Could or Should? The Changing Modality of Authority in the China Daily

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Abstract

This paper applies corpus techniques of linguistic discourse analysis to an examination of the Chinese government-owned English-language newspaper the China Daily. The aim is to look for evidence of change over the last decade in the way the deontic modal language of power, obligation and permission—expressions such as ‘you must do such-and-such’ and ‘you should/may do so-and-so’—is associated in the newspaper with Chinese establishment/authority figures. The study compares two corpora of 50 China Daily texts—one selected from 1998, one from 2010—to look for evidence of change in the way such deontic modal language is used, and seeks to interpret this evidence in the context of China’s changing social, political and media culture. The study focuses on modality found in the context of what William Labov (1972) labelled ‘evaluation’—an aspect of the narrative structure of text revealing the relationship between narrator and audience.

Keywords: China, media, censorship, power, modality, evaluation, discourse analysis

Introduction

On 22 August, 2012, Xu Huaiqian, editor-in-chief of the Earth (Dadi) supplement of China’s principal state-owned newspaper, the People's Daily (Renmin ribao), committed suicide. In an interview before his death, Xu was quoted as saying: ‘My pain is I dare to think, but I don't dare to speak out; if I dare to speak out, I don't dare to write it down, and if I dare to write it down, there is no place to publish,’ (Wu, 2012: 1).

Xu is far from the first Chinese journalist to have struggled with censorship and self-censorship through fear. In a 2008 blog, the journalist Chang Ping wrote about his own inner struggles while working for government-owned
publications. ‘I am afraid of other people praising me as a brave newspaperman, because I know I am full of fear,’ he wrote. ‘What I’ve practiced most is avoiding risk. Self-censorship has become part of my life’ (Chang, 2008: 1). Chang’s case is among those cited by Bennett (2010) in her list of the ways in which the Chinese state continues to exercise control over the Chinese media. The struggles of journalists such as Xu and Chang to reconcile their consciences with the reality of state control tell a more subtle story than just the continued existence of censorship within the mainstream Chinese media, however. They point towards a growing sense of professionalism among China’s mainstream journalists—a growing desire to push the boundaries of what can be reported while not pushing too far or too fast.

This delicate balance was demonstrated in the way the Chinese media reported the collision of two high-speed trains near Wenzhou in mainland China on 23 July, 2011. Chinese news outlets quickly reported the collision. But within hours, noted media commentator Qian Gang, reporters received directives from the Central Propaganda Department, the Information Office and other government departments on how and what to report. ‘Many journalists were called back from the crash scene. Newspapers and television stations were instructed to report positive stories and avoid questioning the Ministry of Railways and government more generally’ (Qian, 2011: 1). This was not the end of the story, however. Despite the efforts at control, some state media outlets carried strongly worded criticism of the Chinese government. By 29 July, a dramatic shift in mainland news coverage was under way: ‘Media, including the People’s Daily, did widespread reporting... The front pages of many Chinese newspapers conveyed the sadness and rage felt by ordinary Chinese’ (Qian, 2011: 1). There were three main reasons why such a shift was possible, Qian argued: the rapid growth of the internet; the increasing existence of ‘media professionals who harbour idealism and see themselves as voices of the people’; and the presence of a force within the Chinese Communist Party itself promoting the advancement of political reform.

The tension between an increasingly diverse, commercialised and globally exposed media in China, and the attempts by the Chinese state to maintain control over it while pressing ahead with economic reform and greater participation in the global economy and community, has been the focus of increasing attention from academic researchers. Some, such as Wang and
Chen (2008), have used data collected from a survey of Chinese news consumers in Shanghai to examine whether the attitude of Chinese citizens towards state-media relations is shifting. Others, such as Stockmann and Gallagher (2011), have used content analysis of Chinese newspapers and TV news programmes, supplemented by interviews with Chinese journalists and a survey of news-consumers, to document how Chinese media coverage of labour disputes sticks closely to the Party line, despite the fact that marketisation has changed the way the news is delivered. Qian (2010a, 2010b, 2011) uses observation of the way news events are reported in China to attempt better to understand the shifting nature of the relationship between state and media in the country. Sun (2008) argues, meanwhile, that the apparent process of reform taking place in China’s media articulates mainly middle-class concerns and peripheralises disadvantaged communities.

This paper seeks to contribute to this growing body of work by applying some of the discourse analytical techniques developed for the deconstruction of English-language media to an examination of how a Chinese newspaper—the English-language China Daily—has been responding to the changing social, economic and political climate in China over the last decade. There are good reasons for focusing on the China Daily which will be looked at later. Not least of these, however, is the fact that, being written in English, the China Daily is susceptible to analysis by linguistic tools and methodologies developed for the English language.

There has been a huge amount of academic research aimed at deconstructing the way the English-language media function and this has resulted in the development of a range of sophisticated linguistic tools and approaches for the analysis of media texts written in English. Work has been done, for example, on challenging the idea that news coverage is the unbiased reporting of ‘hard facts’ (e.g., Fowler, 1991; Hall et al., 1978, 1980); on analysing what Fowler (1991) called the social construction of news through choices of what has ‘news value’ (e.g., Fowler 1991; Glasgow University Media Group, 1976; Philo 1983); and on the social and economic factors involved in news selection (e.g., Fowler, 1991; Philo, 1983; Cohen and Young 1973). More recently, the concept of framing has been used to analyse ‘the way events and issues are organised and made sense of, especially by media, media professionals and their audiences’ (Reese, 2001).
This study falls within the research tradition that has been able so effectively to deconstruct the western, English-language media, but seeks to apply some of the same techniques to the Chinese media, specifically the *China Daily*. The study uses corpus techniques to look at the use of the deontic modal language of power, obligation and permission—expressions such as ‘You must do such and such’; ‘you should / ought to / may do so-and-so’—in the *China Daily*, and specifically at the way in which this language is associated with, or put into the mouths of, Chinese establishment/authority figures whose words or actions are reported in the *China Daily*. The study compares two corpora of 50 *China Daily* texts—one corpus selected from 1998 and one from 2010—and uses a quantitative/qualitative methodology to look for evidence of statistically significant change between 1998 and 2010 in the way modal language is associated in *China Daily* reports with authority figures, and to interpret this evidence in the context of the changing social, political and media culture in China.

