and allows for their existence as cosmic principles. Our friends the horses thus take on a hierarchy of trigram-ness; as an animal, a horse embodies Qian-ness as an inherent characteristic, but this Qian-ness itself can be subdivided into Zhen-ness, Xun-ness and so on at different scales. Thus, considering a group of horses, whilst all are Qian entities, keeping in mind this Qian-ness stepping down a scale, those which are good at neighing possess a more Zhen-like Qian-ness (that is, their Qian-ness is constituted by a significant quantity of Zhen). Likewise, keeping in mind the metonymic character of each trigram category, this point may be phrased in terms of Zhen-as-phenomenon causing good neighing in horses, and Qian-as-phenomenon producing horses among animals. Therefore, contra Ziporyn, a horse that neighs well is both Qian and Kun. The Qian-ness of all horses is simply irrelevant when considering a particular horse in relation to other horses; what is relevant is the particular trigram-ness of that Qian-ness. Trigram-ness is thus both absolute and a function of scale; exactly what scale of trigram-ness is relevant depends on the purposes of the observer.
Conclusion

The nested structure of trigram categories avoids the problem of reconciling their relational character with the fact that the *Yijing* is presented as a genuine account of cosmic principles. Moreover, this explanation is coherent with the epistemological status of the hexagrams as guides to effective action derived analogically from the observable world. Hexagrams themselves can be understood as both symbolic motivators to action as conventional persuasive analogies, and as scientific predicative explanations for why such action is appropriate. Hexagrams-as-symbols can be mobilised as conventional persuasive analogies in order to understand unknown situations, which are rendered knowable through metonymic incorporation into a natural category of tri/hexagram-as-phenomenon, defined in terms of a shared cosmic configuration.

Whilst trigrams may metaphorically substitute for any member of their correlative categories, and the relationship between analogous members of two or more categories may be metaphorically substituted for that between other analogous members of the same categories, members of a single trigram category are not related metaphorically but metonymically. However, from the point of view of taxonomy, the structure of any trigram category can be substituted for another. Members of a given trigram category share inherent characteristics, but from the perspective of an observer a phenomenon’s relevant trigram-ness is a function of scale. A horse in the *Yijing* thus enjoys the privilege of being at once an absolute and relative expression of the cosmos through its different degrees of encompassment across scales.

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*Primary Source*

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The Favourable Partner: An Analysis of Lianhe Zaobao’s Representation of China in Southeast Asia

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Abstract

Singapore has, since its founding, had a critical role regarding Southeast Asia’s interaction with China. The city-state has acted as both an enthusiastic promoter of closer ties with China and also as one of the prominent supporters of a hedging strategy regarding the involvement of extra-regional powers in Southeast Asia. To date there has not been any substantial analysis of how China and Southeast Asia are represented in the local media. Given the ongoing significance of news media as a means to communicate ideas and agendas, to both online and offline audiences, this gap is notable. This article will contribute some initial findings based on an analysis of articles related to China and Southeast Asia in the Lianhe Zaobao newspaper. Sino-Singaporean relations are presented in a positive sense regardless of whether the focus is economic, political, or social; in contrast, when discussing China and Southeast Asia as a region, issues of insecurity and other negative aspects become more prominent. This suggests that, while the Singaporean media reports China in a positive light regarding bilateral relations, there is a clear willingness to raise awareness of the broader regional challenges of China’s rise. It plays the dual role of both friend and critic.

Keywords: Lianhe zaobao, Singapore, China, Southeast Asia, media, representation.

The relationship between the People’s Republic of China (“PRC” or “China” hereafter) and Singapore has been a significant feature of the regional and international politics of Southeast Asia throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. How these two states view each other and their respective roles in the region has been, and will be, key to the stable and prosperous development

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of the region. The relationship between the two states is multifaceted and complex. China has viewed Singapore as a source of investment and developmental knowledge which has manifested in numerous government-to-government and economic initiatives (Bolt, 1996; Lee, 2001; Lim & Horesh, 2016; Pereira, 2002). Singapore has viewed China as a partner to engage with and a rising power which it has had to manage in the context of its regional priorities (Percival, 2007; Lee, 2001). Both countries are also critical to the region of Southeast Asia (Storey, 2013). Beyond the platitudes of elite engagement by government, how is this complex relationship represented? What messages do parts of the Singaporean media, for example, project regarding China and its rising influence in Southeast Asia?

It is widely accepted that the media can play a significant role in the construction of discourses (Fairclough, 2013), which can help to consolidate elite interests, be they associated with ostensibly democratic or authoritarian systems (Hermann & Chomsky, 1995; Shirk, 2011). These studies and the subsequent discussions they have generated tend to focus on the domestic role of media in managing and defining the message received by their audience (see for example Herring & Robinson, 2003; Mullen & Klaehn, 2010; Thompson, 2009; and Yumul & Özkirimli, 2000). The media, broadly defined, can and does reflect the ideas of the state when it comes to foreign policy. This is important as the media can present certain events and policies in an uncritical manner (Dickson, 1994) and be manipulated by public relations campaigns to build favourability towards certain countries (Manheim & Albritton, 1984; Signitzer & Coombs, 1992; Zhang & Cameron, 2002). The development of a more nuanced understanding of media reporting, public diplomacy, and foreign relations has found new purchase in the articulation and discussion of soft power and how states can build favourability to better serve their foreign policy goals (Nye, 2005, 2008, 2011; Roselle, Miskimmon, & O’Loughlin, 2014). With regards to Singapore, analysis of the role of the media has tended toward the domestic management of consensus (see discussion in Koh, 2006).

This article provides initial findings from a project on regional leadership in Southeast Asia regarding Singapore and China. It does not seek to explain why Singapore’s relations are presented in a particular way or the extent to which this influences those who read the stories—this requires a different
methodology and level of analysis; rather, the article interprets the content of news articles based on keyword analysis and interpretation of randomised extracts. This provides readers with an initial understanding of how particular parts of the news media in Singapore represent China’s relationship with the city state and with Southeast Asia. To this end, the following article analyses the output of Lianhe zaobao 联合早报, or United Morning Post, with regard to Singaporean relations with China, and also China’s relations with Southeast Asia as a whole, using a computer-assisted corpus analysis software programme, AntConc (Anthony, 2014). The stories were collected on the basis of searches for particular terms, and subsequently subjected to descriptive statistical and content analysis. The advantages of this approach are twofold. First, it allows for a large collection of stories to be analysed in a relatively short amount of time. Second, it is more objective in identifying particular trends from which interpretation can be based. While the final assessment of the significance of particular words or phrases is still subject to the individual researcher, the process of identifying these terms is done through a replicable process managed by the software. A degree of researcher bias is, therefore, removed from the process.

There were no particular expectations in terms of what results might be anticipated from the analysis. It is common to find China’s bilateral relations with other countries to be framed as hot economics/cool politics, or as actively depoliticised (Hammond & Jing, 2016). It could, therefore, be anticipated that relations between China and Singapore reflect this and that the economic aspect of relations is emphasised. In addition, while relations between China and Singapore have cautious periods, there are none of the tensions inherent to relations between China and other countries either in Southeast Asia or beyond—Singapore is not a claimant state in the South China Sea dispute, does not have ideological conflicts due to certain shared values, and there is also a shared cultural heritage between a majority of Singapore’s population and the PRC. It is, therefore, anticipated that Singaporean representations of the relationship will tend towards more positive language and representation, especially regarding opportunities for cooperation and development.

Singapore also acts as a linchpin in the Southeast Asian region and the regional organisation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Tensions between ASEAN and China have waxed and waned over the years, but the current period is one of increasing tensions which has undone, to a large extent, the significant gains made by China during its charm offensive of 1998–2008 (Storey, 2013). Singapore, as the recent controversy over exports to Taiwan has demonstrated, is not immune from Chinese criticism (Chan, 2016). It could also, therefore, be anticipated that discussion of China and Southeast Asia highlights these tensions and the dangers of a destabilising region for both Singapore and the region more widely.

This is broadly speaking what the results found; when addressing Sino-Singaporean relations the news articles tend to focus on the positive ties between the two states, and while economic relations get the most attention, there is also discussion of political and social ties. In contrast, discussion of Sino-Southeast Asian relations highlights more explicitly the dangers of increasing tensions. To this end, the article will be structured as follows. First, the significance of Singapore to the Southeast Asian region and to China will be explored further. This sets the foundation for the discussion which follows and explains why the question of what is discussed in the Singaporean media matters. This is then followed by a methodological discussion which outlines why Lianhe zaobao was selected, how articles were selected, descriptive statistics relating to the number of articles selected, preparation of the texts, the use of AntConc to analyse the texts, and a brief critical discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of such an approach. Having set out the methodological approach, the article will discuss initial findings based on the descriptive statistics generated. This consists mainly of two lists, the wordlist detailing the frequency with which a word is used, and the keyword list that details words which appear more or less often than expected compared to a selected corpus of words. Fourth, the article will discuss a first case based on the selection of a particular term, in this case the “South China Sea” (Nan Zhongguo Hai 南中国海), outlining how the articles which used the term portray differences in relations between Singapore and China and Southeast Asia respectively. Next, a second case will discuss the use of the term “develop” (fazhan 发展), which further highlights the differences in how Singapore relates to China and Southeast Asia. Finally, the article concludes by summing up the overall findings and argument, before highlighting the relative strengths and weaknesses of this approach, as well as future possible research.
The Linchpin: Why Singapore Matters to Southeast Asia and to China

Singapore is a geo-strategic and political linchpin in Southeast Asia, which means it is fundamentally important to both the region, and especially ASEAN as a regional organisation, and China. Furthermore, for cultural, economic, and political reasons Singapore is especially important to China. This does not mean, however, that the relationship between the two does not have some difficulties—in particular China struggles when managing expectations that close cultural ties should lead to political and economic benefits which run counter to Singapore’s regional interests.

Singapore is important in Southeast Asia and for China for a multitude of reasons, a number of which will be detailed here. First, geo-strategically Singapore occupies a significant point in terms of maritime trade in the region as it sits on the crucial Straits of Malacca and Singapore, which serves a conduit linking East and Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean, the Middle-East and beyond. This sea lane is crucial to many extra-regional powers, including China, as the security and free navigation of the Straits has implications for food and energy security, as well as more general trade (Feblica, 2017). Strategically, Singapore has also been a key actor in pushing particular agendas which have helped shape regional security and engagement with extra-regional powers in the years after its founding. For example, Singapore has taken the view that the region being dominated by any single superpower is to be avoided and this has led to the policy of hedging being adopted both by the city-state but also by the region through ASEAN. Singapore has also, through ASEAN, been a crucial contributor to the direction regional co-operation has taken and how ASEAN engages with other states (see for example discussion of hedging and Singapore’s role in Chung, 2004; Kuik, 2008; Kuik et al., 2012; Medeiros, 2005).

Singapore is also important because, in a developing region which has experienced civil, sectarian and inter-state conflict, it is a success. Having survived the difficult circumstances of its founding as an independent city-state and the konfrontasi of Sukarno’s Indonesia, Singapore has managed to emerge as a key actor in the region. Furthermore, Singapore has managed an ethnically diverse population, which is predominantly Chinese, to form a stable and coherent society. Arguably the alternative, demonstrated by its neighbours
throughout the Cold War, of civil conflict driven by ethnic and sectarian hatred, damagingly unbalanced economic development policies, and embracing the political extremes of right or left would not have been to the benefit of either the people of Singapore or the region more widely. In this regard, Singapore has been a linchpin, of stability and success, in an unstable region.