The corpus approach is not without problems. Chomsky’s objections are well-known. In a 2004 interview, he said: ‘Corpus linguistics doesn’t mean anything. It’s like saying... what they’re going to do is take videotapes of things happening in the world and they’ll collect huge videotapes of everything that’s happening and from that maybe they’ll come up with some generalizations or insights’ (quoted in Andor, 2004: 97). McEnery and Wilson (2001) accept that in any sample of a language variety there is a danger that it will be skewed, so that rare constructions may occur more frequently than is the norm. The effects of this, however, can be minimalised by being careful about data selection, they say—and a corpus approach has many benefits, not least that it ‘enables results to be quantified and compared to other results in the same way as any other scientific investigation which is based on a data sample’ (McEnery and Wilson, 2001: 75). Importantly for this study, which combines both a quantitative and qualitative approach, they argue that a corpus can be used as a source of both quantitative and qualitative data.

While it would certainly be possible (and interesting) to examine corpora of *China Daily* texts from several different time periods, so as to chart the progress of change and relate this to the prevailing economic/cultural/political conditions in China, for reasons partly of time and space and partly of focus, that has not been done here. The aim of this paper is not to produce a scale on which linguistic change in the *China Daily* can be mapped against economic
and cultural change year-by-year: that would require a different approach. It is to compare the *China Daily* at two discrete points in time: 1998 and 2010. The justification for choosing these two time points is that the economic, cultural and political changes in China that took place between these 12 years (and which are described in more detail elsewhere) are sufficiently significant to justify a study that examines corpora of texts from these two periods.

The study focuses on modality found in the context of what William Labov (1972) labelled ‘evaluation’—an aspect of the narrative structure of text that is revealing of the nature of the relationship between narrator (in a study of this nature, the journalist) and audience. It examines the type of modality used, and what this reveals about power relationships in China and the newspaper’s attitude towards authority figures; and also the textual context in which it is used (whether it occurs in direct or reported speech, or in the narrative and hence the journalist’s own ‘voice’) and what this reveals about the *China Daily’s* relationship with its audience.

This is not, however, a study of genre. It is an examination of the stance of a particular newspaper, the *China Daily*, towards power, as revealed through the use in its pages of the deontic modal language of power, obligation and permission. It is not, therefore, concerned with examining a range of different authors or genres. The term journalist is used throughout the study to refer to the author of newspaper texts: but it should be noted that in a newspaper, a published news text is actually the work of a series of individuals—the reporter, the sub-editor, the editor—who have all worked upon it, generally to constraints imposed upon them by the newspaper itself. The attitudes being examined in this study are those of the newspaper itself, not of any individual authors.

**The Media and the State in China**

The first decade of the 21st century was a period of extraordinary change and economic growth in the People’s Republic of China. The country emerged as a truly global power—a process exemplified by its joining the World Trade Organisation in 2001, by the Beijing Olympics in 2008, and by China’s overtaking Japan in 2011 to become the world’s second-biggest economy. International news media have tended to represent China as a nation swept along by consumerism, market liberalism, globalisation and technological convergence (Sun, 2008). China’s rapid emergence is often represented, in
fact, as a challenge to the existing financial and geopolitical order (e.g., Tkacik, 2012). But to what extent has China’s embrace of the market and of globalisation been accompanied by progress in democratisation of its media?

There has been great change in the way the Chinese media function over the last 20 years or so. Before Deng Xiaoping’s ‘second revolution’ in 1978, there were a limited number of media outlets in China—a few central-government published newspapers and journals and a network of ‘people’s radio stations’. These tended to follow an approved ideological line (Wang and Chen, 2008) and were generally restrained by both ideological controls and by the system of the planned economy, (Qian, 2011).

According to Chu Yingchi (2008), the role of the media in China began to shift after the introduction of the market economy in the 1980s. The Chinese media were encouraged to play a dual role, of serving the Party and the market—even if the Party remained the priority. News outlets were increasingly allowed to become multiple role players, Chu says, including the provision of information, entertainment and news. The student democracy movement of 1989, however, posed a challenge. Conley and Tripoli (1992) describe how, in the absence of regular meetings with Propaganda Department officials at the height of the crisis, the China Daily’s coverage, like that of other media outlets, fluctuated—at first cautious, then more bold, before the declaration of martial law on 20 May led to the re-establishment of a clear Party line.

Despite the re-establishment of Party control, the process of change that had been underway in the Chinese media before the student democracy movement continued and even accelerated (Chu, 2008). Gradually, the government began permitting the popular press to explore alternative and critical views. Nevertheless, by 1998, Zhao Yuezhi was writing that while there had been significant changes in the news media in China in terms of increasing variety and liveliness and a reduced explicitly propagandist content, the Chinese Communist Party still retained ‘overt political control’.

Before the first decade of the 21st century began, therefore, most commentators (e.g., Lee, 1990; Conley and Tripoli, 1992; Zhao, 1998; Li, 1999) agreed that Chinese journalists still enjoyed significantly less freedom from state control than their Western counterparts. The mainstream government-controlled and funded media were largely expected to put a positive spin on events that were reported (Zhang 1997; Conley & Tripoli 1992). China,
however, had already increasingly begun to open itself up to participation in
global economic competition through exports and foreign direct investment
and, in an attempt to establish a socialist market economy, the Chinese
government began pushing the nation’s media towards a more market-driven
model (Wang and Chen, 2008). The result has been an explosion of new media
outlets. By 2001, a new class of commercial media outlets was
emerging—outlets such as the Beijing Youth News, a newspaper which offered
lively reports about crime, sports, and economic successes (Smith, 2001). By
2005 there were nearly 2,000 newspapers, close to 9,000 magazines, almost
300 radio stations and more than 300 TV stations (Wang and Chen, 2008).
With the introduction of the Internet, almost all these outlets developed an
online presence as well.

The commercialisation and diversification of the media changed their
relationship with the state. The state continued legally to own most media, but
no longer so overtly directed their style and content. Under the dictates of the
market, media organisations that could no longer rely on state funding could
no longer simply act as dull party mouthpieces—they had to innovate and
come up with styles and contents that could help them attract readers and
increase circulation (Wang and Chen, 2008).

Marketisation does not necessarily equate with liberalisation, however. He
Qinglian argues that, since 2005, the Chinese government has exerted
increasingly tight control of the media. She cites the closure of a string of
media outlets since 2005, including Beijing News (Xinjing bao), Freezing Point
(Bingdian) and Shenzhen Legal Times (Shenzhen fazhi bao). Stockmann and
Gallagher point out that while commercial liberalisation and diversification of
media outlets may have changed the way news content was delivered, media
content still stuck close to the Party line by emphasising the positive. The
increased sophistication, diversity and even sensationalism of much modern
Chinese press coverage actually helped maintain regime stabilisation and
authoritarian resilience: ‘Official state messages and policy goals are far more
effectively conveyed and absorbed when presented as news...rather than as
the old-style propaganda of a Leninist state’ (Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011:
467). According to Lum and Fischer (2009), China’s increasingly
commercialised media outlets negotiate a delicate balance between
responding to growing public demands for information and remaining within
the bounds of what authorities will allow and advertisers will support.
Why China Daily?

The China Daily is China’s leading mainstream English-language newspaper. Its website claims an average daily circulation of more than 200,000, one third of which is abroad. The newspaper describes itself as ‘an important source of information on Chinese politics, economy, society and culture. It is often called the “Voice of China”’ (China Daily, n.d.).

Given its language of publication, and the range and diversity of news outlets that have emerged in China over the last decade or so, the China Daily may not be very representative of the Chinese print media generally. It is, however, an example of that section of the Chinese media—the large, mainstream, state-owned news outlets—over which the Chinese government still has most control. By its very nature, the China Daily is written for a foreign language-speaking audience, so could be said to be the mouthpiece for the Party in its efforts to communicate with the wider world (Chen, 2004). New US and UK editions of the newspaper have recently gone into circulation following a 45 billion yuan investment in overseas media by the Chinese Communist Party (Daily Telegraph, 2012), which is an indication of the newspaper’s importance in the eyes of the Party in terms of the way China is perceived overseas.

The China Daily is still subject to a degree of state control. The website China Detail claimed that a high degree of self-censorship is practised by its journalists, with subjects such as Taiwan and Tibet usually deemed ‘too sensitive’ to cover. Foreign editors of the newspaper have also been told that editorial policy is to support the policies of the Communist Party (China Detail, n.d.). The newspaper is not exempt from the commercialisation of China’s media industry. The China Detail website reports that, like most other state-owned Chinese industries, the newspaper and the publication group to which it belongs will no longer receive subsidies, and have thus adopted a more commercial approach, with editorial content being pitched increasingly towards a wider range of readers so as to attract more advertising revenues, (China Detail, n.d.).

For all these reasons, the China Daily thus offers a unique window through which to study the changing relationship between the Chinese state and media.
Modality and Attitude

Modality, according to Roger Fowler, can be informally regarded as ‘comment’ or ‘attitude’ (Fowler, 1991). He distinguished four types of comment/attitude expressed through modality:

- truth: statements expressing a conviction of certainty or otherwise
- obligation: statements in which the speaker/writer stipulates that his or her audience ought to/should/must perform certain actions
- permission: statements in which the speaker/writer grants or withholds permission: ‘You may do this…’
- desirability: the speaker/writer indicates approval/disapproval

As many researchers (Perkins, 1983; Halliday, 1994; Martin and White, 2005) have made clear, however, modal language encodes not only comment and attitude but also social relationships. Martin and White noted that ‘deontic’ modals of obligation and permission such as must, should, and may are bound up with relationships of power and control. But they are not simple commands, or imperatives. A modal statement ‘explicitly grounds the demand in the subjectivity of the speaker—as an assessment by the speaker of obligation rather than as a command’ (Martin and White, 2005: 111).

This acknowledgement that the deontic modal captures the speaker’s assessment of obligation, and therefore something of the speaker’s assessment of his/her relationship with those being addressed, is central to the argument of this paper. It is precisely because of this quality that such modals are revealing of a speaker’s perceptions of their relationships of power and control relative to others. In so far as journalists choose to associate such modals with speakers, they also reveal something of the journalist’s own perceptions of a speaker’s relationships of power with others.

This paper examines a particular aspect of modality—that occurring in the context of what Labov (1972) labelled modal ‘evaluation’—as it appears in the China Daily in 1998 and 2010. It looks for evidence of change in the use of modal evaluation over this period, and attempts to interpret it in the light of the changing social, political and cultural environment in China.

Modal Evaluation and Audience

This study is part of a larger programme of research aiming to develop a range of critical linguistic tools which can identify in newspaper texts key
linguistic indicators that reveal the social, political, cultural and commercial factors influencing the writing of those texts. My previous research has sought to identify a number of such indicators, and I have used them in the contrastive analysis of corpora of texts from the China Daily and the UK Times (Chen, 2004, 2005 and 2007) and from the China Daily in 1998 and in 2010 (Chen, 2012 and 2013). A number of discourse analytical tools have been chosen to carry out this work, based upon theories and approaches to understanding a text ranging from M.A.K. Halliday’s System of Transitivity (Halliday, 1994) to Labov’s work on oral narratives (Labov, 1972); from a simple analysis of type of person quoted (labelled the ‘sayer’, following Halliday) to a study of the use of direct speech. These tools were then applied to analysis of a range of indicators in the corpora of texts studied.

This particular paper is part of a pair of studies looking at what Labov labelled ‘evaluation’. This is a system for analysing the narrative structure of a text which is revealing of the relationship between the producer of that text (the speaker in an oral narrative; the writer in a written text) and their audience. The term, as Labov described it, refers to ‘the means used by the narrator to indicate the point of the narrative’ (Labov, 1972: 207). Labov developed this concept while studying speech patterns in New York. He asked subjects to record oral narratives in which they talked about personal experiences. When analysing these, Labov identified six structural elements that make up a narrative:

- the abstract, which sets out what a narrative is about
- the orientation—who, where, when, why, and what
- the complicating action
- the evaluation
- the resolution
- the coda

The evaluative element has to do with the way the speaker embellishes his/her narrative to make it more interesting. Evaluative elements, according to Labov, say to us: ‘This was terrifying, dangerous, weird, wild, crazy; or amusing, hilarious, wonderful; more generally that it was...worth reporting’ (1972: 209). As we will see later, texts rich in evaluation tend to be multi-layered and dramatically and emotionally engaging.