In terms of its relationship with China, from the 1970s Singapore has walked a careful line in how it has viewed both its role in Southeast Asia and the emergence of China as a potential regional power. Singapore has exhibited certain leadership qualities in relation to the rise of China which are inextricably linked to its recognition that its ethnic identity is a source of potential hostility and division. While Singapore enthusiastically embraced the PRC in economic terms from the 1970s onwards, in political terms it has walked a careful line which saw it only recognise the PRC diplomatically once all other ASEAN members had done so in the early 1990s (Percival, 2007; Storey, 2013). In the last two decades Singapore has continued to engage China enthusiastically while also being aware of the challenges China’s rise presents to Southeast Asia. Singapore’s position regarding China has, therefore, two aspects. First, there is a cautiously enthusiastic engagement with China in terms of economic opportunities including significant investment in the PRC. Second, Singapore has sought to support China politically and bring it into the region but not at a cost of either its regional position—it will not be seen as China’s proxy—nor at the cost of region itself. The stability of Southeast Asia and its regional organisation ASEAN has come first; and if this means bringing in other powers to balance the interests of another then Singapore will support this. Singapore therefore has supported China’s engagement with Southeast Asia, but it has not been an unquestioning cheerleader, and has at the same time continued to cultivate relations with the United States (US), Japan, India, and other potential extra-regional powers which might balance China’s influence.

The PRC’s relationship with Singapore is also more nuanced than might first be anticipated. It has actively courted Singapore as an economic and political partner—but there are also difficulties regarding the relationship which China appears to struggle with. Politically, China has viewed Singapore as a natural ally when facing criticism for its authoritarian political system as well as its human rights record. As the offspring of an alternative political tradition to that of the
West, at least in their self-perceptions, both Singapore and China emphasise the more communitarian basis of their political systems and reject criticisms based on the Western tradition of human rights and liberal democracy (Roy, 1994). At times when China or Singapore are facing criticisms from Europe or the US they have been able to count on the support of each other.

For the PRC, Singapore also offers a vision of the future where economic dynamism and engagement with the global economy are married to a soft authoritarian de facto one party political system. The hope that the Singaporean model can offer China a guide to the future has driven some co-operation such as projects in Suzhou and Tianjin, although there have been problems with this co-operation because the cultural and political ties are not as close as had been assumed (Bolt, 1996; Lee, 2001; Lim & Horesh, 2016; Pereira, 2002). Regardless of the difficulties, the idea that Singapore, through its management of the state, society, and the economy, offers China a model has been a consistent theme.

China also needs friends in Southeast Asia due to a difficult history in the region. Resentment and suspicion dominate the politics of some states which harbour memories of dynastic China’s imperial ambitions or more recent difficulties associated with China’s support of insurgent movements and ethnic Chinese unrest during the Cold War (Taylor, 1976). This is particularly crucial at a time when China’s rise is viewed as both a threat and an opportunity not just in Southeast Asia but also globally. During periods of perceived good or bad neighbour policies in the region, Singapore is a potential ally based on the cultural, political, and economic ties between the two states. Although, as noted above, this is something which Singapore itself is aware of and will distance itself from when it undermines the city-state’s other interests.

The nuanced nature of the relationship, and Singapore’s tendency to look out for its own interests, means that there is some frustration in the relationship. Arguably, this is also born of China’s recognition that Singapore, a relatively young city-state of only 5.6 million people, has an influence in Southeast Asia and independence of policy which appears to exceed its size. This periodically leads to outbursts by the PRC suggesting frustrations at the relationship where the relative size and weakness of Singapore is emphasised, such as the recent conflict over Singaporean exports to Taiwan (see for example Chan, 2016).
Both states have a significant role in Southeast Asia, although for different reasons. Singapore has been at the forefront of increasing regional interactions and a strong voice cautioning against any one state dominating the region be it the US, China or Indonesia. China has, as a consequence of its economic growth and increasing international assertiveness, been drawn further and further into Southeast Asia as both a welcomed partner for economic development and a suspected future hegemon asserting unreasonable territorial claims. How Singapore views the different states contending for the role of regional leader, or at least regional influencer, is significant because of the many important aspects of the city-state’s geographic, economic and political position. How China is represented in Singapore’s media is an important aspect of these developments, and how to analyse this is the topic of the next section.

Methodology

The newspaper selected was *Lianhe zaobao*. It is a daily broadsheet published by Singapore Press Holdings (SPH), with a daily circulation in 2014 of 187,900 (39,300 of which is digital) (SPH, 2015: 65). It is the largest Chinese-language newspaper in circulation in Singapore, although it is dwarfed by its English-language sister, *The Straits Times*. Because of its significant circulation and also its links with the established publishing stable of Singaporean news media, *Lianhe zaobao* is a good choice for analysing how China and the region is discussed. Additionally, the selection of the *Lianhe zaobao* provides the opportunity to analyse a newspaper which is not frequently the focus of academic attention in spite of its readership, and explores how an important issue is being presented in a forum which might be ignored or overlooked due to perceived insignificance or issues related to accessibility.

Stories were collected from the online version of the paper only. This was for practical reasons as the digital version is readily accessible and did not require a field visit to Singapore to access. The online version of the paper is limited in how far back stories go, and therefore the period from which stories were collected begins in September 2008, and ends in October 2015, when funding for the project which supported this research finished. Stories were collected via a search of the digital version of the paper using its own search engine. For
the purposes of the larger project, which focused on ideas of regional leadership in Southeast Asia, the search terms were used to build up five collections of stories focused on China and its relations with Southeast Asia, and Singapore. In addition, one year of stories from a special heading, flagged by the newspaper itself, of stories on Sino-US relations were collected to offer a (limited) point of comparison. It is recognised that there are limitations associated with how the newspaper articles were collected. These include the search tool used; this will have some impact on the stories returned and the results of the analysis. For example, it is to be anticipated that for particular collections of stories, the corresponding search term used to collect the stories will appear disproportionately high. However, as a means to narrow down what might be hundreds or thousands of articles to something more manageable, this approach was deemed acceptable. It also ensures that materials collected are relevant to the focus of the investigation.

Once the stories were identified, they were copied from the web into individual text files (.txt) and saved with UTF-8 encoding to ensure they could be analysed using AntConc. Each story was saved using its headline and the date published. Where stories had not been saved as UTF-8, the programme UTF Cast Express was used to convert them (RotatingScrew, 2014). Once encoded correctly, the stories were then segmented so that AntConc would be able to recognise the Chinese characters as words rather than blocks of text. This was done using SegmentAnt, a tool designed for the segmentation of Chinese and Japanese scripts (Anthony, 2016).

With the texts prepared they were then analysed using AntConc. Initially, the collections of stories would be loaded and a wordlist generated. This lists all the words which appear in the texts by frequency, and forms the foundation of further analysis. It was my intention to look for words that appeared an unusually high number of times rather than just in high volume. In order to do this, a corpus list is required against which the stories can be compared. Section A (newspaper reportage) from the Lancaster Corpus of Mandarin Chinese (LCMC) was used as the corpus for comparison (McEnery & Xiao, 2004). This was loaded and subsequently a keyword list was generated. This ranks words by their “keyness” or how unusually high or low they appear in the selected documents—this is determined as log-likelihood noting the difference between
the two collections of documents. This process identifies terms which appear higher or lower than might be expected when the documents analysed are compared with the corpus.

The next step is to analyse what these words mean in isolation and also in relation with other words in the text. AntConc provides a range of tools for interpreting the use of language. In the case of this study, only the most basic Keyword in Context (KWIC) analysis was used. This essentially provides a quick method to click through from frequency and keyword lists to see the words in the context used. The researcher can set various parameters, such as the amount of surrounding text shown. There are more powerful tools available, such as using KWIC to focus on collections of words surrounding the keyword. This was used in the analysis but did not produce any usable results. This is likely because the sample size for each keyword was quite low relative to the type of corpus linguistic analysis the programme is designed to facilitate. AntConc allowed quick compilation of every instance of a particular keyword being used and for these examples to be extracted to a text file for further qualitative analysis. For this study, the keywords were extracted as part of 100-character chunks and subject to interpretation. A randomised sample of the extracts was analysed (20 from each collection). This was done for two reasons. First, randomisation ensures that samples analysed are not subject to selective bias. Second, the choice of 20 samples for each collection makes the data more manageable, allows for more words to be analysed, and ensures that a comparison between collections is conducted.

An advantage of using software like AntConc to support the analysis is that it allows for the prompt analysis of a large volume of material. This is, however, both a blessing and a curse because it means that a researcher could very quickly be swamped and subsequently get lost in data. This has led to a number of decisions being made regarding both the total volume of data analysed and how this data was analysed, which will be briefly set out and explained below. First, for the purpose of this article, the analysis has focused on only two of the collections, those for “China and Southeast Asia” and “China and Singapore”. This was done in order to make the volume of materials more manageable and also to avoid going over materials which appeared in multiple collections. The search terms were chosen because they were closest to each other in terms of
word order, both being “China and...” as well as producing a relatively similar number of hits. Second, the wordlists and the keyword lists generated were set at 50 and only the cases of words appearing more often than might be expected were investigated. However, underrepresented words offer an opportunity for future research.

Once lists are generated, it then becomes incumbent on the researcher to make decisions regarding which terms are to be investigated. This could be done based entirely on the rank of keywords and the frequency in wordlists, and the initial analysis set out below will address this. For those more inclined to linguistic analysis, rather than politics, the frequency of modal particles and common terms might be of more interest, but in this case, I investigated those examples where there were clear contrasts in frequency and keyness of words.

As noted briefly above, there are a number of issues which might be raised about such an approach, which should be dealt with before moving on to findings. First, while the use of computer assisted analysis does streamline a great deal of the process of collecting materials and analysing them, it does not completely remove the person from the research and therefore subjectivity is not removed entirely. Arguably it would, in the case of the subject for this article, not be desirable to remove choice as this might limit possible findings and there is also, of course, a significant interpretative element which remains even after generating the various lists which starts with the selection of which terms to investigate. Second, the material collected was in the first place determined by the results generated by a newspaper search function. This means that almost inevitably stories might not have been picked up, due to the terms used for example. However, this is not in and of itself a reason to reject such an approach—rather the findings just need to be set in their methodological context. Third, the use of such software for analysis, which moves beyond simply the words used to the context they are used in, means that reading and interpreting of the text is still a crucial part of the process. Therefore, while software like AntConc means that handling hundreds if not thousands of texts becomes possible, it does not remove the requirement that the findings get read and interpreted. As with the previous points, the researcher’s role in the process is crucial and should not be forgotten.
**Broad Trends**

As noted above, two collections of the five gathered were used for the purposes of this article, “China and Southeast Asia” and “China and Singapore”. The section which follows will discuss the descriptive statistics generated and initial findings based on the relative ranking of certain words in the frequency word list and keyword list. For the “China and Southeast Asia” collection there were 98 articles which included the term, consisting of 13,299 word types (unique words) and 96,963 word tokens (individual words). For the “China and Singapore” collection there were 185 articles, 18,730 word types, and 165,408 word tokens. As noted in the previous section, both collections were compared against the LCMC A corpus.

In the case of these collections, the following was notable. In both collections, the specific terms for the search which led to selection (China in both, and Southeast Asia and Singapore for their relevant collection) all appeared in the frequency and keyword lists for the relevant collection. This is not a surprise or unforeseen outcome because, as noted earlier, the process for collecting materials would have built in a tendency for the frequent appearance of these terms. What is notable is that Singapore does not appear that frequently (relative to other terms) in the “China and Southeast Asia” collection; and, in the “China and Singapore” collection the term “Southeast Asia” did not make the top 50 frequency or keyword lists at all.

There are five observations that can be made based on the keyword and frequency lists. First, in the “China and Southeast Asia” collection, other extra-regional actors are prominent—Japan and the US both appear in the top 50 for the frequency and keyword lists. However, in the “China and Singapore” collection, the terms do not feature in the top 50 list at all. This suggests that “China and Singapore” stories focus on bilateral relations between the two states, whereas the “China and Southeast Asia” stories take a more regional view that involves other actors. Second, the term for state or country (guo 国) appears in both collections, but is higher in the “China and Southeast Asia” stories. This makes sense if it is assumed that the stories covering the region will be discussing the key regional actors who are mostly states. Third, terms which might suggest negative or problematic aspects of the relationship between
China and the region only appear in the top 50 list for “China and Southeast Asia” stories and not for “China and Singapore”. This includes reference to specific issues which are currently, and during the period the stories collected covered, negative, such as the South China Sea (Nan Zhongguo Hai 南中国海), in addition to terms which are open to more interpretation but imply a negative or problematic situation such as “issue” or “problem” (wenti 问题) and “security” (anquan 安全). Fourth, terms which suggest a more positive relationship with China, or more positive outcomes, do appear in both collections but are more frequently used, and more key, in the “China and Singapore” collection. This includes terms such as “cooperation” (hezuo 合作) and “develop” (fazhan 发展), which tend to be positively deployed when discussing state-to-state relations. Fifth, the term “economy” (jingji 经济) is used more frequently and is more key in the “China and Singapore” stories. This loosely supports the assumption that bilateral relations with China tend to be depoliticised and/or reduced to economic exchanges.

Overall, a review of the frequency and the keyword lists suggests the following. First, when discussing China and Southeast Asia, the newspaper articles are more inclined to discuss things in broader terms and include extra-regional actors such as the US. This suggests a broader view, which looks beyond bilateral relations, being taken in these stories. Second, problematic aspects of China’s relations with Southeast Asia are more likely to be discussed in articles which focus on the region rather than bilateral relations with China. This suggests that discussing the region gives a forum in which to highlight the more problematic aspects of China’s engagement, including specific issues like the South China Sea, as well as terms which denote problematic relations such as the term wenti and “security”/“safety”. Third, and in contrast, more positive aspects of China’s engagement are highlighted in the discussion of China and Singapore. The expectation that the economy would get a high priority, outlined in the early parts of this article, is supported by the high frequency and keyness of the term relative to the other collection. In addition, positive terms like “cooperation” and “development” are also discussed with an unusual frequency in stories related to China and Singapore. Overall, this suggests that when discussing China and Singapore specifically, the articles tend toward more positive interpretations of China’s role. In contrast, discussion of China and Southeast Asia provides an opportunity, and arguably a need due to the
circumstances, to highlight the problematic aspects of China’s role in the region. These suggestions are only based on an examination of the lists generated from the stories collected and, therefore, to confirm or counter these findings it is necessary to focus on the texts and the context in which certain keywords are used.

**The Varied Use of the South China Sea**

Due to the heightened tensions in the South China Sea and its significance as an issue to the direction that Sino-Southeast Asian relations take, as well as the impact on particular bilateral relationships, the term was selected for further examination. It was also chosen because it offered a significant contrast between the two collections; for the “China and Southeast Asia” collection the term scored highly for keyness, coming 22nd in the keyword list, but falling outside the frequency list (166 instances). This indicates that the term appeared an unusually high number of times relative to its frequency and compared with the LCMC A corpus. In the “China and Singapore” collection, the term appeared a small number of times, 28 in total, and did not score highly on either the frequency or the keyword lists. Because of the political tensions inherent in discussion of the South China Sea, the term is also worth investigating because it is likely that if there are any differences in how a term is being framed, then it will be regarding a term which is loaded with political significance for the parties involved. It is expected that tensions and concerns would be highlighted when discussing the region as a whole, whereas discussion of the bilateral relationship would not include such concerns, or at the very least they would be framed as less problematic. The findings for this section do broadly follow these expectations, but not quite as anticipated. A significant factor in determining how the term is being framed is who is being reported, and as will be shown, different actors and voices are given space to articulate their points of view in the two collections—this then explains the differences in how the term is framed in the stories collected.

The randomised extracts for the “China and Southeast Asia” stories show that the situation is viewed as problematic due to the complex nature of issues in the South China Sea and the long-term impact tensions might have. This is in
part because of the fluid nature of the problem as it is ever-changing and unpredictable (*Lianhe zaobao*, 2011b). The main negative is not the problem in and of itself, but the impact tensions over the South China Sea have on possible co-operation in other areas (Cai, 2014). The complexity of the problem is noted in one extract which warns that the South China Sea should not be viewed through the prism of a single national or nationalist perspective (Zhao, 2010). Historical tensions in the region, due to global security issues, are also noted. Both SEATO and the Cold War were noted as a check on China in the South China Sea—a sword hanging over China—at the time (Ma, 2012).

The role of the US tends to be presented through the prism of whoever is being reported. So it is neutrally reported in some instances (Cai, 2014). In other extracts, Clinton is reported as against escalation and against China taking action (Cai, 2012). When Chinese representatives or media are reported commenting on the US, it is presented negatively (*Lianhe zaobao*, 2014; Cai, 2012). Chinese domestic opinion is also noted as being unfavourable to the US due to its position on both the Diaoyu and South China Sea disputes, although both China and the US are reported as making positive comments through their representatives regarding the possibility of working together (Cai, 2012).

The discussion of China is mixed in this collection of texts. China is presented as not having the capability to resolve the problems in South China Sea bilaterally (Zheng, 2010), although Chinese representatives are reported as presenting the contrary (*Lianhe zaobao*, 2014). China is also presented as a military threat due to the capability of the Dongfang 21-D missile providing capability to cover the South China Sea (Chosun-Ilbo, 2010). This sets up an interesting contrast in how the stories present China. On the one hand, China is presented as unable to resolve issues in the region, and on the other, it is a threat.

China and ASEAN’s relationship is presented as problematic due to the South China Sea, but full of possibility. Economic ties are noted as trumping territorial disputes for ASEAN, but this is problematized by the possibility that the reverse is true for China (Ma, 2012). The “Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” (CoC) is highlighted as the next step in the relationship (Cai, 2012). It is noted that ASEAN has accommodated China, Korea, Japan, and the US already,
and that the “Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” (DoC) is seen as the cornerstone of an ASEAN-China security order and a foundation for mutual trust for the future (Zheng, 2011). The base established by both the DoC and a future CoC, along with economic cooperation, is the foundation for good relations (You, 2013). Energy security is one area where cooperation between China and Southeast Asia on the South China Sea is seen as “important” (zhongyao 重要) (Zhao, 2010). These statements suggest an optimistic or positive interpretation of the future of China and its relationship with Southeast Asia, despite the myriad challenges presented by the South China Sea.

The analysis of the “China and Singapore” stories is similar to the “China and Southeast Asia” collection in that there is no dominant pattern. It is, however, drawn from a much smaller sample of stories. China does have a clearer voice in relation to the South China Sea due to the reporting of particular actors’ views on the matter. Notably, Foreign Minister Wang Yi is reported and this reflects on the position being articulated. For example, in one sample, he is reported saying that the South China Sea is the front line in China’s defence of its sovereignty (Zhao, 2015). The South China Sea is also noted as a domestic concern for China, not just an international problem, which is a position not often found in the media when discussing, what appears on the surface, an international issue (Zhao, 2015). The actions of other states are noted, in particular the naval presence of the US, the pursuit of arbitration by the Philippines, and Vietnam’s claims (Zhao, 2015). In these extracts, China is presented as one actor among many in the South China Sea and no judgment or responsibility for developments is attributed to any one of them.

This does not mean that China and other states in the South China Sea are immune from criticism. China’s actions are highlighted as responsible for rising tensions in the region, as well as for provoking actions by other states (Zhao, 2015). The US, discussed as a historical actor constraining and facilitating actions, is described as a problematic actor in the region—the impression is given that the Philippines would not act without US support and the US would not be able to act in the region without the support of other states (Lianhe zaobao, 2009a). Finally, it is repeatedly noted that tensions related to the South China Sea are having a negative impact on other aspects of China’s relations
with the region; in particular, uncertainties related to the Maritime Silk Road are rooted in a lack of certainty stemming from China’s activities in the South China Sea. What stands out is that the tone of the stories, in terms of how favourable they appear to be, depends on the comments which are being reported. In the “China and Singapore” stories, the prevalence of the Foreign Minister of the PRC, Wang Yi, as the source of comments clearly links to extracts which are more favourable to China’s position.

The Different Forms of Development

In an effort to seek a balanced analysis, the next term selected was chosen on the basis of a high ranking in the keyword list, and also because it might highlight more positive aspects of the relationship between China and both Singapore and/or Southeast Asia. The term fazhan 发展 is translated as “to develop”, “develop”, or “development” (which will be used interchangeably from now on) and frequently appears in texts when discussing, for example, economic development (jingji fazhan 经济发展). The term was chosen because of its relatively high frequency in both collections, where it was 16th in the “China and Singapore” texts and 38th in the “China and Southeast Asia” texts. There was a big difference in the number of times the term was used. In the “China and Singapore” texts it appeared 664 times, whereas in the “China and Southeast Asia” texts it appeared 226 times. In terms of keyness, when compared against the corpus, fazhan ranked 9th in the “China and Singapore” texts and 37th in the “China and Southeast Asia” texts. The higher frequency and keyness of the term in the “China and Singapore” texts is already suggestive of a different approach between the two, with a greater emphasis on development, suggesting a more positive view of this particular relationship.

In the randomised extracts for “China and Southeast Asia” texts which included fazhan, the following points were discerned. Generally speaking, there was a diverse range of stories in this sampling, which covered everything from historical geopolitics in the region through to museum exhibits. A number of extracts focused on discussion of China as an emerging threat in the region, and how this might develop further. Extract 9 notes that the US and other states might seek to contain China, but this is something China can resist as it is not
weak (Zheng, 2011). The lack of trust between China and Western nations is noted as a problem for the region (Lianhe zaobao, 2011a). This has developed since the great financial crisis, when China began to ascend in the region and could be perceived as a threat (Zheng, 2010, 2011). However, in another extract, China’s rise is not viewed as inevitable but as a consequence of its economic development (Zheng, 2010). The outcome is, however, the same with China viewed as a potential threat in the region. The US is also a source of discussion. In some extracts the US is the container of China. This role is a consequence of ASEAN’s lack of unity regarding how to deal with China and the various territorial disputes which have emerged (Zheng, 2010). Another extract cites the history of extra-regional involvement in Southeast Asia because of trade (Lianhe zaobao, 2010). Taken together these extracts suggest a multifaceted view of China, and to some extent Southeast Asia’s limitations, which mean that China’s rise is viewed negatively. It should be noted that a number of these stories are opinion pieces authored by an academic and, therefore, will offer a different view of China and Southeast Asia than if reporting an event or speech.

The discussion of ASEAN in the extracts is multifaceted, reflecting both positive and negative views. The positive discussions focus on the economic relationship between China and the organisation. Ties are complex with different political and economic ties between China and the members of ASEAN (Ma, 2012). The length of China’s relationship with ASEAN and the number of agreements signed is also noted (Ma, 2012). However, not much else is offered in terms of discussion of China and ASEAN beyond this measuring of relations, and the suggestion that the relationship is complicated by the multi-member nature of ASEAN as an organisation.

There are two extracts which note the difficulties in the relationship. These highlight, in particular, the problem of sovereignty disputes in the region. What is notable about these extracts is that they are putting across China’s view, in China’s voice. Again, the more critical or controversial aspect of a story is being delivered by using the source of the story, rather than it being part of the newspaper and its reporters’ voice. For example, in one extract, “China says” is used when explaining that there is no dispute with Vietnam over the Paracel Islands and that the US has no role in the region as it is not a claimant in the South China Sea (Lianhe zaobao, 2014). In another extract, it is noted by Chinese
officials that cooperation with ASEAN is hoped for and that the issue of the South China Sea has derailed the agenda since 2010. Furthermore, the issue has been artificially hyped and enlarged (Cai, 2014). However, there is also one extract which is supportive of closer cooperation with the US although this is, again, a reflection of the words from officials (Cai, 2012).

Other extracts address a range of different issues relating to Southeast Asia. This includes the finding of porcelain at the Bukit Bintang tombstones in Malaysia (Lianhe zaobao, 2013), the regional challenge of food security due to climate change (Wu, 2013), and the opportunities and challenges of developing Yunnan Province in China as a link with South and Southeast Asia (Qin, 2010). Overall, the “China and Southeast Asia” samples constructed Southeast Asia as facing a difficult relationship with China. There was a lot of discussion of the threats posed by political tensions in the region, and the influence of extra-regional powers.

In the “China and Singapore” texts, a much stronger pattern emerges, with the extracts focusing on bilateral economic ties between the two states. The significance of Singapore to China and vice versa is repeated in a number of extracts, which outline the trade and investment ties through some core statistics—China is Singapore’s 3rd largest trading partner, Singapore is China’s 11th largest trading partner, Singapore was the largest source of FDI into China in 2013, China as the 5th largest Asian investor into Singapore in 2012—which paints a consistent message of close and important economic ties (Shen, 2014; You, 2010; Lianhe zaobao, 2010c). Extracts also note specific bilateral economic projects between China and Singapore, providing a level of detail regarding the relationship between the two which is lacking when it comes to discussion of Southeast Asia. These specific examples are Tianjin Ecocity in Northern China (Zhang, 2011; Shen, 2012) and The Interlace, a residential project in Singapore (Zhao, 2013). Finally, one extract also notes the extensive network of offices representing Singaporean interests in China developed by the Singapore Enterprise Development Board (Lianhe zaobao, 2010c).