Use of evaluation is an important indicator of the nature of the relationship between narrator and audience because it suggests that the need to attract
and hold the attention of the audience is important to the narrator. Although Labov’s system was developed while analysing spoken English, I argued (Chen, 2004) that it could also be adapted for analysis of written texts. I developed an analytical approach (Chen, 2004 and 2012) based on the identification in texts of a particular category of evaluative linguistic device Labov labelled comparators. These provide a means for a narrator to embellish a narrative by placing the events/situations described against a wider background of possible events/situations that might or could or should have happened, but did not.

A variety of linguistic forms can be used by narrators as comparator evaluation. They include negatives, modal verbs, futures, and many more (Labov, 1972). In previous research (Chen, 2004), I focused on just three—negatives, futures and modal verbs—and described three categories of comparator evaluation based on these, as follows:

- negative evaluation (such as is not in ‘assisted reproduction is not a cure-all’, from the 2010 corpus of texts analysed). Negative evaluation places the events/situations described against a background of other possible events/situations that have not come about. Thus, it is conceivable that assisted reproduction might have been a cure-all for infertility, but in fact it is not.
- future evaluation (such as will make in ‘The mainland will make greater efforts towards further cross-straits ties’ from the 1998 corpus). This tends to be used when reporting on future events or possible developments.
- modal evaluation (such as should begin in ‘Taiwanese authorities should begin political discussions’, from the 1998 corpus). These enable narrator/author/speaker to express visions of the world as he/she believes it could, should or ought to be.

The results of my 2004 study revealed the different roles that the Times and China Daily played in their respective societies in 1998. The Times, a commercially-owned newspaper which faced competition from rival newspapers, questioned authority and was concerned with producing interesting, dramatically rich reports in order to attract and keep readers, made ample use of evaluation. The China Daily, in 1998 essentially a state-controlled newspaper that acted as a mouthpiece for the Chinese government and, being centrally distributed, did not need to spice up its reports to attract readers, used comparatively little evaluation (Chen 2004).
A subsequent article (Chen, 2012) compared that original corpus of 1998 *China Daily* texts with a later corpus of 50 texts selected from the same newspaper in 2010 to look for evidence of change in negative and future evaluation. I argued that the changes identified (a significant increase in negative evaluation between 1998 and 2010, coupled with a greater diversity of sayers in 2010) suggested that by 2010 the *China Daily* may have been starting to offer a broader diversity of perspective than in 1998; and also that it appeared more concerned to make its reports interesting and readable.

This paper complements that earlier study by focusing on modal evaluation—evaluation incorporating modal verbs that enable the narrator to express visions of the world as they believe it *could* or *should* or *must* be—which is revealing of attitudes (on the part of both sayer and journalist) towards power and authority, among other things. Future modals, having been dealt with in the earlier paper, are not included in this analysis.

**Methodology**

A total of 100 texts were analysed: 50 from the *China Daily* in 1998, 50 from the *China Daily* in 2010. A number of criteria for selection of texts were decided upon: texts were all between 250 and 700 words in length, about domestic news, and published online. In order to attempt to achieve what McEnery and Wilson (2001) referred to as a 'maximally representative finite sample', one which can provide as accurate a picture as possible of the language variety being studied (here, domestic news texts from the *China Daily*), I attempted, when selecting data, to minimise the risk of subjective choice. To this end, the first piece of domestic news for any day that satisfied the above criteria was selected: no other texts from that day were chosen.

The approach adopted to analyse the texts was both quantitative and qualitative. It was quantitative in the use of corpora containing statistically-significant samples of texts, which were analysed for evidence of significant differences in the patterns of use of modal evaluation in the *China Daily* between 1998 and 2010. To this end, instances of modal evaluation found in each of the 100 texts were recorded. They were assigned to one of two categories—deontic modals of obligation or permission such as *should, must* or the permissive *can*; and other modals, frequently of permission or speculation—and tabulated. A count was also made of whether the evaluation appeared in direct speech or reported speech (and hence could be attributed
to a person being quoted) or in the narrative itself (and hence was attributed to the journalist).

But the approach was also qualitative. Individual texts from each corpus that were particularly rich in the use of modal evaluation were subjected to a close qualitative textual analysis in order to better understand how the modal evaluation used was revealing of attitudes towards power and control, and also to consider what it revealed about the emphasis placed in texts on readability.

As stressed in the introduction, this is not a study of genre. It could be argued that to some extent, the modal language found in a news text may vary depending upon whether that text is an arts article, a news article and so on. All the texts selected for this study, however, were domestic news texts. They were selected according to the same criteria, and while the subject of texts did vary, Table 9 reveals that the subject range in the two corpora of texts was broadly similar.

**Findings**

The analysis revealed some striking quantitative differences between 1998 and 2010. These are summarised below and in Tables 1 and 2. Significance was calculated using the Proportion Test, unless otherwise stated:

- The overall frequency of modal evaluators increased from one every 210 words in 1998, to one every 137 words in 2010. This is significant (P<0.05).

- There was a change in the nature of the modal language used. In 1998, deontic modals of obligation or permission such as *must, should* and some forms of *can* made up more than half (56 per cent) of all modal evaluation. By 2010, they made up just 28 per cent. A Chi-square test reveals this change to be significant (P<0.05).

- There was a big increase, between 1998 and 2010, in the proportion of modal evaluation occurring in direct speech, from 12 per cent in 1998 to 42 per cent in 2010. This is significant (P<0.01)
Table 1: Types of modal evaluation in *China Daily* in 1998 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>China Daily 1998</th>
<th>China Daily 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deontic modals of obligation or permission</strong> (<em>must</em>, <em>should</em>, <em>ought to</em>, some forms of <em>can</em> or <em>may</em>)</td>
<td>44 (56% of modal evaluators)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other modals</strong> (<em>could</em>, <em>would</em>, <em>might</em>, some forms of <em>can</em> or <em>may</em>)</td>
<td>34 (44% of modal evaluators)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Modal evaluation in *China Daily*—direct speech, reported speech or narrative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>China Daily 1998</th>
<th>China Daily 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instances of modal evaluation</strong></td>
<td><strong>% of total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct Speech</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reported Speech</strong></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Narrative</strong></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evaluative devices are a way of dramatically enriching a narrative, and therefore of gaining and holding the reader/listener’s attention. Since modality expresses ‘comment’ or ‘attitude’, we would expect modal evaluation to bring to a text the richness of comment, opinion and attitude. When deontic modals such as *should*, *must*, *ought* and some forms of *can* and *may* are involved, modal evaluation also expresses relationships (or perceived relationships) of power, control and obligation. When other modals—for example of possibility or speculation such as *could* or *might* and other forms of
may or can—are involved, meanwhile, modal evaluation is neutral in terms of power, but makes possible the expression of hopes, or speculation about the future.