There is also a clear emphasis on bilateral political ties between the two states. This takes the form of noting the development of ties between China and Singapore when they were ruled by Deng Xiaoping and Lee Kuan Yew.
respectively, a point also noted by Lim and Horesh (2016). These stories relate in part to the unveiling of a monument to Deng in Singapore but still they do highlight that the relationship between the two is not just economic or cultural (Zhang, 2011; Sun, 2009). The contemporary continuation of this relationship is noted in an extract discussing Prime Minister Lee Hsien Long and President Xi Jinping attending the unveiling of the Deng monument (Zhang, 2010). Two extracts citing Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, also highlight the political relationship between the two states. These extracts note China’s developmental stage, China’s admiration for Singapore, and the fact that a stable and prosperous China is good not just for China but for the region as a whole (Lianhe zaobao, 2009b; Han & Li, 2009). Another extract notes the progress China has made developmentally and also appears to support the status quo in the PRC by arguing that there is sufficient feedback for citizens (Gu, 2015). There is also one extract which emphasises the personal ties between China and Singapore. In this instance the text focuses on Lin Song, who came to Singapore to study. Instead of returning to China, he married a Singaporean and settled down in the city (Miao, 2011).

In contrast to the “China and Southeast Asia” texts the “China and Singapore” collection presents a much more coherent set of messages in spite of the random sampling. It also presents a much more positive set of stories. This ranges from the deep and ongoing economic ties between the two states to the political and personal stories which tie them together. This is altogether lacking in the “development” extracts for the “China and Southeast Asia” stories which still discuss the threatening aspect of China’s engagement with the region as well as the consequences of the involvement of extra-regional actors. This collection of stories, analysed through the term “development”, does highlight a clear distinction between the two sets of texts. Those addressing China and Singapore are focused on the positive regardless of whether it is economic, political, or personal stories, whereas those discussing China and Southeast Asia are much more mixed, consisting of both the possibility of cooperation but also the threat of China destabilising the region, or of other powers becoming involved as a consequence of China’s rise.
A Critical Friend?

The relationship between Singapore, its neighbours in Southeast Asia, and China will be critically important as we enter a period of uncertainty in what has not, historically, been a region known for its stability. How Singapore presents itself, and its priorities, to the region and to China will be a significant factor in how developments play out. Singapore is important to the region as a founding member of ASEAN, as its most developed state, for its geostrategic position, for the composition of its population, and because most of the time it is viewed favourably by China. A great deal is assumed about the relationship between Singapore and China but, with the notable exception of a relatively small selection of studies discussed earlier, there has not been much in the way of detailed analysis. This article has set out to contribute to understanding the dynamic between Singapore, China, and Southeast Asia by exploring how the relationship between the three is articulated through the *Lianhe zaobao*, a Singaporean Chinese-language daily newspaper.

The *Lianhe zaobao* newspaper was chosen because, of the Chinese-language newspapers in Singapore, it has the widest daily circulation but is infrequently referred to, and is therefore under-researched. It is also a member of the dominant Singapore Press Holdings, and so might be anticipated to be on message in terms of what the Singaporean government, journalists, and those interviewed wish to communicate. The computer programme *AntConc* was used to aid in the analysis of the materials using a number of functions available including frequency word lists, keyword lists, and keyword in context (KWIC). Although KWIC did not prove to be helpful due to the small sample size of the text, the other functions enabled the analysis of a large number of stories in a relatively short space of time. While this certainly smoothed the process of analysing the texts, at the same time, the relative ease of generating data was almost overwhelming. The programme is, however, overwhelmingly useful and opens up a great deal of possibilities for analysing Chinese-language texts in the future.

The analysis also presents some challenges which could be addressed in future research on the subject. From a methodological perspective, mixing interpretation of text extracts with corpus linguistic analysis means that some
of the meaning of texts is lost unless consciously addressed at the beginning of the process. In this article the text was dealt with as a series of extracts, but this means that the author of the text, where and when the story appears, and the form the story takes (editorial, opinion piece, or more conventional story), are not factored into the analysis. Furthermore, the analysis as presented here is solely interpretative and any explanation as to why the themes identified emerged would require a broader analysis of the Singaporean media landscape and its relationship with the state.

A final point: the analysis presented above is a snapshot from a certain period of time. This is a problematic, if unavoidable, outcome of the analysis because relations between countries change. Such an analysis will not reflect these developments. The conclusion outlined below needs to be situated within the broader context of the ongoing development of Sino-Singaporean relations. These have, of late, become a bit more intense than in previous years. For example, in early 2017 nine Singaporean Terrex armoured vehicles were returned by Hong Kong, having been seized in November 2016 on their return from Taiwan (BBC, 2016, 2017). This event followed soon after a story in September 2016 involving China’s Global Times (Huanqiu shibao 环球时报) newspaper, which was critical of Singapore (Zhou, 2016). This culminated in Singapore’s ambassador to China releasing an open letter admonishing the editor and the contents of the story (Loh, 2016). These difficulties in the relationship have continued into 2017 with the Global Times publishing at least three additional stories which are highly critical of Singapore’s government (Polin, 2017; Global Times, 2017; Yang, 2017). While it is often noted that the Global Times does not equate to the Chinese government, the diplomatic spat between China and Singapore has continued over 12 months. It is almost inevitable this will have had some negative impact on the relationship. These developments, and the potential impact they have had on the relationship, is one area that further research on how China is represented in Singaporean news reports could and should address.

Having said this, the findings broadly reflected what was anticipated in the initial stages of the article. The newspaper would use Southeast Asia as a proxy for criticism of China whereas stories which discussed China and Singapore would focus on the more positive aspects of the relationship. In the use of the
terms “South China Sea” and “development”, the stories addressing Southeast Asia were much more varied and included stories that were critical of China’s role in the region, as well as highlighting the problem of the China threat, explaining and criticising the involvement of the US, and raising concerns about the behaviour of other states. In contrast, the stories regarding “China and Singapore” were overwhelmingly positive and focused on economic ties, political links, and personal stories which brought China and Singapore together. The contrast was stark in both terms analysed for the purposes of this article, in spite of them being very different and having very different profiles in terms of frequency and keyness in the texts. While recognising the limitations of the analysis conducted, this article does indeed show that, in this specific case, Singapore’s press does act out the role of China’s critical friend in Southeast Asia, and uses the region as a means to deliver its concerns and criticisms regarding China’s actions. What will be of interest is how this role develops in the future, as China becomes more assertive in both the region and also towards Singapore.

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Free Trade, Yes; Ideology, Not So Much: The UK’s Shifting China Policy 2010-16

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Abstract

Fox and Godement’s (2009) Power Audit of EU-China Relations grouped the EU’s member states into four categories based on their national approaches to relations with, as well as their preferences for, the EU’s policies towards China. In this typology, the UK, at the time governed by New Labour, was designed an “ideological Free Trader”—seeking to facilitate greater free trade while continuing to assert its ideological position, namely in the areas of democracy and human rights. Since the Conservative Party took the reins of power in 2010 (in coalition with the Liberal Democrats until 2015), China’s prominence on the UK’s foreign policy agenda has arguably increased. This paper examines the direction of the UK’s China policy since 2010, and asks whether the label “Ideological Free Trader” remains applicable. Through qualitative analysis of the evolving policy approach, it argues that while early policy stances appeared consistent with the descriptor, the emphasis on free trade has grown considerably whilst the normative (ideological) dimension has diminished. Consequently, the UK should be redefined as an “Accommodating Free Trader” (an amalgamation of two of Fox and Godement’s original groups—“Accommodating Mercantilist” and “Ideological Free Trader”).

Keywords: UK-China relations, China’s rise, foreign policy, Conservative Party, Cameron, Osborne.

On the eve of his October 2015 UK visit, President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China described his hope that the high-level meetings would

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chart the course for the future growth of China-UK relations, inject new impetus in practical cooperation between our two countries in all fields and enable us to jointly usher in a “golden time” for China-UK comprehensive strategic partnership (cited by Reuters, 2015).

British Prime Minister David Cameron was equally enthusiastic in his comments during the joint press conference, stating that the visit marks a key moment in the relationship between our two countries. It’s founded on a basic belief, which President Xi and I share, that a strong relationship is in the interests of both Britain and China. ... [T]his visit marks the start of a new era. Some have called it a golden era in relations between Britain and China, an era of stronger economic ties, deeper trade links, closer relations between our peoples and meaningful dialogue on the issues that matter to us both (Prime Minister’s Office, 2015).

These statements represent the culmination of a trend towards closer UK-China bilateral relations, which in many ways reflects the positive narrative present at the EU level, regularly defined by policymakers as a “comprehensive strategic partnership”.¹ Yet, in recent history, the UK and China have not been so close, particularly due to the issue of Hong Kong’s retrocession to the PRC in 1997 and the UK’s strategic proximity to the United States of America. The UK was identified by an influential report from the European Council on Foreign Relations as one of the few EU Member States willing to push for ideologically-driven policies towards China, with a willingness to criticise failings in areas such as human rights protection (Fox & Godement, 2009). This paper attempts to offer insights into the course of UK-China relations by addressing two questions: 1) to what extent have the Conservative-led governments since 2010 diverged

¹ The extent to which the EU-China relationship is actually “strategic” is highly questionable, and is the subject to frequent academic critiques. Nevertheless, a persistent narrative around the “strategic partnership” concept has emerged and persisted within the EU from 2003 onwards, reflecting the perception that the relationship is of considerable importance (Brown, 2018: 125-9).
from their predecessors’ approach to China? And 2) to what extent is the description of the UK as an “Ideological Free Trader” in relations with China still applicable?

Since the Conservative Party took the reins of power in 2010 (along with the Liberal Democrats as junior coalition partners until 2015), China’s prominence on the UK’s foreign policy agenda has increased. This paper examines the direction of the UK’s China policy since then, and critically evaluates the continued utility of the “Ideological Free Trader” (IFT) descriptor as devised by Fox and Godement (2009). Through qualitative analysis of evolving policy discourse and select government decisions, the argument is that while early policy stances appeared consistent with the IFT descriptor, the emphasis on free trade has grown considerably whilst the normative (ideological) dimension has diminished. Consequently, the UK should be redefined as an “Accommodating Free Trader” (AFT, a newly-devised amalgamation of two of Fox and Godement’s original groups—“Accommodating Mercantilist” and “Ideological Free Trader”).

The paper aims to make a contribution to the study of UK and EU-China relations. While the literature on EU-China relations is still relatively small—compared to US-China relations, for instance—it has undoubtedly expanded considerably over the past decade. While scholars have often recognised that member states remain crucial to the overall relationship, there has been a bias towards EU-level relations with member states occasionally examined as “actors” within the intergovernmental policy processes. Work on member states’ bilateral relations with China—even the so-called “EU3” of France, Germany, and the UK—are relatively few and far between, with a few notable exceptions. Thus, there is a discernible mismatch between the insistence from scholars that individual member states’ independent/national foreign policies cannot be ignored when considering European foreign policy towards China, and the actual degree to which these are seriously studied. This paper hopes to offer a contribution to bridging that gap.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the subsequent section, I outline the analytical approach adopted with respect to assessing UK foreign policy towards China vis-à-vis Fox and Godement’s (2009) work. Their four categories are reviewed to illustrate their analytical utility and foundation in empirical reality. This provides the basic framework to examine the extent of change in the UK’s case, and map its shift from “Ideological Free Trader” to an essentially new orientation. Before we can discuss the notion of a policy shift, we must locate the “starting point”, thus the third section draws on the Labour government’s 2009 China paper, which encapsulated key elements of policy from 1997 onwards. The fourth section analyses select junctures in the bilateral relationship under the Cameron government. Rather than attempting to construct a comprehensive analysis of relations, the focus is narrowed to a few prominent cases that represent important developments in UK-China and EU-China relations, as well as significant manifestations of China’s rise—such as the militarisation of the South China Sea. The analysis is confined to examining key policy actors’ preferences, as we are interested in their motivations behind decisions/responses. The analysis demonstrates that the designation of the UK as an “Ideological Free Trader” is less appropriate against the background of recent policy direction. The fifth section discusses how to best characterise UK policy towards China since 2010. The paper closes with a reflection on the state of UK-China relations through the first half of this decade, and suggests future avenues of research on UK and EU-China relations.