We would, therefore, expect that texts generally richer in modal evaluation would be more dramatically rich and interesting in terms of comment and attitude, their depiction of power relationships, the expression of hopes, and their ability to speculate about future states. That being so, the mere fact that there has been such a statistically significant increase in modal evaluation between 1998 and 2010 suggests that by 2010 the China Daily is producing texts that are more dramatically rich, interesting and readable. Much more is going on than just this, however.

**Interpretation**

*The modal language of power*

It might be anticipated that a newspaper that serves as the mouthpiece for an authoritarian regime would use a high proportion of deontic modals of obligation/permission—and in the 1998 China Daily, as Table 1 shows, that appears to be the case. There were fewer instances overall of modal evaluation in the 1998 China Daily compared to 2010: but a far higher proportion were deontic (56 per cent in 1998, compared to 28 per cent in 2010). The 1998 China Daily text richest in modal evaluation was text 2, a politically sensitive report on the importance of improved business relations with Taiwan. The modal evaluation found is set out in Table 3, together with its attribution.
Table 3: Modal evaluation in 1998 *China Daily* text 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribution</th>
<th>Modal evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese foreign minister</td>
<td>Taiwanese authorities <em>should begin</em> political discussions...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qian Qichen</td>
<td><em>any issue or topic can be discussed.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*both sides <em>should make</em> procedural arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>they can reach</em> agreements on the topics they feel <em>should be discussed</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>the ‘One China’ principal must be upheld...</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity <em>cannot be separated</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The mainland</td>
<td>*both sides <em>should begin</em> political talks...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under the formula...Taiwan <em>can maintain</em> its capitalist system...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*out of concern that Taiwan <em>may declare</em> independence...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What we have, in Text 2, is the Chinese government defining the terms for political discussions with Taiwan over cross-strait ties. There were only two identified speakers, Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen, and ‘the mainland’, code for the Chinese government. No alternative perspective appeared. Perhaps most dramatic of all, however, was the fact that all but one of the modals used were deontic modals of obligation or permission. Thus we have Qian saying that the Taiwan authorities *should begin* discussions (obligation); any topic *can be* discussed (permission); but China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity *cannot be separated* (permission). The bulk of the modal evaluation occurs in reported speech attributed to Qian. It presumably therefore reflects the language Qian used, as mediated by the journalist. Qian himself, through his choice of language, and the journalist, in the way Qian’s language is reported, leave little room for doubt that in their view Qian is in charge of setting the rules for discussion of cross-strait ties. The effect is to present the Chinese government as in a position of power and authority relative to Taiwan, demanding that Taiwan comply with the mainland’s position.

This, then, is the *China Daily* as government mouthpiece. This picture becomes clearer when we look at Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 lists every modal clause from the three 1998 *China Daily* texts richest in modal
evaluation—including text 2—and breaks them down into their constituent parts. Table 5 summarises Table 4 and divides the sayers into two categories—government sayer (government spokesmen, and government-owned organisations and their representatives, including the military); and non-government sayer (everybody else).

Table 4: Modal evaluation in the 1998 China Daily (top three texts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sayer</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Modal</th>
<th>Object or circumstance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Govt.</td>
<td>Non-Govt.</td>
<td>obligation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Text 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qian Qichen</td>
<td>Taiwan Authorities</td>
<td>should begin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qian</td>
<td>*any topic</td>
<td>can be discussed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The mainland</td>
<td>both sides</td>
<td>should begin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qian</td>
<td>both sides</td>
<td>should make</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He (Qian)</td>
<td>they (both sides)</td>
<td>can reach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Qian)</td>
<td>*they (both sides)</td>
<td>feel should be discussed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qian</td>
<td>*the ‘one China’ principle</td>
<td>must be upheld</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qian</td>
<td>*China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity</td>
<td>cannot be separated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Text 46</strong></td>
<td><strong>Beijing Securities Regulatory Commission (BSRC)</strong></td>
<td>net assets invested</td>
<td>should not be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Text 46</strong></td>
<td>(BSRC)</td>
<td>net profits</td>
<td>should be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Text 46</strong></td>
<td>(BSRC)</td>
<td>assets liability ratio</td>
<td>cannot be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Text 46</strong></td>
<td>(BSRC)</td>
<td>the candidates</td>
<td>must be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Text 46</strong></td>
<td>(BSRC)</td>
<td>(the candidates)</td>
<td>must be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Text 46</strong></td>
<td>(BSRC)</td>
<td>the interval between issue and flotation</td>
<td>can be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Text 46</strong></td>
<td>(BSRC)</td>
<td>B-share candidates</td>
<td>must be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Text 46</strong></td>
<td>(BSRC)</td>
<td>they (B-share candidates)</td>
<td>should also submit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Text 25</strong></td>
<td><strong>Narrator</strong></td>
<td>the total trade volume of art works</td>
<td>would equal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Text 25</strong></td>
<td><strong>Narrator</strong></td>
<td>the increase in auction companies</td>
<td>can only lead to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. Vice-chairman of the PRC's Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits.
2. Reporter for *China Daily*. 
Narrator management of the market should be strengthened
Narrator qualifications of auction companies should be strictly examined
Narrator training of agents and art dealers should be conducted
Narrator potential investors and buyers should keep their peace of mind
Narrator the auction market may be put in some kind of order

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Sayer</th>
<th>Modal of obligation</th>
<th>Modal of permission</th>
<th>Other modal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Government</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What Tables 4 and 5 reveal is clear. Every single sayer associated with a modal comparator in the three texts was a government spokesman or representative. And the majority of the modal comparators associated with these government sayers were modals of obligation or permission.