Analytical Framework

The analysis rests on examining the policy position of the executive; thus domestic disputes over policy—as often aired in the legislatures—are deliberately overlooked. This approach will be followed here, as in-depth analysis of debates in Parliament or the wider public discourse is surplus to requirement and well beyond the scope of the paper. In the UK, the executive is paramount in making foreign policy decisions, therefore the views of political actors within the various institutions matter the most for present purposes. While China pays close attention to Parliamentary debates and activity—for instance, it denounced the Foreign Affairs Select Committee’s 2014 inquiry into UK-Hong Kong relations as “foreign interference” (cited by Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 2015: 23)—this does not alter the fact that Parliament lacks the prerogative to change the policies of the UK as a state independent of the executive. Thus, I share Fox and Godement’s (2009) approach of concentrating on the “official” government foreign policies as created by the Executive.

To focus on the “big picture” of the evolution of the UK’s approach to China, the analytical framework is designed with simplicity in mind. Rather than offer up a detailed analysis of the policymaking process, only the most relevant actors are factored into the empirical cases. It is worth briefly contextualising the institutional setting in which this occurs. Dyson (2004: 5) identified the Cabinet and sub-cabinet committees—such as the National Security Council—as the “primary organizational forums [institutions] for foreign policy core executive decision making”. While the Prime Minister has considerable latitude in foreign policymaking, they are constrained by the need for consensus within the Cabinet on “major foreign policy actions” (Dyson, 2004: 8). Traditionally, the Foreign Secretary, leading the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, is the other key player within the Cabinet. The Chancellor of the Exchequer—widely considered the second-most important position—assumes the central role in foreign economic policy, often spilling over into diplomatic and security considerations. Consequently, the Treasury has an institutional role to play in foreign policymaking, particularly when Osborne enjoyed the informal position of Cameron’s “righthand man” (Parker & Warrell, 2015). As shown below, from 2012 onwards Osborne effectively positioned himself as the key policy entrepreneur with respect to China. Foreign Secretary William Hague (2010–2014) appeared largely in the background of many cases below, partly due to Osborne’s elevated role but also based on Hague’s level of interest in China. In a 2011 interview, Hague expressed scepticism of concentrating attention on relations with China alone as an emerging power: “The world is not going into concentric blocs of power. … You can’t just say we’re going to do it all in Brussels, Beijing and Washington”, further adding that “Latin America is an economy

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3 In this article, I follow Mintrom’s (1997: 739) definition of policy entrepreneurs as “people who seek to initiate dynamic policy change ... [using] several activities to promote their ideas. These include identifying problems, networking in policy circles, shaping the terms of policy debates, and building coalitions”.
considerably bigger than China’s and growing almost as fast, and yet we’ve all heard about China” (cited by Rawnsley & Helm, 2011). Hague’s successor, Phillip Hammond, took office in July 2014 once Osborne’s policy shift was well under way and, so far as the available evidence reveals, did not attempt to wrest back control of policy—instead, he appears to have broadly supported the Chancellor and PM.

John Fox and Francois Godement, of the European Council of Foreign Relations, produced a short but important report entitled *A Power Audit of EU-China Relations* in 2009. Their aims were to assess the EU’s performance in relations with China and construct an explanation for the failings of the EU to leverage its considerable resources to effect positive outcomes in the bilateral relationship. They argued that forging a common EU-level strategy was problematic due to member states’ variegated responses to China’s rise; this produced a situation in which the default was not to challenge China politically. Arguably the most important contribution of the report was the creation of four categories into which the authors pigeonholed the then-27 member states, providing a useful analytical tool for understanding contestation over the EU’s collective stance towards China. Despite the fact that no member state had exactly the same policy position, they were separated into broad groups defined by, essentially, their attitude towards China and labelled as the Assertive Industrialists, Ideological Free-Traders, Accommodating Mercantilists and European Followers (Fox & Godement, 2009: 4–7). The groups were unevenly sized and of differing influence within the EU generally and its foreign policy specifically. Most importantly for current purposes, the categories were not “fixed” as recent history had shown that member states had shifted out of one and into the other following a change of government. Overall, the conceptual framework was unique because it was predicated exclusively on national-level policy preferences with respect to China rather than broader worldviews, or specific national characteristics (identities). That is, the model only applied to EU-China relations, and could not be used for, say, EU-Russia relations.

The report was widely read in member states’ capitals and EU institutions, as this author learned on previous fieldwork trips in the two years subsequent to
the *Power Audit*'s publication. According to Google Scholar statistics, as of June 2017 the report has been cited in over two hundred publications; a respectable figure in the still-niche area of EU-China relations scholarship. Yet, no updated *Power Audit* has been forthcoming from the ECFR, nor have other scholars critically reflected on the extent to which member states have shifted in and out of these groups. This is to the detriment of overall EU-China scholarship, as the potential of Fox and Godement’s framework has yet to be fully realised. In this paper, the original framework is utilised and adapted to construct an understanding of how and why the UK’s policy approach to China shifted quite far in only a few years. Before undertaking the analysis, it is worth briefly surveying the characteristics of Fox and Godement’s groups to help map out the “geography” of member states’ approaches to relations with China.

Taking the largest group first, the *Accommodating Mercantilists* (AM[s]) are driven by a common assumption that “good political relations with China will

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4 This was determined through a search on “Google Scholar”; see the results at: https://scholar.google.com/scholar?client=safari&rls=en&oe=UTF-8&um=1&ie=UTF-8&lr&citers=9542962397354496225 (accessed June 2017).

5 Although the *Power Audit* itself saw no direct successor, Godement et al. (2011) did revisit the categories in a paper entitled “The Scramble for Europe”, looking at EU-China relations in the wake of the financial crisis and ongoing Eurozone crisis. In this, the original four categories were dropped in favour of two new categories: “frustrated market openers” and “cash-strapped deal seekers”. The UK was assigned to the former. However, I do not follow Godement et al. (2011) as my interpretation is that the new categorisations were far more specific to the context of the bilateral relationship during the global financial and Eurozone crises. Arguably, these have lost relevance since the worst manifestations of these crises have subsided. As such, the “original” groups come back into play, as we need to be able to consider more than just member states’ economic positions with respect to China (the two new names were notably economically-oriented). The *Power Audit* groups were more comprehensive since all member states (with the exception of France under Sarkozy) were categorised. In the 2011 paper, 12 of the 27 states were uncategorised—more than were assigned to either of the two new groups; an analytically unsatisfactory and unhelpful move if we are to advance the model. Further, when comparing “political attitude” (x-axis) across both versions, it’s notable that the main players (the UK, France and Germany) and most other states had not changed much over the two-year period between the reports, other than a handful of AMs becoming more politically supportive. “Economic attitude” (y-axis) demonstrated a greater degree of shift, but because what was being measured therein changed (protectionist/liberal spectrum replaced by prioritisation of market access in China versus “Chinese deals in Europe”) there is reason to be cautious about comparing the two.
lead to commercial benefit” (Fox & Godement, 2009: 6). They tend to favour protectionist measures to shield their economies from Chinese competition, but compromise by broadly avoiding exerting political pressure or overtly challenging China on normative issues such as human rights. Fox and Godement (2009: 6) claim that “at the extremes, some effectively act as proxies for China in the EU”. In short, states belonging to this group are motivated by economic self-interest and fail to push the normative agenda, running contrary to the assumptions of the Normative Power Europe model which has gained much attention in the academic literature (see Manners, 2002). Fox and Godement identified France (under Chirac) and Germany (under Schröder) within this group, along with Italy and Spain, the two most protectionist states. The Ideological Free Traders (IFT[s]), including the UK, are those states “mostly ready to pressure China on its politics and mostly opposed to restricting its trade” (Fox & Godement, 2009: 6). Their economic interests are served by promoting free trade to facilitate cheap imports of goods as China continues to grow, since their economies are comparatively less reliant on manufacturing.

The Assertive Industrialists (AI[s]) comprised just three states, including Germany once Angela Merkel assumed the chancellorship. Only AIs were “willing to stand up to China vigorously on both political and economic issues” (Fox & Godement, 2009: 5). Reluctant to allow economics to drive the overall relationship, they are ready to use economic pressure in an attempt to alter China’s behaviour. Germany sits in a particularly powerful position as China’s main EU trade partner, and at times has attempted to leverage this to obtain specific political issues. Fox and Godement (2009) essentially endorse this group as having the most desirable approach that should be applied at the EU level.

The final group were designated the European Followers (EF[s]), those “who prefer to defer to the EU when managing their relationship with China” (Fox & Godement, 2009: 7). China plays a relatively small part in their foreign policy calculations and ambitions; while happy to support the EU position, they are generally inactive in policy debates. The group consisted of smaller states that look to the collective for shelter from Chinese pressure on politically-sensitive issues.

The prevalence of four different groupings of attitudes towards China has had two main effects. First is the impression conveyed to China that the EU lacks
unity (Fox & Godement, 2009: 7), curtailing the extent to which the latter can realise its ambition of a “comprehensive strategic partnership”. If member states cannot agree among themselves on what their strategy should be, the prospects for genuine strategic cooperation are inherently limited. This leads to periodic “re-bilateralisation” of relations, where the EU states view their interests as best served through direct interactions with China, and vice versa. This was evident, for example, in the wake of the EU’s “non-decision” on the lifting of its Chinese arms embargo in 2005 (Stumbaum, 2009: 165). The other—and from Fox and Godement’s (2009: 2) perspective, the more troubling—effect is that the EU’s policy can be characterised as “unconditional engagement”; that is, one that “gives China access to all the economic and other benefits of cooperation with Europe while asking for little in return”. This renders overall policy ineffective, as the EU is essentially unable to influence China’s behaviour.

Fox and Godement’s (2009) report was a snapshot in time. Their observation that both Germany under Merkel and France under Sarkozy “shifted” groups opens up the possibility that variation in member state attitudes impact the overall relationship. Inevitably, it is “movement” by the members of the so-called EU3—France, Germany and the UK—that have the greatest potential for influencing EU-level policies (see Lehne, 2012). Therefore, scholars of European/EU relations with China can utilise the foundation laid by Fox and Godement (2009) to analyse bilateral relations. Such studies, while standing on their own as contributions to the study of the foreign policy of the member state in question, can also feed into further study of EU-China relations. Understanding and explaining shifting attitudinal constellations among the member states with respect to China may also offer modest predictive capacity for how EU policy might evolve, by characterising the policymaking environment as more critical versus more supportive in the political domain and more economically protectionist versus liberalising.

The UK’s 2009 China Policy Paper

To ascertain the degree by which the UK has shifted away from being an Ideological Free Trader, it is necessary to show why it earned this designation in Fox and Godement (2009). However, detailed historical analysis of the
relationship under previous governments is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, our point of departure is the first ever UK policy paper on China, entitled *The UK and China: A Framework for Engagement* (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009). The document essentially consolidates the various strands of the government’s approach from 1997 onwards in one coherent narrative: engagement for the benefit of the UK, China itself and the wider world. This approach would continue, assuming that Labour were re-elected in 2010. There was significant emphasis on economic opportunities from closer engagement, but balanced by constant reinforcements of the need to promote human rights. There is a notable caveat to the benefits of China’s rise—as then-Prime Minister Gordon Brown argued in the foreword that the UK must “get [its] response right” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009: 3). This set the tone for the remainder of the paper with respect to the need to influence China’s behaviour at both the domestic and international levels.

Then-Foreign Minister David Miliband’s contribution to the foreword stressed that the promotion of human rights constituted a “fundamental part of this Framework, both because it is the right thing to do, and because we firmly believe that greater respect for human rights will enable China to manage peacefully the internal tensions it will inevitably encounter as it continues to develop” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009: 4). Human rights advocacy through foreign policy would be achieved by an approach based on engagement and cooperation (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009: 4); implicitly rejecting an approach based on criticising, disengaging or isolating China for human rights failures. Specific outcomes that the UK hoped to see included ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), strengthening of the rule of law, greater independence for the judiciary, abolition (or reduced usage) of the Re-education Through Labour system, reduced application of the death penalty and increased safeguards against torture, and increased media freedoms (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009: 19).

The central focus of the paper was economic opportunities: “In a climate where restrictions on market access remain, and the process of economic reform is not yet complete, we should try to make deeper inroads into China’s market. We will help British businesses make the most from the opportunities
China’s growth offers” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009: 9). The paper outlined objectives of reduced tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, greater protection for Intellectual Property Rights, and the deepening of sector-specific collaboration, e.g. tertiary education and science (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009: 15). A broad commitment to a strategy of engagement was reiterated in a discussion on bringing China into global governance structures, arguing that it was time to bring major international institutions “into line with modern realities of power” by reshaping them to ensure that “China’s role ... reflects its weight and influence” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009: 12). This goal of enmeshing China within the status quo international order must be met without “undermining [the] norms, or diluting [the] effectiveness” of “international leadership structures” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009: 13).

Security issues only appeared in relation to prospects for cooperation on salient international issues, highlighting China’s increased global influence. China’s cooperation would be required to tackle pressing challenges including terrorism, nuclear proliferation and conflict prevention/reduction (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009: 8). The document suggested that the two should “cooperate to manage regional tensions peacefully” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009: 11), later clarifying that this included the East Asian region but—unsurprisingly—stopping short of identifying China’s rise as itself a contributory factor to regional tensions (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009: 17). Passing reference was made to the need for China to increase transparency regarding its defence budget and policy as part of fostering its “emergence as a responsible global player” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2009: 17) but context for the call was missing. In sum, the document matches closely with the description of the IFTs as per Fox and Godement’s (2009) framework: strong emphasis on the importance of free trade, and an ideological component stressing core national values.

The above is not to say that the UK lived up to the “ideal type” of an IFT at all times. Indeed, although policy discourse was peppered with reference to human rights and positions adopted were more critical than that of many European counterparts, the government’s translation of rhetoric to action was often limited. Good economic and political relations dominated, with a
tendency to fall in line with the general trend amongst EU states of pursuing unconditional engagement. For instance, the UK for a time supported the lifting of the arms embargo (contemplated between 2003 and 2005) without attaching formal conditions and despite no real improvement in China’s human rights record (Brown, 2011). Moreover, it is notable that despite the political commitment to the embargo at the EU level, the UK resumed arms and related exports to China in 1998, with reports of some $820 million’s worth by 2016 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017). According to the Campaign Against Arms Trade’s (2017) calculations, between May 2010 and December 2016 the UK government issued licenses for military-related exports of £164 million.6

To some extent, this inability to persistently stand up to China is arguably the reality—that a country the size of the UK has an inherently limited influence on the behaviour of a rapidly-rising economic giant. Despite the former’s diplomatic experience and continued political and economic weight in the international system, it is not easy to demand change—as even the US could attest to. Nevertheless, the willingness of the leadership to raise human rights issues at the national and EU levels (when the opportunity arose) and the embedded belief that political and economic engagement would facilitate Chinese socialisation into Western norms highlights the presence of both “ideological” and “free trader” characteristics in New Labour’s policy.

China Policy in the Cameron Years, 2010-2016

In May 2010, Labour lost power after thirteen years in government. Unusually for Britain, neither of the two major parties secured an outright majority. The options were either entering coalition with a smaller party, or governing as a minority. After a few days of political wrangling, a coalition agreement was forged between the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties with David

6 Nevertheless, restrictions have been enforced, with applications for export licenses to China refused on the basis of the UK’s international treaty/convention obligations, risk of use for internal repression, preservation of regional stability, national security (including that of EU member states, allies and other “friendly countries”), and/or the “risk of diversion or re-export to undesirable end-users” (Campaign Against Arms Trade, 2017).
Cameron (leader of the former) occupying 10 Downing Street. The Conservatives, as the major coalition partner, dominated cabinet positions, including the Treasury and Foreign Office portfolios. On the surface, the major difference of the new government compared to its predecessor was a much cooler attitude towards the EU generally. Consequently, the concern with driving the EU’s China policy was diminished under the new government, albeit the emphasis on greater market access for China persisted. In this section, I explore a series of cases which illustrate the UK’s reaction to the political, economic and security ramifications of China’s continued rise. The Dalai Lama controversy was the catalyst for the departure from previous policy, highlighting Beijing’s increased political and economic clout. The case of the UK signing up to the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank represented a decision that is as much political as it is economic, while Hinkley Point C and the South China Sea represent, respectively, domestic (British) and regional (East Asian) security issues.

In the early stages of Cameron’s government it appeared that continuity rather than change was the name of the game with respect to China relations. The Conservative Party’s manifesto had included a few references to China, buried deep towards the end of its 119 pages. The prevailing policy approach was articulated by the manifesto’s concise assertion that in power they would “seek closer engagement ... while standing firm on human rights” (Conservative Party, 2010: 110). EU-China relations were briefly mentioned, giving support for an EU external policy that would contribute to a “strong and open relation[ship]” (Conservative Party, 2010: 113). The only specific policy change outlined was, to serve a goal of increasing the efficiency of international aid spending, that the Conservatives would end aid to China on the grounds that their own government (along with other countries, such as Russia) should be “looking after their own poor citizens” (Conservative Party, 2010: 118).

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7 Despite the coalition, for expediency I hereafter refer to the “Conservative government” or the “Cameron government” for the 2010–2016 period. This is appropriate given the strength of the Prime Minister in the domain of foreign policy, as well as the primacy of the Chancellor during this period, due to the lack of a formal system of checks and balances based on a codified constitution.
Early policy choices and positions staked out on key issues in the relationship with China reinforce the validity of the designation as an IFT. Ahead of his first official visit to China, Cameron commented that the government was on a “vitaly important trade mission”, emphasising that “Britain is now open for business, has a very business-friendly government, and wants to have a much, much stronger relationship” (cited by Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2010). In a speech to students during an official visit in November 2010, Cameron addressed political reform, arguing that he was “convinced that the best guarantor of prosperity and stability is for economic and political progress to go in step together” (cited by Wintour & Inman, 2010). It was reported that Cameron also raised individual cases of human rights abuses directly with Premier Wen Jiabao, although had justified his approach of doing so behind closed doors on the grounds that “we shouldn't be lecturing and hectoring but it is right we have a dialogue on these things” (cited by Wintour and Inman, 2010). When the issue of the arms embargo briefly threatened to resurface on the EU’s agenda in late 2010 and early 2011, it was reported that the UK was opposed to revisiting the issue (Lohman & McNamara, 2011).

The policy shift came after the 2012 meeting between Cameron and Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, and the Dalai Lama, despite PRC lobbying efforts. Arguably, this precipitated the lowest point in UK-China relations since the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. China’s reaction was nothing new—indeed, it cancelled the 2008 EU-China Summit following French President Sarkozy’s meeting with the Dalai Lama—but it was the first time that Cameron’s government had been on the receiving end. The plug was pulled on Wu Bangguo’s planned UK visit, the British ambassador was summoned by the government, and Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Hong Lei publicly rebuked the meeting, which “seriously interfered with China’s internal affairs, undermined China’s core interests, and hurt the feelings of the Chinese people” (cited by BBC, 2012).

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8 This speech was given to a relatively small group of students, with no broadcast or media coverage. Consequently, the Chinese government had little motivation to censor Cameron.  
9 Despite continuing to export certain items, as noted in Section 3.  
10 Chairman, Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.
This marked the start of a turning point for the UK government’s approach, whereby those who favoured greater political accommodation in order to ensure smooth progress in the economic relationship started to win internal debates. Based on the publicly available evidence, Osborne was the key policy entrepreneur for this school of thought. The Economist (2015) later reported “no British politician [was] more closely associated” with the improvements in UK-China relations since 2012 than Osborne himself. Osborne stressed that the government “made a determined effort to ensure that ... Britain is China’s best partner in the West. And that has been a conscious decision” (cited by Economist, 2015). The shift was evident in early 2013, when reports emerged of a split within in the Cabinet, with Osborne and Cameron on one side and Hague and Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg (leader of the Liberal Democrats) on the other. One Whitehall source summarised the division:

Hague and Clegg ... believe we need to stand up to the Chinese. For Clegg, human rights are a matter of principle. For Hague, it’s about not kowtowing to the Chinese. He believes we need to stand up to them, or they will simply treat us with contempt. Cameron and Osborne are focused on trade. They want to keep the Chinese on side [politically] (cited by Oakeshott & Grimston, 2013).

Despite the events of 2012 and the Cabinet’s internal debates in 2013 instigating a reorientation of Britain’s approach, the process was gradual rather than immediate, with no political fanfare or high-level declaration. The shift seemed to go largely unnoticed until 2015, with the exception of human rights groups criticising Cameron—ahead of his 2013 visit to China to promote trade and investment deals—for agreeing not to meet the Dalai Lama in the near future; this criticism was accentuated by an ICM survey revealing that sixty-nine percent of respondents thought that “protecting human rights in Tibet was more important or as important as maintaining good trade relations with China” (cited by Hope, 2013). The next major issue stemmed from China’s 2014 proposal to establish the AIIB as a means through which to fund its One Belt, One Road (OBOR—or New Silk Road) initiative.
The significance of the AIIB is twofold. One, it represents the manifestation of China’s increased confidence to exercise both political and economic power to further its aims—effectively a form of soft power. If successful, the AIIB will increase China’s international influence through economic incentives for participating states. It may also enable China to challenge “dollar hegemony” (Holmes, 2015). Two, it arguably signals China’s willingness to operate outside the established international economic order—rather than turning to existing institutions, a new one was created. The move then plays into debates over whether China is a status quo or revisionist power. Certainly, numerous commentators picked up on the fact that the Obama administration appeared to view the AIIB as a direct challenge to the US-designed (and backed) institutions (e.g. Subbachi, 2015). Others saw the institution—and the divergent responses in Europe and the US—as a strategy designed to divide the West (e.g. Le Corre, 2015). The UK government apparently did not share these pessimistic interpretations; in March 2015, Osborne announced the UK’s intention to become a founding member of the AIIB, proudly declaring that it would be “the first major Western country” to do so (HM Treasury, 2015a).

While the announcement was warmly received in China, the tone of the reaction in the US was remarkable for its bluntness. Ostensibly, the UK had given no prior indication of its intentions, and the Obama administration took issue with a key ally committing to joining an institution that it saw as a challenge to its own power, even after direct appeals to allies—including the UK—not to join (Higgins & Sanger, 2015). The subsequent rush of other European actors to sign up to the AIIB, lest they miss out on the opportunity, further reinforced US concerns. Somewhat unusually, the US National Security Council issued a statement about the UK’s move to The Guardian, noting that it “is the UK’s sovereign decision” but urged the British government to “push for adoption of high [governance] standards” similar to those of the World Bank and other regional development banks (cited by Watt et al., 2015). There was a parallel concern among US officials that the AIIB was effectively a tool for increasing China’s regional soft power (Watt et al., 2015). One senior official was quoted as lamenting the fact that the UK’s announcement was preceded by “virtually no consultation”, and added that there was wariness regarding “a trend toward constant accommodation of China, which is not the best way to engage a rising power” (cited by Dyer & Parker, 2015). Eswar Prasad, formerly head of the IMF’s
China division told *The Financial Times* that “apart from gaining favour with China it is not immediately obvious what the UK interest is in joining this bank” (cited by Anderlini, 2015).