We have already seen, in text 2, Chinese vice-premier Qian Qichen presented, through the use of modals of obligation and permission, as being powerful enough to define the terms of political discussions with Taiwan. The modal language of texts 46 and 25 is equally emphatic. Headlined ‘Prospective listed firms must be profitable’, text 46 reports on a series of requirements imposed by the Beijing Securities Regulation Commission (BSRC), a branch of government, on Chinese companies wishing to issue shares to the public. Since
it essentially lists a series of qualifying requirements, the text consists of little more than a string of modals of obligation and permission, all attributed to the BSRC: qualifying companies *must be* in government-supported industries; they *must be* industry leaders; etc. The text displays little of the dramatic richness often associated with texts high in modal evaluation. But it does demonstrate the connection between modal evaluation of obligation and permission, and power: the text is presented in such a way as to make clear the BSRC calls the shots on the requirements for qualification. One of the trends noted by Chu (2008) in the Chinese media over recent years has been a shift from sender-centred to audience-centred media. This 1998 text, clearly, is sender-centred—it is all about the message.

Equally with text 25, headlined ‘Art auctions mushroom.’ Here, the only sayer is the *China Daily* journalist: there are no quoted sources. The journalist is classified as a government sayer because the *China Daily* was and is state-owned: and most of the modal evaluation is in the form of deontic modality of obligation. Text 25 is, like text 2, an example of the *China Daily* acting as government mouthpiece. It may seem odd to describe a report on China’s art market in this way. But the text itself makes clear art is big business: ‘The total trade volume of art works through auctions reached 1 billion yuan last year’. The concern of the government, however, is also clear: there are too many auction companies fighting for a share of this market. In text 25 the journalist, on behalf of the government, is essentially issuing a series of exhortations about how the art market should be regulated.

Importantly, the quantitative statistics in Table 1 and 2 above show that this picture—of government sayers issuing instructions or commands using the modal language of obligation and permission—is broadly repeated across the corpus of 1998 texts.

By 2010, however, the picture has changed. The percentage of modal evaluation that is of obligation or permission has fallen from 56 per cent in 1998, to just 28 per cent. There is also a much wider diversity of sayer associated with modal evaluation as is demonstrated in Table 6. The analysis reveals that, in contrast to 1998, only 11 of the 31 instances of modal evaluation found in the three texts are associated with government speakers: and of these, only three are modals of obligation or permission. This picture is summarised in Table 7.
Table 6: Modal evaluation in *China Daily* 2010—top three texts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sayer</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Modal</th>
<th>Object or circumstance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Govt.</td>
<td>Non-Govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Text 20</td>
<td>Analysts</td>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Analysts)</td>
<td>(China)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrator</td>
<td>massive scale of the holdings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrator</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>dumping its dollar assets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jing Ulrich</td>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jing Ulrich</td>
<td>the country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun Lijian</td>
<td>the country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He (Sun Lijian)</td>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun (Lijian)</td>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 Reporter for *China Daily*.
4 Managing director and chairman of China Equities and Commodities at JP Morgan.
5 Fudan University economist.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Zhu Xiaochun⁷</th>
<th>Policy-makers should raise</th>
<th>interest rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Commercial banks must keep</td>
<td>(more money) in reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qu Hongbin⁸</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>may continue to raise the requirement (for reserves)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qu</td>
<td>Interest rate hike</td>
<td>could come (in April)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qu</td>
<td>inflation</td>
<td>could be very serious</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic forecasts</td>
<td>China’s CPI</td>
<td>could be Mild</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysts</td>
<td>It (China’s CPI)</td>
<td>can rise 3 per cent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Analysts)</td>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>can still pick up</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

⁶ Economist at China Academy of Social Sciences.
⁷ Central Bank governor.
⁸ HSBC’s chief China economist.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nomura Securities</th>
<th>Inflation</th>
<th>could stabilise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Lan⁹</td>
<td>The possibility of interest rate hikes</td>
<td></td>
<td>would decrease</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Text 36</th>
<th>Yi Gang¹⁰</th>
<th>Gold</th>
<th>cannot be</th>
<th>a major investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yi Gang</td>
<td>Purchases</td>
<td></td>
<td>could push up</td>
<td>prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yi</td>
<td>the market price will surge</td>
<td></td>
<td>(which) would affect</td>
<td>consumers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The reports</td>
<td>gold purchases</td>
<td></td>
<td>could help</td>
<td>reduce the risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Xiu¹¹</td>
<td>it (China raising its holdings)</td>
<td></td>
<td>would cost</td>
<td>$300 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu</td>
<td>That</td>
<td></td>
<td>would account for</td>
<td>15 per cent of foreign reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some US legislator</td>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td>could gradually reduce</td>
<td>its holding of US treasuries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yi</td>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td>would keep</td>
<td>the currency steady</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yi</td>
<td>expectations of a stronger yuan</td>
<td></td>
<td>would intensify</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

⁹ Head of research at Changjiang Securities.
¹⁰ Head of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange.
¹¹ Senior metal analyst at China International Futures.
Table 7: Modal evaluation breakdown in *China Daily* 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Sayer</th>
<th>Modal of obligation</th>
<th>Modal of permission</th>
<th>Other modal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Government</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notably, there are actually more modals of obligation associated with non-government speakers than with government ones. Thus in text 20, headed ‘Caution urged on dollar assets’, we get Jing Ulrich of international bank JP Morgan gently advising that China *could be* more actively diversifying its currency reserves. Fudan University economist Sun Lijian is more robust. China *must have* enough resources to protect financial viability, he says. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences economist Dong Yuping joins in: China *must quicken* the pace at which it balances domestic demand and exports.

Much the same is true of 2010 texts 9 and 36. In text 9, headed ‘Rate of inflation still low’, there are two modals of obligation. In one, China (i.e. the Chinese government) tells commercial banks they *must keep* more money in reserve. In the second, Central Bank governor Zhou Xiaochun (a government sayer) talks about the ongoing debate among officials over when policymakers *should raise* interest rates. Set against these two modals of obligation, however, are a string of modals of possibility or speculation in which, as in text 20, a range of non-government experts speculate about likely future trends in China’s inflation rate. Text 36, meanwhile, has a single modal of permission—government sayer Yi Gang, head of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, saying gold *cannot be* used as a major investment—and a string of modals of possibility or speculation, some associated with Yi, others with non-government sayers.
The pattern observed—of government sayers only rarely using modals of obligation/permission; and of numerous non-government sayers (often academics) advising the government on what it should do—is very different to that found in 1998. And as Table 8 reveals, this is a pattern broadly replicated across the entire 2010 corpus: it is not true simply of these three texts. Where in 1998, 63 per cent of all modal evaluation associated with government sayers involved deontic modals of obligation and permission, by 2010 just 26 per cent of modal evaluation associated with government sayers was of this form. And where in 1998 fewer than one fifth of modal evaluation was associated with a sayer other than government, by 2010 almost half was.

Table 8: Deontic modals associated with government and non-government sayers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China Daily 1998</th>
<th>China Daily 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government sayer</td>
<td>Non-Government sayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deontic modals of obligation or permission (must, should, ought to, some forms of may or can)</td>
<td>40 (63%)</td>
<td>4 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other modals, including of possibility and speculation (could, would, might, some forms of may or can)</td>
<td>23 (37%)</td>
<td>11 (73%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>63 (100%)</td>
<td>15 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This appears, then, to be a genuine shift in the way modal evaluation is used. The question can be asked how truly independent of government are
sayers such as Fudan University academic Sun Lijian and economist Dong Yuping, who in 2010 text 20 are encountered advising the government what it should and must do? It is hard to know. Both are employed by state-owned academic institutions—but equally, they are academics, rather than Party or government representatives. In the 1998 corpus, there was not a single example of such an academic advising the government what it should do. Furthermore, many of the non-government-sayers advising the government in 2010—such as Jing Ulrich of JP Morgan—are unambiguously independent of the state.

Could the changing pattern of usage then be to do with the fact that the topics of the texts are different? The first 1998 China Daily text analysed qualitatively above, text 2, is about the highly politically sensitive topic of relations with Taiwan. It is unsurprising, in such a text, to find a high level of deontic modals associated with senior political figures. The other two 1998 texts analysed, however, deal with economic/financial matters (one with art as a business). This is little different from the three 2010 texts analysed, which all deal, in one way or another, with the economy and finance. The criteria for selection of the two corpora of texts were the same. And as Table 9 below reveals, there was no fundamental shift in the type of topics dealt with, apart from a decrease in 2010 in the number of finance-related texts.

Table 9: Comparison of topics of the China Daily texts analysed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>politics/ govt. policy</th>
<th>finance/ economics</th>
<th>other</th>
<th>international relations</th>
<th>sport</th>
<th>crime</th>
<th>arts</th>
<th>agriculture</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Modal evaluation in direct speech, reported speech or narrative

The other key finding of the statistical analysis was a statistically significant increase, between 1998 and 2010, in the proportion of modal evaluation occurring in direct speech, from 12 per cent in 1998 to 42 per cent in 2010.
At an obvious level, modal evaluation occurring in direct speech can be said to be the sayer’s own language, and hence is revealing of the sayer’s attitudes and perception of power relationships (though it may also be revealing of the journalist’s attitudes to the extent the journalist chose to report it). Modal evaluation occurring in reported speech is possibly the sayer’s own language, but as edited/interpreted by the journalist. Evaluation in the narrative is the journalist’s language, hence is revealing of the journalist’s attitudes and perceptions.

The use of direct speech as opposed to reported speech or narrative is revealing in a different way, however. Suzanne Eggins (1994) appears to posit the existence of a continuum of attitudinality of texts, from the highly attitudinal (spoken texts) to the minimally attitudinal (texts written to be read). Texts at the ‘attitudinal’ end, she suggests, are more approachable and ‘interactive’, while those at the non-attitudinal end tend towards distance and authority. Direct speech in newspaper reports is plausibly an attempt to capture some of the attitudinal nature of speech. Reported speech, being filtered and edited by the journalist, is less attitudinal and less dramatically rich. Texts which consist of narrative only, meanwhile, are minimally attitudinal.

The 2010 text with most direct speech modal evaluation (six instances) is text 26, headlined ‘Doubts over increase in property price’:
- ‘Only a 1.5 per cent increase? Shouldn’t it be 15 per cent?’ Zhang (company executive Zhang Lan) asked in disbelief.
- ‘An increase of 20 per cent from last year in a common, small town... is quite ordinary, let alone major cities like Beijing and Shanghai where the price could have soared by at least 50 per cent,’ he (Zhang Lan) said.
- ‘Property prices may differ greatly from city to city... and it is natural that people in different areas may have different views of the sector,’ said Qin Xiaomei of property firm Jones Lang LaSalle, Beijing.
- ‘As the accuracy of such statistics is key to policy making, the NBS (National Bureau of Statistics) could publish the pricing details of each city,’ said Carlby Xie, of property firm Colliers’ North China division.
- ‘Sale prices are likely to fall from mid-2010 as slower demand, higher supply and various government initiatives could dampen market sentiment,’ said Bei Fu, associate director of corporate rating at S&P.
These quotations, as you would expect when modality is involved, are full of opinions. Because the modality occurs in direct speech, these opinions are directly associated with named individuals. The fact that these are direct speech quotations rather than reported speech quotations, however, also puts them at the attitudinal end of Eggins’ continuum of attitudinality. The use of direct speech even allows a little of the character of the speakers to come through, especially in the case of Zhang Lan’s ‘Only a 1.5 per cent increase? Shouldn’t it be 15 per cent?’ The reader can almost hear the note of incredulity. This, then, is a text written in a style seemingly intended, in part at least, to be dramatic and interesting. This is evaluation in its purest form, producing a text peopled with real individuals expressing real opinions. But what about when modal evaluation is put in reported speech?

The 2010 China Daily text with most reported speech modal evaluation (seven instances) was text 9, already encountered, headlined ‘Rate of inflation ‘still low’. The modal evaluation found, almost all of it (seven out of eight instances) in reported speech, is set out in Table 6 above. Here, again, the modal evaluation is associated with identifiable sayers. However, they are often impersonal sayers (economists or analysts) or organisations rather than recognisable individuals with opinions, lives or idiosyncrasies of their own. Even when there is a named individual, Qiu Hongbin, as sayer, the fact that his opinion is expressed in reported speech divests it of real character or individuality. A typical example reads: ‘Qu said an interest rate hike could come in April because inflation could be very serious.’ The text is, in Eggins’s terminology, less attitudinal. The language by means of which Qu’s opinion is expressed is flattened and moderated, and much of the dramatic richness is lost.

Modal evaluation occurring in the narrative is different again. Interestingly, the 2010 China Daily text with most modal evaluation in the narrative (five instances) is text 35, headlined ‘Avatar is Chinese choice’. This is actually an opinion piece written by a named author, Raymond Zhou, identified as a ‘renowned film critic’. As such, it is in one sense highly individualised. As with the cases of direct speech modal evaluation seen above, it is clear that these are the opinions of a particular individual, expressed in that individual’s own language:

- People can read all kinds of messages into it (Avatar)
If we could vote, we would no doubt have made George Clooney the best actor. If a Hong Kong actress was so convincing in such a role, she would surely be recognised by her peers. Some swore that they would never eat shark’s fin again.