The negative reaction to the AIIB decision was largely external. However, Osborne’s September Xinjiang visit and President Xi’s October state visit caused analysts, commentators and the public to sit up and take notice of the accommodating nature of UK policy. Osborne’s goal in Xinjiang was to enhance economic ties and state support for the One Belt, One Road initiative. In an opinion piece—co-authored with former Goldman Sachs economist Lord Jim O’Neill—published in *The Guardian* just before the visit, the Chancellor’s perspective on China relations was clearly set out:

> There are those who say we should fear China’s rise—that we should somehow guard ourselves against it. But we reject such thinking, which would simply leave the UK slipping behind. Instead, we should embrace it. We want a golden relationship with China that will help foster a golden decade for this country. It is an opportunity that the UK can’t afford to miss. Simply put, we want to make the UK China’s best partner in the west (Osborne & O’Neill, 2015).

At home, Osborne received criticism from human rights activists for failing to raise the issue of increased repression in the region. Sophie Richardson, Human Rights Watch’s China director, asserted that a failure to publicly raise human rights issues would demonstrate “how craven and cowardly UK policy towards China has become” (cited by Phillips, 2015a). Activists’ concerns appeared to be validated by government statements around the trip; an HM Treasury (2015b) press release on the first day of the visit did not mention the ethnic violence in the region or human rights concerns more broadly. Pressed on the issue, Osborne told BBC Radio’s “Today” programme that he would not engage in “megaphone diplomacy”, and argued that the UK would help with the economic development of the region (cited by Phillips, 2015b). Later during the trip, he told foreign journalists that in his view it would be “very strange if Britain’s only relationship with one fifth of the world’s population and the government that
represents them was solely about human rights ... [but it] doesn’t mean we don’t stand up for our values” (cited by Phillips, 2015b).

Xi’s state visit the following month was the first of its kind in a decade, and was described by the British government as “a spectacular celebration of our shared appreciation of heritage and culture” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2015). In addition to the diplomatic dimension, there were economic incentives behind the visit. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2015) identified commercial agreements across the “creative industries, retail, energy, health and technology, financial services, aerospace and education” sectors. Cameron called it “a very important moment for British-Chinese relations ... a real opportunity to deepen our relationship” (cited by Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2015). Of the issue areas listed on the government website for discussion, China’s human rights record and actions in the South China Sea were not listed. Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond’s comments ahead of the visit identified the opportunity to “ensure that China’s emergence is done in a way that ensures she respects the rules-based international system and works with the grain of the international community to be, and to remain, a responsible player on the world stage” (cited by Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2015).

Criticism of the portrayed closeness of the relationship with China quickly mounted up in the national and international media. The Financial Times framed the visit as “the moment when the existing global hegemon’s closest ally bent its knee to the rising superpower” (Anderlini & Parker, 2015). The speaker of the House of Commons, John Bercow, remarked that India was a “great democracy” following an MP's comment that the government should treat both great powers the same way (cited by Dathan, 2015). Such political statements in this manner from the speaker are rather rare, and garnered considerable attention given the implicit criticism of China’s regime. Cameron’s own former adviser, Steve Hilton, characterised the government’s behaviour as “humiliating” (cited by Parker, 2015). Elsewhere, Fabian Hamilton MP (Chair of the All Parliamentary Group on Tibet) stated that the UK should not allow China “to get away with the kind of human rights abuse that our government seems so eager to ignore in the name of economic growth” (cited by EuroNews, 2015). Supporters of Tibet...
and the PRC even clashed on the streets of London upon Xi’s arrival (Islam, 2015).

Cameron was quick to counter his critics, arguing that he “totally reject[ed] the idea you either have a conversation about human rights and steel or you have a strong relationship with China ... you can have both, indeed you must have both” (cited by Parker, 2015). He also claimed that he raised human rights issues behind closed doors, although his aides would not disclose specifics (Parker, 2015). The government largely went on the defensive throughout the visit and thereafter, with Hammond denying that the UK was in a “master/servant” relationship with China (cited by Islam, 2015). Irrespective of these assertions and what may have been said behind closed doors, the overall impression was that the red carpet had been rolled out for the Chinese President. There was a concerted effort to present the image of a “friendly” personal relationship between Cameron and Xi with a pint at the pub and a “selfie” with Sergio Aguero of Manchester City Football Club. The front page of *The Spectator*’s September 26 issue—published ahead of the visit—depicted Cameron and Osborne kowtowing to a Chinese emperor, and asked: “Where’s the morality?”11 The cover served as a graphical representation of the extent of criticism that Cameron and Osborne received from across the political spectrum for their open-armed approach and ostensible political accommodation in return for economic gain.

Out of the October 2015 visit came one of the UK government’s more controversial decisions: the solicitation—and eventual approval—of Chinese investment in the development of a new nuclear energy power station. The final deal saw France’s EDF commit to building the station, to be part-funded by China General Nuclear (*France24*, 2016). The controversy largely focussed on China’s involvement, with critics citing concerns over security, particularly the prospects for China to gain develop insights into—and potentially exploit—weaknesses in critical infrastructure. Caroline Baylon of Chatham House stated that “if the international situation changes [with respect to the unspoken agreement between nations not to target each other’s infrastructure], the UK

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may find itself in a tricky spot if this Chinese deal goes through. Today’s alliances are not tomorrow’s alliances” (cited by BBC, 2015a). In the same report, unnamed defence and security sources were concerned over the prospect of “trapdoors or backdoors” being built into the computer systems designed by the Chinese company, facilitating the bypass of security measures if ever needed (BBC, 2015a). Despite these warnings being communicated to the public via the media, the government actively played down the concerns, instead concentrating on the economic and energy-related benefits.

Osborne justified the decision to facilitate Chinese investment in the UK’s civilian nuclear infrastructure through appealing to the British taxpayer; he referred to the decision as a “concrete advantage for British people” of the close bilateral relationship. As Chancellor, he did “not need to stump up billions and billions of pounds of taxpayers’ money to build a new nuclear power station ... money I can’t then spend on the health service or can’t then spend on the education system or can’t use to cut taxes” (Osborne, cited by Economist, 2015). Osborne apparently had little regard for either the potential security implications or, it would seem, how the public, the media, or the UK’s international partners might perceive the decision, even after the recent criticisms levelled at his policy approach. Treated in isolation, the decision could be argued to be relatively innocuous; however, placed in the wider context of China’s increasing assertiveness at that time (see below), then the decision arguably represents further accommodation when the UK’s main strategic partner—the US—was increasingly concerned about China’s actions.

The South China Sea disputes (SCSDs) —and the international community’s response to China’s assertive actions and uncompromising political position—arguably represents the clearest case of the challenge of integrating a rising power into the Western-led, rules-based international system. China is involved in long-running disputes with its neighbours pertaining to sovereign territorial claims within the South China Sea (SCS). The contestation for territorial control is deemed worthwhile for access to natural resources (oil and gas) and fisheries, and of course, national pride (Lunn & Lang, 2016: 5). Trade routes through the SCS are also important: some $5.3 trillion in total trade passes through annually, and 90% of Middle Eastern fossil fuel exports are projected to go the Asian region by 2035 (CFR, 2016). Therefore, there are economic and political factors
at play. The fine details of the disputes are beyond the scope of this paper, but
the most salient aspects can be distilled: China asserts historical claims of
sovereignty of territory far from its own coast, bringing it into dispute with
Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. In order to bolster their
claims and assert their “sovereignty”, all but one (Brunei) have occupied at least
some of their claimed islands, establishing a (para)military presence there (Lunn
& Lang, 2016: 6). Controversially, since 2013, China has “engaged in
unprecedented and ecologically devastating dredging and island-building” in
the Spratly Islands, creating “more than 3,200 acres of new land” (Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative, 2016a). Upon these new artificial islands, China has
apparently been constructing military bases, despite claims from the
government that they are for civilian purposes (Sanger & Gladstone, 2016). The
militarization of the SCS is viewed as a potential flashpoint for conflict between
the disputants, as well as facilitating China’s ability to project power throughout
the region (CFR, 2016).

Although the UK lacks a regional presence in any meaningful sense, it
nevertheless remains an interested party due to its permanent seat on the UN
Security Council and its considerable economic stakes in continued freedom of
navigation, which some are concerned is under threat due to the increased
militarization of the SCS and China’s increased assertiveness in the region. As an
IFT, the UK would be expected to uphold the international status quo and insist
on adherence to international law precisely because the current arrangements
continue to deliver benefits. The US, the principal status quo power, has
repeatedly made clear that it will not accept China’s aggressive approach to the
SCSDs and insists upon continued freedom to navigate through contested
waters. Despite the conventional wisdom that the UK largely backs the US in
foreign policy matters, the Conservative-led government in the UK has been
relatively quiet on the SCSDs, only offering statements with more direct
language when prompted to do so by others or under the cover of multilateral
settings, for instance within the G7.

The most revealing statements from government officials are found in the
Parliamentary record. In December 2015, Minister of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs Hugo Swire responded to a written question regarding
whether the UK had a view on, specifically, China’s maritime claims. Swire noted
that the UK “takes no position on the underlying and conflicting claims” and that it advocated the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes “in accordance with international law, for example [UNCLOS]” (Parliament, 2015a). The Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Penny Morduant, replied to a written question on whether the Royal Navy would adhere to China’s proclaimed territorial limit around the Spratly Islands with confirmation that British ships would “exercise the right of innocent passage whenever transiting in another States’ recognised territorial seas” which would require “neither prior authorization nor authorization from the coastal State” (Parliament, 2015b). In March 2016, Swire responded to a question on the SCSDs during a parliamentary debate, reasserting these principles. He added that the government was “concerned about the risk that some of the large-scale land reclamation … could pose to maritime freedom of navigation and to the area’s stability” (Parliament, 2016). Importantly, Swire only expressed “concern”, and did not articulate a preference for cessation of the reclamation activities. While it can be inferred that the concern stems from China’s activities specifically, this was not explicitly stated. By contrast, President Obama had previously called on China to “halt reclamation, new construction, and militarisation of disputed island[s]” (cited by BBC, 2015b). Consequently, the UK has adopted a non-confrontational approach on this issue, apparently unwilling to directly challenge China on the political front, and crucially, unwilling to offer rhetorical support for the position of the US.

Cameron’s willingness to stand up to China on political matters appeared to return in May 2016 when, at the G7 Summit in Japan, he called for compliance with the upcoming tribunal ruling from the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, arguing that China should be encouraged “to be part of [the] rules-based world. We want to encourage everyone to abide by these adjudications” (cited by Asthana et al., 2016). According to coverage in The Guardian, Cameron had “adopted his toughest stance yet on China’s claims, following criticism from the White House that he has been too accommodating towards Beijing” (Asthana et al., 2016). Yet Cameron called on all sides to respect the outcome, and purposefully avoided taking a side on the competing claims. Thereafter, the government largely avoided making further, independent statements on the upcoming tribunal ruling, despite the US looking to its allies to take a firm
stance. By the time the ruling was made in July 2016, Cameron was no longer Prime Minister.

Theresa Fallon (2016) argued that “China’s economic statecraft has softened the resolve of some EU member-states and groomed them to advocate Beijing’s position” on the SCSDs. Fallon (2016) noted that the language in the EU’s collective response to the arbitration tribunal failed to take a strong position, only acknowledging the outcome, not supporting or welcoming it. The main opponents of a stronger position were Greece, Hungary and Croatia—although we can infer that the UK, France and Germany were not desperate for one either, for they could have brought their weight to bear and pushed forward. Essentially, China hoped for EU neutrality on the SCSDs. Here then, it is not just a case of the UK accommodating China—and indeed there were more egregious examples from other EU states. However, the evident unwillingness of the UK to take an assertive position and call on China to respect the ruling, as the US had and hoped its allies would, conforms to the general drift away from its ideological approach towards accommodation. In the context of the UK having voted to leave the EU—although still formally a member state until official withdrawal—there was arguably scope to start asserting its own voice on the international stage, had the government chosen to do so.

From “Ideological Free Trader” to “Accommodating Free Trader”

Fox and Godement (2009: 7) observed that with respect to the competition between the major EU states for the title of “partner of choice”, China typically only granted “preferred status for a limited duration offering its favours to the highest or most pliant bidder”. Thus, if the UK’s recent overtures on the political and economic fronts were orchestrated to position it as the new favourite, at best the results would be of short-term benefit, but potentially costly in terms of the negative reactions in the domestic and international contexts. Breslin

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12 Arguably, the EU referendum outcome may prove to diminish China’s interest in the UK given that it will no longer be able to influence overall EU China policy. However, even in the situation whereby the UK had voted to remain in the EU, its boosted reputation with China would still be subjected to the same patterns of recent history—short-term favouritism which encourages competition from France and Germany.
(2004: 409-410) noted that some observers saw New Labour’s early approach of promoting economic relations while attempting to maintain an “ethical” foreign policy centred on human rights as essentially contradictory; however, the counterargument rested on the belief that engaging China and integrating it with the established international order would facilitate change in domestic policy over time—this national-level engagement strategy was largely in tune with the positions adopted by other EU member states during the 1990s.