Nevertheless, the text is still less dramatically rich and complex than text 26 above: it presents only a single voice, rather than the multiplicity of (sometimes disagreeing) voices we had there.

It is interesting to compare this text with a 1998 China Daily text rich in narrative modal evaluation: text 25, headlined ‘Art auctions mushroom’ already encountered, which contains seven instances. The modal evaluation in this text, all in the narrative, is set out in Table 4 above. There is not a single sayer, whether individual or institutional, quoted in either direct or indirect speech. The result is a flat, sender-centred piece, which outlines, in statistical terms, the expanding art market in China—and then sets out, in authoritarian style, a strategy for reform of what is clearly seen by the Chinese government as an increasingly chaotic Chinese art market. The text is minimally attitudinal, and hence distant and authoritative.

As Table 2 above reveals, the bulk of modal evaluation in the 1998 China Daily (more than 50 per cent) actually occurred in reported speech, not the narrative as in text 25. A closer look, however, reveals that functionally this is often narrative modal evaluation at one remove, either by being associated with a single sayer—often a government spokesman—or attributed to another state-owned newspaper.

Almost half of all the modal evaluation occurring in reported speech in the 1998 China Daily—17 out of a total of 40 instances—occurs in just two texts: texts 2 and 46, already encountered. The modal evaluation in these two texts—almost all of it in reported speech—is also set out in Table 4 above. Apart from the fact that the modal evaluation is associated with Qian, the form and style of text 2 is in many ways similar to text 25. There is the same sense of a powerful authority saying how things must or should be; the same lack of alternative perspectives. This is again a case of the China Daily as mouthpiece: it is just that here, the government message conveyed is attributed to a single, identified individual—vice-premier Qian Qichen. The modal evaluation in text 46, meanwhile, is to all intents and purposes narrative in nature. The text is essentially a list of conditions which must be
met by companies that wish to issue shares to the public. The modal evaluation is categorised as reported speech rather than narrative only because the opening paragraph makes clear these conditions have been set out by the Beijing Securities Regulatory Commission.

Where it occurs in the remaining 48 *China Daily* texts from 1998, reported speech modal evaluation is often, as here, found in the context of texts setting out the government’s vision for how things should be. The overwhelming majority of modal evaluation in the 1998 *China Daily*—88 per cent, or 69 out of 78 instances—occurs either in the narrative or in reported speech in this way. In the entire corpus of 50 texts, there are just nine instances of modal evaluation in direct speech (12 per cent of the total), compared to 77 instances in the 2010 *China Daily* (42 per cent of the total). The contrast is striking, and, whether consciously designed or not, the effect is to make the 2010 *China Daily* texts studied more attitudinal, approachable and interactive, while the 1998 *China Daily* texts are more distant and authoritative.

**Conclusion**

The analysis above has identified a number of statistically-significant changes in the *China Daily* between 1998 and 2010 in the newspaper’s use of what Labov labelled modal evaluators—changes that I argue could well be revealing of the changing social and political factors acting upon the newspaper, and its response to them.

To recap, the key quantitative differences identified are as follows:

- A significant increase in the use of modal evaluation overall in 2010 compared to 1998.
- A significant change in the type of modal comparator evaluation encountered. There are proportionally far fewer deontic modals of obligation and permission in the *China Daily* in 2010 than in 1998, and many more modals of possibility and speculation.
- A significant change in the type of sayer associated with modal evaluation. In 1998, most sayers were government spokespersons. By 2010, a much greater range of sayers was encountered.
- A significant change in the type of modal evaluation associated with government sayers. In 1998, 63 per cent of modal evaluation associated with such sayers involved deontic modals of obligation and permission. By 2010 this had fallen to 26 per cent.
A significant change in the context in which modal evaluation occurs. In 1998, the bulk of modal evaluation occurred in the narrative, or in reported speech that was only one degree removed from being the voice of the narrator. By 2010, a significantly greater proportion of modal evaluation occurred in direct speech. These changes are interpreted as follows:

- The change in the use of modal evaluation of obligation and permission in the *China Daily* between 1998 and 2010 may reflect a shift in the social and political climate in China, which on the evidence of this study may have affected both the way senior government figures think about or present themselves and the way journalists at the *China Daily* write about them.

- The greater range of sayers using modal language may or may not reflect a growing government receptiveness to independent advice. It does, however, seem to reflect a willingness on the part of *China Daily* to represent a broader spectrum of opinions and perspectives.

- The increase in modal evaluation overall by 2010 may suggest that the *China Daily* is becoming more audience-centred, since the effect of evaluation is to create texts that are dramatically rich and interesting. This finding is underlined by the significantly increased occurrence of modal evaluation in direct speech: a contrivance which serves to increase the attitudinality of texts. The emphasis on readability that these changes suggest is not in itself indicative of changing media attitudes towards power and authority, but does perhaps reflect the fact that the newspaper in 2010 exists in a more market-driven culture: one in which there are a greater range of competing printed and other news media (including the internet) so that the newspaper is less able to take its readership for granted than it did in 1998.

The evidence may not in itself be sufficient to demonstrate that there has been a genuine shift in the power and status of government figures in China. The linguistic changes identified in this study may be no more than what the Chinese economist Zhang Weiying is quoted in a recent magazine article (Zhuang, 2013) as calling ‘linguistic corruption’—in other words, they may be evidence simply that the Chinese government is using its state-owned newspapers, such as *China Daily*, to make it seem as though change is happening, where none really is. But linguistic corruption or not, the evidence
does suggest that the way authority figures are presented in the media—or at least, in the *China Daily*—has changed. This may be a response, perhaps, to China’s emergence on the global stage and the Chinese leadership’s growing sensitiveness to how it is perceived by the international community. Even if the latter, however, it would seem to suggest that at the very least Chinese government figures and/or the *China Daily* feel the need to moderate the language of power associated with the governing elite. By 2010 the *China Daily* also clearly feels able to turn to a much wider range of sources than just government representatives when constructing news reports—a further sign at least of presentational change.

**References**


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