As with Fox and Godement’s (2009) observation that both Merkel and Sarkozy had substantially shifted the approach of their respective country’s policy towards China, the UK underwent a similar—although less immediate—reorientation following the Conservatives replacing Labour in government. Thus, the characterisation of states as “Ideological Free Trader”, “Accommodating Free Trader”, or any other designation must be caveated with the realisation that these are not fixed identities. The interesting difference in the case of the UK’s reorientation was that rather than the head of government, it was in fact another policy entrepreneur, Chancellor Osborne, who was in the driving seat. Ultimately, Cameron, as PM, held constitutional power over foreign policy within the Cabinet as the core executive and could have effectively “vetoed” Osborne, but appeared to have been sufficiently persuaded by his colleague to support the new approach. Osborne was critical of the failure of the preceding government to capitalise on economic opportunities, complaining that “we woefully failed to connect Britain to the growing Chinese economy in the previous decade” (cited by Economist, 2015). In the interview, The Economist’s Bagehot columnist queried the UK’s role in democracy and human rights promotion; Osborne’s response largely dodged discussing these issues directly, instead focussing on the fact he was engaging China in an “economic and financial dialogue” and was personally interested in “Britain projecting itself abroad” (cited by Economist, 2015). According to one source familiar with Osborne’s views, he was “convinced that the UK strategy is right and that the US is wrong” (Anderlini & Parker, 2015).

In terms of material circumstances changing, a question remains as to exactly how economically important China was for the UK during the timeframe of analysis. The data on UK-China trade over the 2006-2016 period shows that exports and imports have increased (Table 1). Although lagging behind UK-US
trade and comparatively small compared to UK-EU trade, China is nevertheless an important trading partner for the UK already. Osborne’s rhetoric emphasised the potential for even greater economic relations on the basis of its continued growth (both in terms of overall GDP and the wealth of its expanding middle classes). Compared to 2006, by 2016 UK exports to China had more than trebled. By comparison, exports to the US only increased by approximately ten percent, and exports to the EU had in fact shrunk. Imports from the US and China were virtually level in 2016. In 2015, one report projected that British foreign direct investment in China would quadruple by 2020 (Burn-Callander, 2015). During his September 2015 visit to Chengdu, Osborne hailed the “unprecedented opportunity to secure significant [Chinese] investment into some of our most ambitious projects” (cited by Giles & Plimmer, 2015). The potential for attracting investment is evident, when China’s FDI outflows increased by an average of thirty percent annually from 2005-2015 (Hanemann & Huotari, 2017: 4). Between 2000 and 2016, the UK was the top European destination for Chinese FDI, attracting over €23.6 billion—in the same timeframe, Germany attracted over €18.8 billion (Hanemann & Huotari, 2017: 10). Even so, Osborne continually pressed that the UK could—and needed—to do better. This impacted his policy preferences, which Cameron enabled him to translate into both government statements and policy decisions.

The trend in the UK’s foreign policy orientation towards accommodation is not irreversible; a crucial point here is that the prevailing views of actors (particularly policy entrepreneurs) within the foreign policy core executive can
strongly set the course for how the country interacts with China. This is true for
the other EU member states, as shown by Fox and Godement (2009). This
perspective rejects the notion of the “fixed” national interest to which all
policymakers are relentlessly working towards. It also demonstrates the
limitations of assuming that interests are exogenously determined by the
structure of the international system or contingent on the behaviour of third
parties. China’s policy towards the UK did not change significantly during the
2010–16 period—rather, it continued to press its case for greater access to
British/European markets and retaliate to any perceived criticism of its domestic
behaviour towards its own citizens or offences to its international character
(such as the Dalai Lama being granted high-level meetings). Thus, calculations
of interests and perceptions at the individual or group level can result in rapid
policy shifts.

Indeed, although the new Prime Minister, Theresa May, has been in office for
less than a year at the time of writing (June 2017), there are indications that her
government may push the UK back towards the IFT grouping. It is too early to
draw any firm conclusions, with few interactions to analyse; rather
unsurprisingly, the May government is preoccupied with other, arguably more
pressing issues, not least the UK’s impending departure from the EU. However,
éarly signs suggest a different approach to her predecessor. May initially
delayed the final approval of the Hinkley Point cooperative deal, citing security
concerns. The delay was defended as necessary to address outstanding security
concerns. In the end, however, May relented and signed off on the agreement,
but gave no clarification as to whether her concerns had even been resolved, or
what steps would be taken to ensure national security or assurances from China
(if any). Indeed, the delay lasted for just seven weeks, which does not appear to
provide much scope for tackling the complexity of questions around protecting
critical infrastructure while allowing the close practical involvement of a state-
backed Chinese enterprise. Nevertheless, the very fact that May was willing to
publicly declare that the government harboured security concerns was a
marked departure from Cameron and Osborne.

On the SCSDs, the UK has not shifted stance and continues to align with the
rest of the EU. This would be one area where the UK could actually demonstrate
its “difference” from the EU—supposedly one of the goals of those who
advocated leaving the Union—and shore up its strategic partnership with the US by recalibrating its policy and rhetoric. In July 2016, the tribunal ruled on the SCSDs following the Philippines’ request for arbitration over China’s claims. The court can only enforce its rulings through “international pressure”, thus “how many countries recognize the decision as legally binding on both parties and call for it to be respected will determine its ultimate value” (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2016b). Prior to the ruling, the UK—along with the other EU states—had supported the tribunal, arguing that it would be legally binding and that both sides must respect the outcome (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2016b). However, at the time of writing, the UK has yet to join the ranks of those—including the US—issuing public calls for the outcome to be respected. Had the government done so, this would more clearly signal a return to a more assertive stance on political issues. Instead, the primary response came from the High Representative, in a statement on behalf of the EU and its member states that acknowledged the ruling but did not explicitly push for China’s compliance. The policy line that the EU does not “take a position on sovereignty aspects relating to claims” was reiterated and the involved parties were urged to resolve the dispute through peaceful means and “in accordance with international law” (Mogherini, 2016). Missing from the statement was an endorsement of the final ruling as legally binding (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2016b). Still, it is relatively early days since the ruling thus it would be premature to definitively claim that the UK’s position will remain unchanged.

A final point with respect to the UK’s status within the EU at present: the decision to leave the Union does not necessarily undermine the rationale of looking at its China policy through the prism of Fox and Godement’s (2009) typologies, or variants thereof. Until the UK and the EU finalise the withdrawal process, it remains a full member and therefore an active participant in the Common Foreign and Security Policy framework, even if its ability to influence EU policy towards China is considerably diluted. It is reasonable to suggest that, even after “Brexit”, there will be much need for the UK and EU to cooperate on foreign policy. It is possible that something akin to an “EU+1” policy sphere may emerge due to overlapping interests and shared history. The exact nature of the new political relationship and forms of cooperation in “external” relations remains to be determined by the Article 50 negotiation process. Even if this results in effectively zero cooperation in foreign policy, the UK will still be
interested in pursuing free-trade arrangements with China, and will continue to make decisions on whether or not to inject ideological concerns into the political dimension of the bilateral relationship. In short, even outside the EU, we can still meaningfully talk about the UK as an Ideological Free Trader, Accommodating Free Trader, etc. A question which further research should address is whether Brexit—when it finally happens—correlates with a reorientation of British foreign policy towards China. Moreover, as Kerry Brown (2016) pointed out, in China’s “strategic thinking, the UK will figure as a far less important partner than it has hitherto”; thus, how the PRC orders its priorities with regards to engaging with the EU and UK will be an interesting feature worthy of scholarly exploration.

Conclusion

At the outset, I established two questions to be pursued through this paper. Here, I will briefly recap my argument in relation to these, and then consider how further research might build upon the analysis. First, the Conservative-led government between 2010 and 2016 diverged from its predecessor’s approach to China mainly in terms of adopting a more politically accommodating stance. This emerged in the wake of China’s repudiation of Cameron for meeting the Dalai Lama in 2012, and thereafter the government revised its mode of engagement to avoid upsetting the PRC. This fostered an environment in which the UK could pursue economic relations largely unrestrained by ethical concerns. Although previous governments had sought good economic relations at the expense of sticking to a principled or ethical foreign policy at all costs, Cameron’s government arguably took this further than ever before. Kerry Brown (2013) commented that Cameron’s “journey from human rights champion to business pragmatist has been spectacular”. The political approach moved the UK into close proximity with its EU counterparts, while on the economic dimension, it continued to promote free trade. Thus in answering the second question, the “Ideological Free Trader” descriptor for the UK is no longer applicable; instead its behaviour is more accurately encapsulated by designating it as an “Accommodating Free Trader”.
Further research will of course be required to ascertain whether this persists through the premiership of Theresa May and once the UK has left the EU. It is possible that this shifting approach may simply reflect the policy preferences of key players confined to the Cameron government between 2010 and 2016. The early evidence from PM May’s government is inconclusive; the relatively quick decision to finalise the Hinkley nuclear deal without making further ado about security concerns may indicate continuity over substantive change. On the South China Sea dispute and associated international ruling, May resisted taking a more forceful line. Future research could be broadened out to examine the trends in policy direction of other EU member states, and test the extent to which Fox and Godement’s (2009) original categories remain useful tools of analysis. Further down the road, researchers could look into how the EU’s approach to China changed following “Brexit”, and the extent to which it enabled the UK to pursue a more distinctive policy, as envisioned by key proponents of the Leave campaign (see, for example, Leave.EU, 2016).

References


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Investment is often more than merely about simple movements of capital and seeking for financial gain. For the People’s Republic of China it has been linked to issues like acquiring badly needed know-how and technology, or supporting diplomatic or soft power strategies. Investment and hosting of business from the Republic of China (Taiwan) carries with it a whole host of implications. Forbidden in the era of martial law under the KMT, in the late 1980s and into the 1990s these restrictions were relaxed. What had been a mere trickle in the era just after reform and opening up, started in the mainland in 1978, had become a floodgate by the time the People’s Republic joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001.

As Chun-Yi Lee makes clear in this lucid, well-structured overview of the phenomenon of Taiwanese business in the mainland, there were three broad phases to this phenomenon. At the start, she makes clear, through looking at meeting frequency and interaction between Taiwanese and Chinese officials and business people, it was mostly a matter of local governments in the mainland seeing an opportunity to boost their growth figures and tax revenues by getting as much foreign investment as possible—and Taiwan fell into that category, despite the Beijing central government’s demand that Taiwan was politically considered domestic space.

The politicisation of this link with Taiwan became more overt after the democratisation of the island in 1996. Suddenly, faced with the challenges of dealing with that fundamental change, the Beijing government took a much closer interest in co-ordinating responses to Taiwanese investment, treating the many tens of thousands of Taiwanese business people as a bridge or useful link between the two places, and trying to involve them much more in a broad
political approach to Taiwan that was constantly pushing towards messages supporting closer integration, deeper mutual involvement and eventual reunification. Some of these moves were so indulgent to Taiwanese that they were outlawed by the WTO agreement and its strictures on non-preferential treatment for one partner over another.

Finally, from the era of Ma Ying-jeou and his election as President in 2008 onwards, Lee sees a cooling off of interest towards using Taiwanese business as a conduit. By that time, with a new trade deal, and restoration of air, postal and other links directly across the Strait, there were other ways by which to exercise influence that were more direct, and easier to see tangible direct gain from.

This study, arising from Lee’s doctorate, is based on extensive field research within China with Taiwanese business people and Chinese government officials. It provides a clear narrative for the role of Taiwanese business, one which carefully maps out its rise, and then development. This is an important contribution to the story of foreign investment in the People’s Republic, to the study of cross-Strait relations, and to the political economy of Northeast Asia.

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